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Nothing Happens Everyday is an ethnographic study of the 
everyday in a lower court. The everyday in court was described by the 
women court users in my study as a spatio-temporal site where 
‘nothing happens’. Thus, this is an ethnographic study of the ordinary 
and ‘unperceivable’ of everyday in a lower court in Northern Mumbai, 
India. Drawing on Maurice Blanchot’s work on the everyday, this nine-
month ethnographic study of the everyday, of ‘empty-time’, of the 
discomfort, dreariness and boredom of sitting and waiting, follows the 
lives of women who encounter the Protection of Women from 
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and examines how women perceive and 
‘make sense’ of the law and everyday procedures. “Nothing happens 
in courtrooms. We only sit there all day,” was how women described 
their everyday encounter with the law, as everyday felt the same. The 
description of the everyday as unremarkable and as it is encountered 
in its quotidian moment is an analytical thread followed throughout 
this thesis, and I examine the perception of ‘nothing happens’ in light 
of the lived experience of the everyday through an embodied 
approach.   
The study argues that the examination of the routine and 
everyday experience of law sheds light on the disparity between what 
the law promises and what the law delivers, and what women seek 
from the law when they come before it. Thus, this study is a detailed 
exploration of what happens in the everyday in courts. What happens 
to those who come before it? How do women ‘reach’ the law, and why 
does the law remain out of reach? By focusing on everyday interactions 
and waiting, the project reveals law’s everyday inaccessibility, 





Chapter One   
Introduction 
 
The everyday is platitude (what lags and falls back, the residual life with 
which our trash cans and cemeteries are filled: scrap and refuse); but this 
banality is also what is most important, if it brings us back to existence in its 
very spontaneity and as it is lived-in the moment when, lived, it escapes every 
speculative formulation, perhaps all coherence, all regularity. 
 
Everyday Speech, Maurice Blanchot1 
 
This thesis is about the everyday of law. The everyday in law and the 
everyday of law was described by the women litigants in my study as a 
site where ‘nothing happens’. Thus, this thesis is an ethnographic 
study of the ordinary2 and ‘unperceivable’ of the everyday law in a 
lower court in Northern Mumbai,3 India. More specifically, I focus on 
the everyday encounter with the Protection of Women from Domestic 
Violence Act, 2005 (hereafter referred to as the Domestic Violence 
Law or Act) in a lower court in Mumbai, and how women litigants 
using the Domestic Violence Act perceive and ‘make sense’ of the law 
in the everyday context. “Nothing happens in courtrooms. We only sit 
there all day,” was the characteristic description of women litigants’ 
experience with the law, and everyday felt the same. That ‘nothing 
happens’ in courts is an analytical thread I follow throughout this 
thesis. From the perspective of the women court users, the feeling that 
                                                             
1  Maurice Blanchot and Susan Hanson, “Everyday Speech,” Yale French 
Studies, no. 73 (1987): 12–20, https://doi.org/10.2307/2930194. 
2 Scholars have differentiated between the ordinary and the everyday, arguing 
that the everyday refers to that which is repeated in succession, as opposed 
to the ordinary which is uneventful, but does not necessarily occur every day. 
For more, see Lorraine Sim, Ordinary Matters: Modernist Women’s Literature 
and Photography (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2016). 
3 In order to maintain my informants’ anonymity, the Magistrate court I 
studied and the specific ‘courtrooms’ I situated myself in for the period of 
my fieldwork, will be referred to generically as ‘the lower court’ and the 
geographical location of lower court as in Northern Mumbai. I will not 
identify the exact geographical location of the court or identify the court I 
studied.    
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nothing happens in courts relates to the disparity between what the 
law promises and what the law delivers, and this further differs from 
what women seek in court. Precisely, this study follows what happens 
to the legislative promises and guarantees of the Domestic Violence 
Act in everyday application, and in the adjudicatory site of the lower 
court where the Act is applied. By this I do not mean how the Act is 
being implemented, nor is this a legal analysis on the effectiveness of 
the Act, or its impact or how appellate judgements are interpreted. 
Rather, based on an ethnographic study of a Metropolitan Magistrate 
Court4 in Mumbai I examine the inevitable interaction between the 
everyday and the law, and how women litigants in my study 
experienced the adjudicatory process of seeking relief in court. The 
study was conducted for a period of nine months in three phases 
(January 2014 to March 2014, followed by the next phase from August 
2014 to December 2014, and the third phase in August 2015). 
The Domestic Violence Act was drafted with the objective of 
filling the gap in civil law, that is, a law that provides civil remedies to 
women in violent relationships, such as, economic relief, the right to 
reside in a home shared with the perpetrator or an alternative 
accommodation, compensation orders, and orders to stop violence 
immediately. 5  In opposition to criminal law, which focuses on 
penalising the wrong doer, the civil Act focuses on civil remedies to 
help women move out of violent homes, as women are in most cases 
economically dependent on violent relationships and often have no 
alternative home in which to seek shelter. Moreover, unlike a civil law, 
a criminal provision that sends the husband and his family to jail, 
completely breaks-down the possibility of reconciliation that women 
often hope for in cases where women use the law as a mode of 
intervention and stopping violence. This is related to the nature of 
                                                             
4  The Metropolitan Magistrate Courts are typically referred to as Police 
Courts and are the lowest courts on the criminal side. They were established 
under Section 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. At present, 75 
Metropolitan Courts are sanctioned according to the Indian e-courts website. 
These courts are situated in 16 court complexes spread across Mumbai. For 
more, see “History | Official Website of District Court Of India,” 
http://ecourts.gov.in/mumbai/cmm. 
5 For more on the objective and history of the Domestic Violence Act, see 
Indira Jaising, “Bringing Rights Home: Review of the Campaign for a Law 





civil law since, as opposed to criminal law under a civil Act, the dispute 
is between two parties and concerns the failure to fulfil certain duties 
and obligations. The dispute is filed for redressal of civil reliefs, like 
monetary relief, residence orders, or compensation for the emotional, 
mental or physical violence caused. The Domestic Violence Act grants 
women in all kinds of relationships the right to seek relief under the 
Act, including married women, women in live-in relationships, and 
sisters and daughters who may be victims of violence. Thus, the Act 
ensures that women can seek reliefs irrespective of the status of their 
relationships. 
The objective of the Act was to provide quick reliefs to help 
women escape violent relationships without necessarily breaking-
down the marriage. This included interim orders and a summary trial6 
that ensured a hearing date was fixed within three days of the 
application and the final reliefs granted within sixty days of the 
application. Quick reliefs in the form of interim relief were considered 
critical under the Act since civil reliefs under personal laws were often 
delayed. 7  Moreover, interim reliefs like the right to reside in an 
accommodation that may be shared with the perpetrator, or providing 
an alternative accommodation, along with protection orders and 
directing the perpetrator to stay away from the shared home, can be 
sought, thus providing women an escape from violent relationships 
while the court case continues. Economic rights in the form of interim 
monetary relief were seen as key to ensure that women are not left 
destitute after filing the Act against the perpetrator. Additionally, it is 
the first law that named and defined ‘domestic violence’, and it 
provides for a wide definition of what constitutes domestic violence, 
thus taking cognizance of the nature and depth of violence that 
women can suffer. This includes both acts of omission, or 
commission, or conduct meted out by the ‘respondent’ or the 
perpetrator that is physical and mental abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and 
emotional abuse, or economic abuse. The definition of the 
                                                             
6 The purpose of a summary trial is to ensure a speedy trial and quick disposal 
of a case without compromising on the principles of a fair trial. Procedure 
with respect to a summary trial is provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908. Under the Domestic Violence Act, the Magistrate has discretionary 
powers to direct a summary procedure.   
7  By personal laws I refer to community-based laws that govern matters 
relating to marriage, dissolution of marriage, custody, adoption and 
inheritance in a particular community, that is, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, 
Parsis, and Jews.  
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respondent under the Act is any adult male who is or has been living 
with the woman. 
My interest in the Act was to investigate whether the Act met 
its promise of greater accessibility and quick reliefs. What kinds of 
narratives were employed in seeking reliefs and did giving domestic 
violence a legal name change how cases were argued in courtrooms? 
Given the Act was modelled after the UN Model Code on Legislation 
to Prevent Violence Against Women, 8  were international human 
rights arguments recruited in courtrooms? My interest in studying 
doctrinal law in the first place was a question I became interested in 
while working for a non-profit organisation that monitored the 
‘impact’ of the Domestic Violence Act, and how the Act was being 
used, to what end, and how was it implemented. The NGO that 
assessed the ‘implementation’ of the Domestic Violence Act played a 
formidable role in drafting and campaigning for the passing of the 
Act. 9  The objective of my study though was not to study the 
‘implementation’ of the Act from the perspective of the kind of orders 
granted or reliefs sought, or how the key stakeholders implement the 
Act. The objective was to ethnographically map what happens to a 
globally influenced doctrinal state law in an adversarial, adjudicatory 
process in the everyday – is it transformed, or does it meet its 
emancipatory potential and the initial intention of its drafters? Does 
the focus on providing an avenue for civil remedies, by broadening the 
definition of domestic violence, shift the attention away from 
violence, and what discourses of violence should be recruited to seek 
a specific civil relief?  
This study thus examines what happens to the law in the 
everyday. My main argument in this book is that access to the law is 
an embodied access to the law, by this I mean that ‘who’ is critical to 
how accessible or inaccessible the law is. This accessibility to the law is 
gained through the senses, and the sensory experience of the law is 
located in a specific gendered body. I argue that access to the law is 
attained through the everyday, and the everyday in turn is accessed 
                                                             
8 The UN Model Code provides guidelines to draft a law including detailed 
definitions, rights and protection that should be included in the draft law 
protecting women from domestic violence. For more information, see the 
United Nations, ed., Handbook for Legislation on Violence against Women (New 
York: United Nations, 2010).  
9 For more, see Lawyers Collective, “Staying Alive,” Third Monitoring and 
Evaluation Report on the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 
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through the senses. Thus, senses are critical to our access to the law, 
and this sensory access to the law is interrelated to how does the law 
sense and how do ‘we’ in turn sense the law. The embodied experience 
of the law reveals the unpredictable, changeable and unequal nature 
of established legal categories, and in this thesis I take this argument 
forward. When the women litigants in my study describe their access 
to court as ‘nothing happens’, they refer to the variable nature of 
accessibility itself, and how the promise of doctrinal law is attainable, 
or unattainable, differently for different users. Thus, accessibility to 
the law is not merely a physical, linguistic, financial access to the law, 
but what accessibility means and to who. It differs in what women 
want from the law and what the law delivers, and includes an 
examination of why a civil Act that provided a wide definition of what 
is domestic violence fails to travel into courtroom arguments and 
discussions on ‘violence’ and change how violence is spoken about. In 
this thesis, I specifically examine why the Act remains out of reach, 
and I argue that the discourse on ‘access to justice’ should take into 
consideration the unstable and varied nature of everyday access itself 
to address the structural inequalities. This includes how women’s 
access to courts is determined by the kinds of narratives used in courts. 
The question of access to justice cannot be responded to 
without taking into consideration what takes place in the everyday, 
and what do guarantees of a fair hearing and a reasonable length of 
time translate into in the everyday. By closely looking at established 
legal concepts of a ‘hearing’, a ‘fair trial’, and ‘reasonable time’, this 
thesis argues that hearing and listening, the perception of judicial 
delay and ‘truth’, and accessibility to the law are variant. I demonstrate 
how these multiple meanings unravel in the courtroom. In the first 
few weeks of my fieldwork, I rephrased my research questions relating 
to ‘access’ and what accessibility means in the everyday. What happens 
when ‘what takes place’ in courtrooms is inaudible to a certain section 
of the public, namely, the litigants, and to what extent are the senses 
critical to this access. How do women make ‘sense’ of the law and what 
happens in the everyday? What senses does law recruit when it 
‘listens’, and how in turn does it control how we sense? Starting from 
this inaudibility, and its many meanings both architecturally, 
materially and phenomenologically, the focus moves to questions on 
accessing the law and how do we access the law through our senses. 
Thomas Scheffer forcefully argues that the spatial ordering in courts 
that positions bodies, voice and gaze is what influences performances 
and its reception. The court is essential to both scripting access and 
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co-producing narratives.10 It is this that essentially makes the court 
accessible or not accessible, irrespective of the objective and 
motivation of a doctrinal law.  
The question on how the law is transformed in and by the everyday 
lent itself to an ethnographic analysis of what happens in courtrooms. 
How the law is actualised in courts, and how hierarchy determines 
access were questions that I became interested in, specifically given the 
inequalities that the Domestic Violence Act sought to remedy. It is 
here that my interest in exploring how the Act was used in courtrooms 
took root in place of a mere doctrinal reading of the Act and reading 
lower court and appellate judgements. In this chapter, I lay down the 
theoretical foundations that are key in analysing and addressing the 
primary questions and key themes of this study. Each of the themes 
are further examined in more detail in the chapters that follow. I then 
proceed to provide an ethnographic description of the court and the 
spatial layout, followed by the fieldwork methodology, and the 
limitations and positionality of the study.  
Why does the everyday matter? 
 “Nothing happens in courtrooms. We only sit there all day,” was the 
characteristic description of women’s litigants experience with the law, 
as everyday felt the same. 11  This description of the law, as it is 
encountered in its quotidian moment is something I critically engage 
                                                             
10 Thomas Scheffer writes that courts are one of the co-producers of 
materiality, as each element from the written plaint, cross-examination, oral 
arguments and evidence adds to the case, and different materialities take 
precedence based on the nature of the case. For more, see Thomas Scheffer, 
“Materialities of Legal Proceedings,” International Journal for the Semiotics of 
Law 17, no. 4 (1 December 2004): 356–89, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-004-4958-4. 
11  Henni Alava’s doctoral thesis, “‘There is Confusion’: The Politics of 
Silence, Fear and Hope in Catholic and Protestant Northern Uganda”, 
which explores confusion as an analytical thread in post-war Uganda, helped 
me delve further into the significance of ‘nothing happens’ and what that 
means from the perspective of women court users. Alava reflects on 
confusion and the ambivalence that she encountered in studying violence in 
post-war Uganda. Writing about confusion, silence and uncertainty, she 
emphasises the epistemological and ethical need to recognise the complexity 
of studying violence and its aftermath as opposed to claiming to provide 
clear-cut answers. For more, see Henni Alava, “‘There Is Confusion": The 
Politics of Silence, Fear and Hope in Catholic and Protestant Northern 
Uganda”(PhD diss., University of Helsinki, 2017).  
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with throughout this thesis, and I draw on theoretical debates that 
shed light on the ‘everyday’ of the law. The everyday escapes our senses, 
as there is nothing to perceive and it “belongs to insignificance, and 
the insignificant is without truth, without reality, without secret, but 
perhaps also the site of all possible signification”.12  
I draw on literary theorist Maurice Blanchot’s work on how it 
is the insignificance of the everyday that makes it significant. The 
women litigants I closely followed in this study, though, described the 
everyday in law and their interaction with law in courtrooms as 
‘nothing’. ‘Nothing happens’ is a sensorial feeling of the “nullity” of 
the everyday, and everyday law is no different from this “tragedy of 
nullity”.13 The everyday for Blanchot presents both the “superficial 
and profound, strange and familiar, insignificant and fundamental, 
outside praxis yet the harbinger of anarchic energies”. 14  It is the 
everyday that presents the possibility of challenging and resisting. I 
argue that something does ‘happen’ in courts, even though it escapes 
our senses – that is essentially the nature of the everyday.15 It is in the 
repeated practices of case filing, appealing, responding and 
challenging that courts function. It is the succession of these activities 
that propels the case forward, and it is this succession that also breaks 
settlements and propels the closure of cases.    
By the emphasis on the everyday I mean what does the 
everyday law look like, what does it sound like? Does it have a distinct 
odour and how does it taste16? What about touch? Questions on what 
                                                             
12 Blanchot and Hanson,  “Everyday Speech,”14. 
13 Blanchot and Hanson, 11. 
14 Writing on Blanchot’s everyday Michael Sheringham observes that for 
Blanchot the everyday is insignificant and yet in the everyday lies the 
possibility of resistance. For more, see M. Sheringham, “Attending to the 
Everyday: Blanchot, Lefebvre, Certeau, Perec,” French Studies 54 (2000): 187–
99.  
15 Blanchot and Hanson, “Everyday Speech.” 
16 Writing about taste, Pierre Bourdieu links taste to social capital where ‘a 
sense of taste’, as it is often referred to colloquially, is correlated to social and 
cultural capital. He writes: “Taste, a class culture turned into nature, that is, 
embodied, helps to shape the class body. It is an incorporated principle of 
classification which governs all forms of incorporation, choosing and 
modifying everything that the body ingests and digests and assimilates, 
physiologically and psychologically. It follows that the body is the most 
indisputable materialization of class taste.” The aesthetics of taste and our 
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the law looks like, or how the law appeals to the sight have been asked 
before. My thesis focuses on the intimate connection between how 
women litigants sense the law, how they make sense of it, and how the 
law in turn senses. By this, I argue, we come to know and understand 
law through our senses and how we perceive the law is intimately tied 
to the question of how the law senses. Can you touch the law without 
being touched by it? Possibly not. Our sensations are constantly in 
dialogue with the world around us and respond to it.  
When I refer to the senses, I do not privilege one sense over 
another. I argue that all the senses need to be taken into consideration. 
By lending attention to one sense, we fail to consider how the senses 
work in tandem, overlap or contradict each other.17 Writing on law 
and the senses, Hamilton et al. similarly argue that this attention to 
the ‘taxonomy of five senses’ does not take into consideration the ‘gut 
instinct’, and how senses do not work in a discrete neatly-bound way.18 
Senses go beyond the five senses. Sensing is also an act of making sense 
of what we know, and trying to understand the world. The ‘gut 
instinct’ that forewarns us about something bad, is more linked to the 
‘stomach’ or what we may find difficult to digest as true or good. For 
instance, the lawyers I followed referred to a gut instinct as a kind of 
emotional and legal sensing. Is the legal sense then one kind of sense? 
A kind of sense that lawyers learn in the practice of law, raising 
questions like: Will this story appear believable to the court? or Is this 
woman telling the truth? How does this relate back to legal categories, 
in the case of this study specifically, how does the woman fit the 
category of a ‘victim’ or an ‘aggrieved woman’ defined in the Act? Or, 
                                                             
judgements, according to Bourdieu, are correlated to the social, economic, 
and cultural capital that we acquire through practice, and these aesthetics 
generate a habitus that guides our choices consciously or unconsciously. 
Likewise, by taste I refer to the habitus that plays a role in ‘taste’ and access. 
For more, see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of 
Taste (Harvard University Press, 1984) and Susanne Højlund, “Taste as a 
Social Sense: Rethinking Taste as a Cultural Activity,” Flavour 4 (26 February 
2015): 6, https://doi.org/10.1186/2044-7248-4-6. 
17 Tim Ingold makes a similar argument that in our daily perceptual practice 
our senses “cooperate so closely, and with such overlap of function, that their 
respective contributions are impossible to tease apart.” For more, see 
Timothy Ingold, “Against Soundscape,” Autumn Leaves: Sound and the 
Environment in Artistic Practice, 2007, 
https://abdn.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/against-soundscape. 
18Sheryl Hamilton et al., Sensing Law (Taylor & Francis, 2016), 5-6.  
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does it ring true when held against precedents in law or does a victim 
of domestic violence behave like that? This everyday ‘legal sensing’ 
refers to both normative and empirical aspects 19 that shift attention 
from ‘what we see’ to other modes of sensing that fall outside of the 
five-sensory classification. The lawyers I followed during the course of 
my study used this ‘legal sensing’ to know and differentiate between 
‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ when interrogating questions of fact and what 
counts as ‘truth’. This sensing is located in a particular body and in a 
particular experience.   
Departing from the dualism of mind and body, 20  I use 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work on how a ‘lived body’ is 
essential to the ‘primacy of perception’. For Merleau-Ponty the body 
is “the measurant (mesurant) of all, Nullpunkt of all the dimensions of 
the world”.21 For Merleau-Ponty, the body becomes a standard of 
perceiving the surroundings and the world, just as the world perceives 
the body, our perceptions are in relation to the body and how we make 
sense of the world. Writing on the use of body following Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of a ‘measurant’, Stephen Priest writes that the 
measuring instrument cannot measure itself: “That which perceives 
does not measure itself perceiving.”22 The perceptual world Merleau-
Ponty talks about does not exist in isolation inside our bodies, it 
communicates with those around us. Sensing is particular to who we 
are, and it resides in a particular spatio-temporality. For Merleau-
Ponty, sensing is not a fact or a belief. When we sense, it is a particular 
sensing body that is gendered, sexed, and resides in a particular culture 
and class context. This sensing body is not static but is located in a 
particular spatio-temporality. Thus, ‘who’ senses is critical to our 
experience of how law senses. It is, as Sara Ahmed notes, this lived 
                                                             
19  William Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (Northwestern 
University Press, 1994). 
20 Describing the unity of the mind-body habitus, Michael Jackson writes that 
when people speak of ‘losing their footing’ or ‘falling’ they are not physical 
metaphors of the mind, instead they give “evidence of the actual experience 
of disoriented Being”. He notes that metaphors disclose the interdependency 
of the mind and the body, the self and the world; they reveal unities. For 
more, see Michael Jackson, Things as They Are: New Directions in 
Phenomenological Anthropology (Georgetown University Press, 1996), 11. 
21  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Visible and the Invisible,”(Northwestern 
University Press, 1968), 248-249. 
22 Stephen Priest, Merleau-Ponty (Routledge 2002), 72. 
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experience that shapes bodies, gestures, dispositions or tendencies that 
appear to be repeated effortlessly, but are not. She adds, for Merleau-
Ponty and Edmund Husserl the lived experience was ‘sedimented 
histories’, and for Pierre Bourdieu, it was habitus that integrated the 
past with the actions and perceptions.23 She further adds that in the 
case of Judith Butler, it is in the performative inhabiting and dwelling 
of bodies that one witnesses the effects of social differences.24 Thus, 
women and the law mutually constitute each other. Yet, how a law 
catering to women is perceived by women, as opposed to men, is 
different, and how a law that seeks to correct the imbalance and 
inequalities between men and women and invert cultural norms that 
favour men, is also a specific experience of the law.  
Merleau-Ponty writes that the body is “the same flesh as the 
world”, that is, both of them perceive and are perceived, and are 
mutually constitutive.25 For Merleau-Ponty, human beings make the 
world over to themselves and to others;26 the phenomenological is 
thus an experience of the world we live in. This rejection of the 
dualism of mind/body, self/world, inside/outside, and the argument 
that the body and the world are relationally constituted, is critical to 
my argument on how the law senses and in turn also about how we 
sense the law, and who this ‘we’ is. This perception of the world is 
what anthropologist Paul Stoller has argued is also essential to the 
everyday of ethnography: we shift our attention from merely 
‘observing’ to an “experience-in-the world”,27 that is, a scholarly body 
that smells, tastes, hears, sees and where the mind/body dichotomy is 
dissolved.28 This ‘sensing by the law’ and ‘sensing the law’ then is as 
                                                             
23 Sarah Ahmed, “Orientations: Toward a Queer Phenomenology,” GLQ: A 
Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 12, no. 4 (1 January 2006): 543–74, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/10642684-2006-002. 
24 Ahmed, 552. 
25 Merleau-Ponty, “The Visible and the Invisible.” 
26 Jackson, Things as They Are, 11. 
27 Paul Stoller, Sensuous Scholarship (University of Pennsylvania Press 1997), 
xi. 
28 For more on this embodied ethnography, see Tim Ingold, The Perception of 
the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (Abingdon, UK: Taylor 
& Francis, 2000), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203466025; David Howes, 
“The Social Life of the Senses,” 2013, 20; David Howes, Sensual Relations: 
Engaging the Senses in Culture and Social Theory (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2003); Sarah Pink, Home Truths: Gender, Domestic Objects and 
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much about how I sensed, as opposed to an objective account of the 
field that achieves insight from ‘immersion in the field’ while retaining 
objectivity. An ‘embodied experience’ of the field that anthropologists 
like Stoller have urged for, where anthropologists direct their bodies 
and senses for ethnographic analysis is critical to this thesis. The 
exploring of how law senses and how we in turn sense the law unfolds 
through a detailed ethnographic study of law’s everyday life in a lower 
court in Northern Mumbai, and from the perspective of a specific 
encounter with the Domestic Violence Act. The physicality, 
sensoriality and spatio-temporal setting of the courtroom is essential 
to how the law senses, how it regulates our senses, and the senses it 
evokes in court users.29  
As I said, I was not sheltered from this sensorial experience of 
the court, the sense of hearing I talk about. The sluggishness with 
which time progressed is brought into my ethnography of the court 
and is likewise my experience of the court. Stoller has questioned the 
‘disembodied gaze’ of the scholar where the social scientist supposedly 
faithfully represents ‘what is’ without the mediated gaze of ‘what he 
saw’. When women litigants described their interaction with everyday 
law as ‘nothing’ of value, their description corresponded with my field 
notes from the first few weeks in court, where I described frequent 
adjournments and ‘not much happened today’ in the courts. I worried 
about how I would write an ethnography of a court where cases are 
only adjourned without any arguments taking place, and the sheer lack 
of ‘procedural’ stages expected in a trial. In the first few weeks in court, 
‘nothing happened’ in my perceptible gaze as a researcher expecting a 
trial. ‘Nothing happens in courts’ was also my initial response as I 
waited for something out of the ordinary to happen in court. But the 
ethnographic project seeks to record exactly that, the everyday.  
For instance, in Jane Fajan’s study on the Baining people of 
Papua New Guinea the previous work on the Baining was challenged 
on the grounds that it was not interesting, or worthy of studying since 
it lacked any specific belief systems and social structures. Fajan’s 
ethnographic study of the everyday life of the Baining people, who 
placed high value on the repetitive and mundane everyday work of 
                                                             
Everyday Life (Oxford Berg. 2004); Sarah Pink, “The Future of Sensory 
Anthropology/the Anthropology of the Senses: The Future of Sensory 
Anthropology,” Social Anthropology 18, no. 3 (16 August 2010): 331–33, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2010.00119_1.x. 
29 Scheffer, “Materialities of Legal Proceedings.”  
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food preparation and food-giving, revealed that for the Baining as a 
community it is in the everyday grind of repetitive work that they saw 
an essential quality that differentiated humans from animals.30 It was 
in recording the uninteresting and repetitive nature of the everyday 
life of the Baining people that Fajan discovered the importance of the 
everyday. Similarly, Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearne arguing for 
an everyday approach to the law, write that it is in the everyday that 
we find “what law is and can be”, and it is by studying the everyday 
that law’s problems and possibilities are revealed. 31  Thus, as with 
Blanchot, the everyday accommodates both action and inaction, and 
it is in the supposed ‘inaction’ and the uneventfulness of the day-to-
day that a lot happens and misses our attention.  
To summarise, in this introductory chapter I will examine the 
feeling of ‘nothing happens’ from the perspective of the everyday. 
From there, I divide the chapter into the main themes that I explore 
in the thesis. Given that the focus of this thesis is the everyday, I 
unpack what hearing in the everyday translates into and the role that 
courtroom space and language plays in this hearing and accessibility 
of law. I then proceed to examine waiting and being stuck in courts as 
an essential experience of women’s access to courts. Waiting in court 
is a particular spatio-temporal experience of time. The last theme 
explores what is meant by legal sensing, and what do lawyers rely on 
in the everyday practice in courts. The everyday lawyerly experience of 
courts for women litigants is not the same as it is for lawyers, for unlike 
the litigants, for lawyers a lot happens in courts every day.     
 
‘Nothing happens’ every day  
The recurrent refrain of women litigants that ‘nothing happens’ in 
courts was something I initially did not pay much attention to. What 
I found out, though, is that when litigants described ‘nothing happens’ 
they referred to a spatial and temporal void. This space-time vacuum 
was accompanied by the fact that litigants had to wait, appear in courts 
at a given time, and were rarely permitted to speak or actively 
participate in the trial as their lawyers did much of the talking. 
Sensorially their experience was empty, as there was ‘nothing 
                                                             
30 Jane Fajans, They Make Themselves: Work and Play Among the Baining of Papua 
New Guinea (University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
31 Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, Law in Everyday Life (University of 
Michigan Press, 1995), https://muse.jhu.edu/book/6331. 
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experienced’ in waiting as ‘nothing’ emerged from or after waiting. 
Women typically described their waiting in courtroom as: “Nothing 
happens. We just sit the whole day. Only documents are submitted” 
(kuch nahi hota hai. Hum sirf pura pura dhin waha baithe rehte hai. Sirf 
document submission hota hai) or “We have to show our faces and come 
back” (sirf mooh dekhake waapis aana hai). The physicality of waiting that 
requires them to be seated in a place for hours until the court takes a 
break or their case is called, is another aspect of waiting, where they 
physically and temporally found themselves ‘stuck’ with little else to 
do. This nothingness that they experience is the everyday boredom 
which they find themselves sucked into. Writing on everyday speech, 
Maurice Blanchot defines the everyday as “Nothing happens; this is 
the everyday.”32 He further queries what this non-movement might 
mean: 
For whom does “nothing happen” if, for me, something is necessarily 
always happening? In other words, what corresponds to the “Who?” of 
the everyday? And why in this “nothing happens” is there at the same 
time the affirmation that something essential might be allowed to 
happen?33 
Nothing happens then is a cue that something that should 
have followed didn’t happen. Something that is significant and worthy 
of reporting. The perceptible feeling of ‘nothing happens’ that women 
describe itself indicates having ‘waited’ for ‘something’ but ‘nothing’ 
took place. However, something did ‘happen’ in the courts, even if it 
was just the quotidian. The everyday life of the law lacks the grandiose 
ambitiousness of its doctrinal promises and guarantees. If anything, 
the everyday is dull and boring, especially for litigants who wait in the 
side lines. It is the overwhelming life of everyday law, where time seems 
to stand still, the case stagnates and one is incapable of deciding “if 
there is a lack of the everyday, or if one has too much of it”.34 The 
everyday escapes us because, as Blanchot writes, it is what we never see 
first time, it lacks the panoramic vision; it is when we perceive it that 
boredom manifests itself. It is when the everyday becomes perceptible 
that it becomes accessible to our senses. ‘Nothing happens’ is a 
description of what women perceived about everyday law. As Blanchot 
points out, it is important to consider for whom nothing happens. In 
contrast to women litigants, lawyers experience the everyday 
                                                             
32 Blanchot and Hanson, “Everyday Speech.” 
33 Blanchot and Hanson, 15. 
34 Blanchot and Hanson, 16. 
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differently. To begin with, something does happen, for that is the 
reason why they are in attendance in courts. The lawyerly and court 
time is of value, and lawyers are ‘busy’ and in a rush, this in itself 
indicates how much is happening in courts. Thus, the experience of 
the lawyerly everyday is different from that of litigants. The experience 
of the everyday itself is stratified, given that the experience of time and 
its non-movement that women express contrasts with the lack of time 
that lawyers have. Nevertheless, the question of for whom nothing 
happens is also a question that concerns the socioeconomic class and 
education of women. I discuss this later in the chapter when I write 
about the women I interviewed.   
The everyday for Blanchot presents a semiotic instability that 
cannot be reduced to a Yes or No binary, and therefore it resists 
analysis. The everyday eludes both perception and speech and “breaks 
down structures and undoes forms”.35 Blanchot’s reflection of the 
everyday as inescapable, yet beyond grasp, approaches the question of 
the everyday as an epistemological and ontological problem.36 The 
everyday thus constitutes law, as much as it is constituted by it. It is 
the ‘everyday’ that feeds into questions of how lawyers know evidence, 
and how they use that in the daily practice of law. The mundane is 
essential to this everyday knowledge of law. Lawyers regularly rely on 
this everyday knowledge of who is a ‘good’ judge and assess if the judge 
is likely to give a favourable verdict, or should the case be manoeuvred 
so as to have it transferred to another court to be granted a favourable 
verdict. It is this experience of the everyday that reveals what a hearing 
means in the everyday context, in opposition to the right to a hearing 
guaranteed in law. It also reveals how the everyday time is altered by 
waiting in court.   
I explore the above themes by studying the lived experience of 
the everyday, which is characteristic of anthropological methods. The 
study of the lived experience and everyday practices has implications 
for anthropological knowledge. It is in studying the uneventful and 
mundane of the everyday courtroom, rather than reading landmark 
judgements, that the nature of what takes place in the everyday 
courtroom is revealed. Yet, speaking of knowledge and querying how 
we know and what we know, goes back to questions of who we are, 
                                                             
35 Blanchot and Hanson, 17. 
36  Jen Hui Bon Hoa, “Totality and the Common: Henri Lefebvre and 
Maurice Blanchot on Everyday Life,” Cultural Critique 88, no. 1 (13 
November 2014): 54–78. 
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and what we sense. To know is a matter of perception, “there is no 
knowledge without someone who knows in a particular way,” writes 
anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup, reflecting on how anthropologists 
know.37 Like Merleau-Ponty, Hastrup sees the body as central to the 
primacy of perception, and one measures the world through one’s own 
measurement of it.  
The everyday law is what we witness in Franz Kafka’s short 
story “Before the Law”.38 James Martel39 writes that the law in Kafka’s 
short story is not the law with a capital l, but law with a small l: “Kafka’s 
parable invites us to think about what the law (in its ordinary “small 
l” sense) is when it is not connected to the Law, when it is experienced 
only in its banal ordinariness, its day-to-day mediocrity.” This Law with 
capital L is a Law which is “infused with justice”, and “it can be said 
to be a product of our expectation for justice”. The law that women 
litigants in my study experience is this everyday law with a small ‘l’. This 
law stands in contrast to the ‘Law’ before which they presumed they 
stood. Despite this, the power and control that everyday law yields in 
their lives as they stand before it, and the submission to this ordinary 
law with a small ‘l’, spirals their lives out of control. By talking about 
women’s engagement with law what emerges is how the determinacy 
of the Law coalesces with what they see as indeterminacy and 
inaccessibility in its everydayness. The interaction with the everyday 
law, if anything, reveals how unstable and ever-changing the legal 
definitions of established legal concepts are, such as, the right to a fair 
trial, the right to legal aid, reasonable time, or the right to be heard. 
How legal definitions and categories are experienced in the everyday, 
and how meanings are made and remade are beyond the control of 
the law. The everyday is ‘here and now’, in this it is both a spatially 
and temporally bound experience.   
                                                             
37  Kirsten Hastrup, “Getting It Right Knowledge and Evidence in 
Anthropology,” Anthropological Theory 4, no. 4 (2004): 455–472, 460. 
38 The short story, “Before the Law” appears in the “Cathedral” chapter in 
Kafka’s novel The Trial. As a stand-alone story, the story is about a man from 
the country trying to gain entry to the law through the door that is open, but 
is secured by a guard standing outside the door. He fails to gain access to the 
law because the doorman denies him access. From more, see “Before the Law 
by Franz Kafka,” http://www.kafka-online.info/before-the-law.html. 
39 James Martel, “Waiting for Justice: Benjamin and Derrida on Sovereignty 
and Immanence,” Republics of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, 




Spatial Arrangement and Inaudibility  
In this thesis I explore questions about how the law hears, what it hears 
and what it lends its attention to. I argue that the meaning of what is 
a hearing in court, and what kind of hearing takes place is 
reconstituted and redefined in the courtroom. With the aid of 
ethnographic explorations of the ‘trials’ I write on the many hearings 
in law. I start with a thick description of the inaccessibility of my own 
hearing to begin with, and then proceed to focus on the many ‘hearings’ 
in law. The questions and themes I delve into are based on the 
ethnographic study of the lower court, and on nine months of 
participant observations. At the very beginning, I focus on the nature 
of audibility and its correlation to how access in a courtroom is 
determined by who you are in the courtroom. I start with the physical 
space where cases are adjudicated, how the trial unfolds, and how the 
textual law and the written life of law hears and listens.40 I start with 
audibility and the inability to hear the proceedings in the courtroom. 
Spatial access determines audibility in court. The spatial 
hierarchisation of a courtroom impacts how we hear and how in turn 
the law hears us. What I essentially explore in this thesis is what Steve 
Feld has called the ‘sonic habitus’.41 Simply put, it means a sonic 
exploration of knowing and being in the world. The habitus refers to 
essentially what living and feeling as a person in a particular 
environment means, and how our knowledge, social and cultural 
experiences and sense of place influence how we hear, and what we 
listen to.  
                                                             
40 Files, as Chapter Four of this thesis will demonstrate, occupy a prominent 
position in the creation of truth in the discourse of law and as an evidentiary 
witness. For Cornelia Visman, it is not what is contained in the files that 
primarily interests her, but the materiality of the files: how they are 
constituted and how “files control the formalization and differentiation of 
the law”. Law and files, she writes, mutually determine each other. Law, for 
Visman, is not just a medium of resolving conflicts, but “a repository of forms 
of authoritarian and administrative acts that assume concrete shape in files.” 
Likewise, she writes, only “by turning into parchment codices, string-tied 
convolutes, or standardized chrome folders, do files acquire face, form, and 
format”. For more, see Cornelia Vismann and Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, 
Files: Law and Media Technology (Stanford University Press, 2008), xi- xiii. 
41  Steven Feld and Donald Brenneis, “Doing Anthropology in Sound,” 
American Ethnologist 31, no. 4 (2004): 461–474. 
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From the perspective of this thesis, I explore what the women 
litigants I followed during the course of my study heard and what they 
did not hear. What is ‘unheard’ and what is ‘inaudible’ has two 
different meanings. By the ‘sonic habitus’ and the soundscape of the 
court I situated myself in, I mean the social and cultural contexts of 
litigants: who they are and how they listen, what the physical, oral and 
written law listens to, and the city and its specific geographical location 
where the court is situated, in this case, the city of Mumbai. This sonic 
exploration and soundscape of the court also takes into consideration 
what the natural rights enshrined in the international human rights’ 
convention,42 such as the right to a fair trial, define the right to be 
heard.  
Here I am in agreement with Tim Ingold’s criticism of the 
problem with teasing out the senses individually, Ingold criticises the 
tendency of studies in visual culture that presuppose the power of sight 
in images, as if eyes are “instruments of playback”, and similarly the 
focus on soundscape supposes “the power of hearing inheres in 
recordings”.43 When I refer to the hearing and soundscape of the 
court in addition to the sounds of the courtroom, I refer to an 
embodied experience of what we hear and listen to. Charles 
Hirschkind, in his book on the ethics of sermon listening in Cairo, 
makes a similar argument.44 How we hear is tied to not merely space 
and time, but also to the normative ear of the law, and how certain 
narratives are more appealing to law. I will explore this in further 
detail in Chapter Three.  
Courtroom space is designed to enhance sounds, and to 
override, absorb, and block out unwanted sounds. As mentioned 
previously, the architectural space of the court I studied was 
paramount in asking the questions I pose in the thesis about law’s 
hearing. It was firstly the physical and spatial architecture of the court 
and the courtroom design that departed from the ornate, imposing 
cavernous doors and arched hallways that differentiate courts from 
other buildings that made this court both accessible and less 
                                                             
42 All key legal texts define the right to a fair trial, such as, article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. For more, see Chapter Three. 
43 Ingold, “Against Soundscape.” 
44 Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 
Counterpublics (Columbia University Press, 2006). 
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intimidating than others.45 The aural architecture, as Barry Blesser 
and Linda-Ruth Salter note, can itself determine the use of a space.46 
So, doors that are open, unguarded and not imposing indicate that 
the space is accessible to all. They write: 
 
Aural architecture can also have a social meaning. For example, the bare 
marble floors and walls of an office lobby loudly announce the arrival of 
visitors by the resounding echoes of their footsteps. In contrast, thick 
carpeting, upholstered furniture, and heavy draperies, all of which suppress 
incident or reflected sounds, would mute that announcement. The aural 
architecture of the lobby thus determines whether entering is a public or 
private event. When applied to a living room, those same acoustic attributes 
convey a different sense: cold, hard, and barren, as contrasted with warm, 
soft, and intimate.47  
 
The spatial design of the court and courtroom reflects the 
purpose of the space, and by whom the space should be used. The lack 
of gatekeepers and security checks at the court entrance, and the free 
movement of people who do not have to justify their presence in the 
court premises, itself makes the lower trial court more public. Yet, the 
courtroom design has invisible markers that make it obvious what the 
space is for. The slight elevation of the witness box that is higher than 
the public but lower than the Magistrate’s table is itself an indication 
of how the acoustic status of the witness is different and higher than 
that of others, yet lower than that of the Magistrate. As Blesser and 
Salter write, social functions and cultural values determine the sensory 
aspect of architecture. While the setting of the courtroom is the same, 
the slight elevation in the witness box changes the acoustics, the mood, 
and how the voice of the witness travels across the room: it is a voice 
that should be heard in the trial.        
                                                             
45 Here I refer to the rather imposing and ornate Gothic style structure of the 
High Court of Bombay. The High Court was established in 1862, and was 
one of the first high courts to be established in India.  
46  Barry Blesser and Linda-Ruth Salter, Spaces Speak, Are You Listening?: 
Experiencing Aural Architecture (MIT Press, 2009), 3. 
47 Blesser and Salter, 3-4. 
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Spaces affect the physical properties of sound waves. 48  And yet, 
listening as opposed to just audibility and hearing, is also a matter that 
needs to be evaluated in its cultural context: who is listening, who is 
speaking and for what purpose and to what effect? Blesser and Salter 
write: “Understanding aural architecture requires an acceptance of the 
cultural relativism for all sensory experiences.”49 Thus, architectural 
acoustics are not limited to the physical structure of how courts are 
designed, but also to how law functions by enhancing certain voices 
and hindering and concealing others. I will demonstrate how this is 
done through the way in which courtrooms are spatially arranged to 
exclude and marginalise voices, and how the law procedurally permits 
only certain voices to be heard and turns a deaf ear to others50. This 
filtering of certain voices is essential to the functioning of the law. It is 
achieved by stalling, obstructing and delaying some voices through 
temporal delays, and by enhancing other voices by shaping narratives 
so that they appeal to the normative in law.   
Writing on the role of architecture in sustaining power 
relations, Linda Mulcahy observes that in courtroom design spaces are 
segregated to create private zones inaccessible to the public both by 
physical separation and with regard to sightlines. Such arrangements 
“are all architectural embodiments of control in which notions of 
‘visibility’ become a ruse”.51 Thus, courtroom design with its raised 
floor, separation between the judicial podium and the public, private 
entrances and exits for judges and lawyers is a manifestation of how 
power is preserved and inequality sustained. David Evans, writing on 
the architectural body of law, observes that law with its lines, borders, 
categories, and inclusions and exclusions, is a manifestation of legal 
                                                             
48 Blesser and Salter. 
49 Blesser and Salter, 3. 
50 For a discussion on the role that architecture and spatial arrangement play 
in justice, see Linda Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the 
Place of Law (Taylor & Francis, 2010); Paul Rock, “Witnesses and Space in a 
Crown Court,” The British Journal of Criminology 31, no. 3 (1991): 266–79. 
51 Linda Mulcahy, “Architects of Justice: The Politics of Courtroom Design,” 




abstraction.52 It is through court architecture, writes Piyel Haldar, that 




...it is through the symbolic power of architecture that the outside world of 
imaginary events, the chaos of the exterior, comes to be reduced to the 
immobility of representation and a monitored order. This juridico-
architectural movement reflects that dimension, a moment of contrast 
between the court house and the disruptive conditions of city dwelling, 
between the monument of a tradition and the fragmentary nature of the 
postmodern subject, where in the words of Bertolt Brecht; “[t]he streets are 
loud, the court is still54 
 
In this court in Mumbai though, the outside and inside world 
intermingled. The walls, doors and windows did not limit sounds 
coming from the outside, making the court more accessible, breaking 
down barriers, and making it sonically dense and complex. At least at 
the first encounter with this court, the ‘door’ to the court was open. 
In Franz Kafka’s short story “Before the Law”, a man from the country 
asks “to gain entry into the law”: 
Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the 
country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he 
cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and then 
asks if he will be allowed to come in later on. “It is possible,” says the 
gatekeeper, “but not now.” At the moment the gate to the law stands open, 
as always, and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in 
order to see through the gate into the inside. 
 
                                                             
52  David Evans, “Theatre of Deferral: The Image of the Law and the 
Architecture of the Inns of Court,” Law and Critique 10, no. 1 (1 January 
1999): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008834110997. 
53 Piyel Haldar, “In and Out of Court: On Topographies of Law and the 
Architecture of Court Buildings,” Revue Internationale de Semiotique Juridique 
7, no. 2 (1 June 1994): 185–200, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01816606. 
54 Haldar, 187. 
21 
 
In the story the ‘door’ and the ‘gatekeeper’ serve as powerful 
metaphors of access and denial in law.  This is a powerful motif from 
the perspective of my thesis, as the women litigants seek what is 
obviously accessible in the law as articulated in the language of rights, 
but these rights fail to have sensorial effect. In Kafka’s The Trial, the 
bewildering labyrinth of rooms with endless corridors is another 
example of the architectural impossibility to ‘reach’ the Law.55 The 
inaudibility of the trial, and what I write about as an ethnographer 
concerning the audible inaccessibility of the law is also my own 
experience. The bewilderment of how the court works in the first week 
of my fieldwork, the lack of audibility in the seat allocated for the 
public attending the trial, or the failure to witness the unfolding of a 
‘trial’, are my experiences of law’s inaccessibility as much as those of 
the women who stood before the law. This inaccessibility plays out at 
several layers and levels: in the language of law, in its institutional 
form, in its sensual, temporal and spatial life, in other words in its day-
to-day materiality. Peter Goodrich has similarly suggested that the 
question of language must take into account other signs, like 
architecture, dress, ceremony and the rituals that accompany legal 
tradition. In the languages of law, the spoken word is the word of law, 
and language is that of the institution. 56  
 
Hearing, listening and waiting in court 
As I have argued, courtroom spatialisation is an essential consideration 
concerning audibility and how sound travels, where it reaches and 
what remains out of bounds. The sounds that are heard in the lower 
courtroom are not merely from within the confines of the courtroom, 
they also include sounds from outside the court and from beyond the 
jurisdictional borders of the court. The snarls of the traffic snarls and 
the calls of vendors escape the physical borders and precincts of the 
court. They leak in and make themselves heard even when they have 
no business to be there. And yet the courts are all about regulating and 
                                                             
55 Kafka’s The Trial is a novel about Josef K, who is summoned to court for a 
crime that is not revealed to him. Kafka’s novel is a parody of the laborious 
and lengthy legal system, in which the protagonist is embroiled in a legal 
system without having any knowledge of his crime. Throughout, the law 
remains inaccessible and indecipherable to him. For more, see “The Trial by 
Franz Kafka,” http://www.kafka-online.info/the-trial.html. 
56 Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logic to Memory to Nomadic Masks 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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controlling sound: who speaks and who does not, who hears and who 
is heard and when are all essential to the procedural functioning of 
the law. The only actor that is permitted to speak out of turn is the 
judge, although what judges are essentially supposed to do is to hear 
and deliver orders. This leaking of sounds that escape the 
jurisdictional control of law, is an acoustic architectural failure of the 
law to control, subjugate and efface sounds that it does not want to 
hear. The law seeks to regulate and control the experience of sounds 
in the courtroom by the use of the gavel, with notices to “SWITCH 
OFF THE MOBILE PHONE”, “KEEP SILENCE” but as Hamilton et 
al. argue, “the sensorial leaks out of those efforts or dances around 
them altogether”.57 
‘Sound’ by its very nature escapes the control of law, by 
slipping in and being heard. Indeed, the very nature of what we hear 
and what we don’t is beyond the control of the law. Thus, for the 
women litigants in my study, how they heard the law and what they 
heard is beyond law’s jurisdictional control, even though they stood 
before the law. By this I mean how the law comes alive and the degree 
to which it is visible is different for different people. By visible I do 
not speak of the sensory organ of sight alone, but how the effects of 
the law impinge on the sensorium. The way in which the law becomes 
embodied and implanted governs the lives of those women who seize 
control by using the law, and yet lose control when the law takes effect.  
The law also governs the way in which their lives and the stories they 
tell are structured in the language of the law, acquiring an aurality not 
entirely of their own making. They are heard and yet not heard.  
In the words of Peter Brooks,58 the law limits and formalises 
the conditions of telling and listening. “In modern judicial procedure, 
stories rarely are told directly, uninterruptedly. At trial, they are 
elicited piecemeal by attorneys intent to shape them to the rules of 
evidence and procedure, then reformulated in persuasive rhetoric to 
the listening jurors.”59 So, what matters is what Brooks calls ‘narrative 
transactions’ that is the way in which the narratives are transmitted 
and decoded, “that is, stories in the situation of their telling and 
listening, asking not only how these stories are constructed and told, 
but also how they are listened to, received, reacted to, how they ask to 
                                                             
57 Hamilton et al., Sensing Law. 
58  Peter Brooks, “Narrative Transactions – Does the Law Need a 
Narratology,” Yale JL & Human. 18 (2006): 1. 
59 Brooks, 27. 
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be acted upon and how they in fact become operative. What matters 
most, in the law, is how the “narratees” or listeners—juries, judges—
hear and construct the story. 60  This ‘narrative transaction’ pays 
attention to how the law listens, and what it listens to. What counts 
in hearing though is also how the women litigants listen. How we learn 
and know whether justice has been done or not done is a subjective 
experience of the law.  
Having addressed the lack of audibility in the courtroom, I 
analyse the discrete and yet connected issues relating to a hearing in 
court. Does the language have a bearing on the nature of a hearing in 
court? Does the nature of a hearing change when the oral 
examinations are translated into a written record of what transpired 
in the courtroom? Firstly, the translation from the oral into the written 
record of the court is a translation from Marathi (the official language 
of Maharashtra) into English. 61  Secondly, the court record erases 
confrontations, reprimands by the Magistrate directed at the witness 
or sometimes towards the cross-examining lawyer not to mislead the 
witness or ask ambiguous questions, and insults that are 
commonplace in cross-examinations and courtroom talk are similarly 
erased. Thirdly, the Magistrate dictates to the transcriber what is 
happening in the public courtroom into words that are considered 
better suited for a record of the law, such as rephrasing questions and 
rephrasing monosyllabic Yes and No into passive sentences. Finally, 
what appears in the written record of the court is what the court listens 
to. It is what is read at the time of giving a verdict by the Magistrate, 
what is read by lawyers, and what appears in the court record that is 
considered of value. The rest as far as law is concerned is superfluous. 
In contrast to the hearing that takes place, the women litigants 
I closely followed desired a different kind of hearing than the one 
provided to them in courts. Both the hearing they receive in court and 
the hearing guaranteed under the right to a fair trial differs from the 
hearing they expected and desired in court. One of the primary 
questions I examine is what does the right to a fair hearing and the 
right to be heard mean in an everyday context, and how is it 
                                                             
60 Brooks, 34. 
61 The official language of the higher courts is English. For lower judiciary, 
the court language can be the state’s official language. In the lower court, 
often three languages were used, English, Hindi and Marathi. Much of the 
use of the language also depends on what is the primary language of the judge 
and the lawyer.  
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experienced sensorially. To begin with, I ask what does hearing mean 
when the women I studied said that they were not ‘heard’ in court. To 
examine what hearing translates to sensorially in its everydayness is to 
unpack the very meaning of what rights guaranteed in law mean. I 
analyse the multiple hearings and the many layers of what a hearing 
implies in this thesis.  
I approach the question of hearing and access by attending to 
the spatio-temporal context, and what access and hearing mean in this 
spatio-temporality. The question of how courtroom space is structured 
and designed has to be seen in a spatio-temporal frame too. The 
experience of time for the women litigants I closely followed in my 
study is a spatially located experience, and without the court space the 
passage of time and waiting would not be the same. For instance, 
waiting for a train at a train station as opposed to waiting for the case 
to be adjudicated and relief to be granted colour how time progresses, 
unfolds, or lingers. Likewise, the sonic dimension of the courtroom 
functions within a specific spatiotemporal frame. 
The question of how the law hears, and what it hears, is within 
a specific spatio-temporal frame, and cannot be responded to without 
understanding how we hear the law. When I write about the spatial 
hierarchisation of the courtroom, I argue that this spatial segregation 
of who takes centre stage and who is marginalised also determines who 
speaks in court, and who is heard and who is considered worthy of 
court time. The soundscape of the Mumbai courtroom includes both 
sounds that escape regulation and leak into the courtroom, sounds in 
the legal trial that the textual law did not envisage, as well as sounds 
that are regulated by the court, such as who stands where and who is 
allowed to speak. The spatial hierarchy functions independently of the 
law that permits litigants to argue their own cases, for under the 
Advocates Act 1961 persons can defend themselves and argue their 
own case in any court of law. In one of the courts I attended, a woman 
who had filed a case under the Domestic Violence Act barged in, 
interrupting an ongoing trial, and insisted on arguing her own case as 
the law permitted her to do so. She argued that she was exhausted 
waiting, and could no longer afford a lawyer, especially with the 
constant delays either because of her lawyer, or because the 
respondent’s lawyer did not appear in court. Waiting was not merely 
a matter of physical waiting. Waiting endlessly for hours and years on 
end is intensified by the matrimonial discord that litigants were 
seeking – but were unable– to escape. The Magistrate denied her the 
opportunity to speak, insisting that she should be represented by a 
lawyer.   
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Gut, legal sensing and narratives  
“How can you tell truth from falsehood in the absence of any 
documentary evidence?” I asked one of my lawyer informants. The 
usual response was: “After so many years of practice I can tell this 
much ya,” or “We can smell it,” (soogh lete hai). This reference to 
smelling something foul or being able to recognise a dubious ‘truth’ is 
a sense lawyers often referred to. The lawyers I interviewed referred to 
a highly refined ‘legal sensing’ that they had acquired through the 
practice of law. While my informant was referring to her sense of 
smell, the other senses were complicit in being able to recognise 
falsehood. The story had to be tasted, chewed and ingested for it to 
pass muster. In determining truth from falsehood the lawyers use their 
‘gut’ feelings, by this I do not refer to one single sense but to senses 
working in tandem. These feelings are developed in legal practice and 
represent a kind of knowledge that is a consequence of legal practice. 
In answer to my questions about how they knew something was 
suspicious, they often referred to more than one sense. They had “seen 
it with their own eyes”, it was “a sense of smell”, it came from their 
“gut”. It was a legal sensing that they had acquired through lengthy 
practice in law, a sense that a novice would lack. It is implicated in a 
particular cultural context and in a particular practice. In the 
Bourdieusian sense it was ‘the aesthetics of judgement’. It is this 
aesthetics of sense that Bourdieu refers to that is implicated and 
ingested physically and psychologically in a particular body. That is the 
purpose of apprenticeship with a senior lawyer who imparts this kind 
of ‘legal knowledge’ to apprentices that a study of doctrinal law does 
not provide.  
Writing on his apprenticeship in Songhay sorcery, Paul Stoller 
notes how power is passed on to the apprentice through a magic cake 
(kusu), a kind of millet made of pulverised plants. Consuming the kusu 
confers the apprentice with ancestral power.62 Lawyers similarly refer 
to this consuming and smelling something foul that is related to the 
gut when they assess ‘truthfulness’. In assessing whether the court will 
believe a story or whether this is how domestic violence victims usually 
behave, or whether in examining the violence narrative it meets 
evidentiary requirements, they employ their ‘gut’ and sense of smell 
that come together in a particular kind of legal sensing. This legal 
sensing requires an astuteness in transmitting and decoding stories, 
but it also entails an understanding of how they are listened to, 
                                                             
62  Paul Stoller and Cheryl Olkes, In Sorcery’s Shadow: A Memoir of 
Apprenticeship among the Songhay of Niger (University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
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received, and reacted to, how they ask to be acted upon, and how the 
stories become operative.  
This is what Brooks calls ‘narrative transactions’, namely how 
narratives are transmitted and decoded: “In modern judicial 
procedure, stories rarely are told directly, uninterruptedly. At trial, 
they are elicited piecemeal by attorneys intent to shape them to the 
rules of evidence and procedure, then reformulated in persuasive 
rhetoric to the listening jurors.”63 What matters most, in law, is how 
the ‘narratees’ or listeners — juries, judges — hear and construct the 
story.64 This ‘narrative transaction’ pays attention to the senses of law, 
that is its aural sense, visual sense, its evidentiary sense, its ‘gut’. It is 
this legal sensing that the lawyers in my study also referred to, a sense 
that is indistinguishable from other senses and cannot be assigned to 
one sense alone. 
In the next few sections I will present the Magistrate Court or the 
lower court that was the site of my study, and follow that with the 
fieldwork site and methodological overview. This also takes into 
account my position as a researcher.  
Field site: The Lower Court 
In the first few weeks in Mumbai, I met many lawyers working on the 
Domestic Violence Act. The purpose was not merely to discuss the Act 
but also to understand which court they usually work in. The lower 
court (hereafter referred to as the Magistrate’s court or court) was 
situated in the eastern part of a suburb in Mumbai. The court was 
surrounded by low-income government and private housing, 
commercial buildings and middle-class apartment blocks. Located off 
a busy road, the court was a building that faced a noisy bustling street 
and was in close proximity to the railway station, like most Magistrate 
courts in the city. One of the courtrooms in which I sat overlooked a 
foot over bridge that connected the road to the station nearby. There 
was a constant ebb and flow of traffic on the road, and at peak hours 
long traffic jams were common.  
There were four Magistrate courts, each of them numbered. I 
shuttled between the courts often depending on the matter at hand.65 
                                                             
63 Brooks, “Narrative Transactions – Does the Law Need a Narratology,” 27. 
64 Brooks, 27. 
65 The four Magistrate courts functioned in four separate rooms, and have a 
common office staff, even though the transcriber and court clerk were 
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I learnt early enough on the first visit to a lower court that if I wanted 
to hear or witness the proceedings in the lower courts I would have to 
be seated in the first rows of the courtroom within hearing distance of 
the judge.66 The lower courts have none of the imposing architectural 
grandeur of the High Court of Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the 
High Court) and the Indian Supreme Court.67 Often enough situated 
on main streets with ongoing traffic, the outside world of traffic jams, 
commuters, goods being sold and everyday goings on creeps into the 
courtroom partaking in court proceedings. To hear above this daily 
din is a challenge for those not seated in the front rows. Inside the 
court corridors, the sounds of children crying, loud chattering 
between clients and lawyers and bantering between lawyers is 
frequently heard.  
Unlike High Courts, lower courts are not air-conditioned. 
There are no security checks and practically anyone can go in or out 
of the courts. In one of the court corridors on a sultry afternoon, a 
black and white stray dog strolled back and forth, much like the 
lawyers, before settling down under a low-hanging fan in the foyer 
between the two courtrooms. As I learnt later, he was a constant 
feature in the court waiting rooms, especially in the summer months, 
and he often sat undisturbed under the fan in the hall waiting area. 
Moreover, unlike the higher courts, the lower courts have a rather 
basic infrastructure. The high courts have monitors in every court 
room that display the ongoing cases in other rooms. These monitors 
help the lawyers, who often have cases running simultaneously in 
many courtrooms, to keep track. On the other hand, in the lower 
courts, lawyers often scurry between different courtrooms to check if 
their case serial number has been called out.   
Although I had visited the High Court and the Supreme Court 
previously, this was my first visit to the lower criminal courts. From 
the road leading to the court complex, male lawyers, typically dressed 
in black gowns, white shirt and trousers approach persons who look 
like litigants and are dressed in ‘non-lawyerly’ attire. The first day that 
                                                             
different in all courts. The four courts were located in the same building and 
on two separate floors and were collectively referred to as ‘the lower court’ 
by all lawyers.      
66 Pratiksha Baxi also writes about how audibility in a courtroom is based on 
privilege. Pratiksha Baxi, Public Secrets of Law: Rape Trials in India. (OUP, 
Delhi, 2014). 
67 The Supreme Court is situated in the country’s capital, New Delhi. 
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I visited the Magistrate courts, I was accosted by various male lawyers 
selling me their legal services to me, much like an Indian street vendor 
might do. Given that soliciting by lawyers is illegal in India,68 the 
lawyers do not approach you directly, but casually drop key words 
while passing, indicating the services they can render, such as drafting 
an affidavit, notarising a document, and so on.69 Male lawyers typically 
stand outside the courts waiting around for clients, as opposed to 
female lawyers, who do not found wait outside or solicit clients. 
The Court and the courtroom’s spatial layout 
The court building was an eight-storeyed building. Two courts 
(referred to as 1 and 2) were located on the ground floor and the other 
two courts were on the first floor of the building (referred to as 3 and 
4). On the first floor was a court office where the court registrar and 
other office staff that worked in the courts were located. On the 
ground and the first floor there were toilets that were initially out-of- 
use and later under repair. This meant that none of the litigants, 
including women with young children, had access to toilets. The staff 
toilet that was on the first floor was only for court staff and was locked. 
On the second floor, there was a chamber reserved for practising 
lawyers, a chamber for only women lawyers, toilets for lawyers, and a 
small canteen that only lawyers or court staff had access to. The floors 
from the third floor upwards were occupied by another court.70  
In all four courtrooms the Magistrate was seated on a higher 
platform along with a clerk and a transcriber behind a computer. The 
Magistrate seated on an elevated platform occupied the central 
position in a rectangular room. Below the Magistrate’s table was a 
table shared by lawyers and by police on court duty; the police sat 
facing the lawyers. This was followed by two rows reserved for lawyers, 
and three rows for the public, including litigants. In addition, on one 
side of the Magistrate there is a long bench reserved only for women 
and on the opposite side of the room there is another bench that was 
occupied by male litigants. There was an elevated witness box facing 
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69 The purpose of notarising a document is to authenticate it. The notary 
validates legal documents by signing and affixing his seal. The public notary 
is appointed by the state or by the central government.    




the Magistrate in all four courtrooms and all four courtrooms had a 
dock reserved for the accused at the opposite end with “cage of the 
accused” written on it in Marathi (aropacha pinjra). The walls of most 
courtrooms indicate the cardinal points – North, South, West, East. 
North is where the Magistrate sits.71 Above the Magistrate there were 
framed photographs of Indian leaders, Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi, Bal Gangadhar Tilak72 and a regional leader, Shivaji.73 On 
one side the windows there was a calendar in Marathi, Hindi and 
English hung on the wall, which the Magistrate, his staff and lawyers 
referred to when agreeing on the next date for a particular case. There 
were usually three calendars hung in a row next to each other.74  
In both courtrooms, green files or court dockets of settled or ongoing 
matters were strewn on the floor, under tables, and on top of 
cupboards. Files wrapped in cloth or bundled together with string 
occupied a substantial amount of space. The dockets like litigants 
encircle the square courtrooms lying on the margins of the room floor, 
pushed against the wall. Underneath chairs and tables, dust settles on 
these pale green files. The court clerks brought the files beforehand 
based on the matters before the court on that day.  
Fieldwork and Methodology 
As previously mentioned, this thesis is based on three phases of 
fieldwork for a total of nine months altogether. The last field visit 
mainly consisted of follow-up interviews. The primary objective of the 
third visit was to inquire into the status of the cases I was following, 
and whether they had been disposed of or settled. I also conducted 
                                                             
71Mulcahy shows how in the earliest illustrations of court space there were 
four categories in the courtroom: the judge who was accorded the highest 
status sat on a raised platform reserved for higher ranking officials, then came 
court officials of varying categories, followed by lawyers and litigants as the 
third category. The last category was for spectators, who were seated at the 
margins of the courtroom. For more, see Mulcahy, Legal Architecture. 
72 Bal Gangadhar Tilak was a national leader who fought the British for 
Indian independence.  
73 Shivaji was a regional leader who in recent years, especially after the growth 
of linguistic politics in Maharashtra and the change in the name of the city 
from Bombay to Mumbai, has acquired great political significance. See 
Chapter Three for more on this. 
74There were sometimes three to four calendars hung on the wall in English, 
Hindi and in Marathi. 
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follow-up interviews with the female litigants after the case had settled 
or disposed of.  
In the first phase of the fieldwork, I visited five trial courts in 
the northern suburb of Mumbai. These courts were not in close 
proximity to each other and were located in distant suburbs of the city. 
For three weeks, I observed multiple proceedings under the Domestic 
Violence Act in these courts before narrowing down to one lower 
court, where I decided to locate my study. Reliefs under the Domestic 
Violence Act are sought in Metropolitan Magistrate courts; Magistrate 
courts deal with criminal cases and are the lowest courts on the 
criminal side. The court I chose was selected for a number of reasons. 
It was mainly recommended by lawyers working on the Domestic 
Violence Act owing to their experience with the court. According to 
them, this court was a ‘functioning’ court, where cases ‘progressed’, as 
opposed to merely being a place where dates were doled out. Secondly, 
while domestic violence cases were heard throughout the week, at least 
two of the four courts (these courts function more as courtrooms and 
are referred to as the lower court collectively) had a day allocated 
specifically to hearing only domestic violence cases.75 The court was 
shut on the second and fourth Saturday of every month. Once I 
identified the lower court, I located myself specifically in these two 
courts, which functioned from 11 am to 5 pm from Monday to 
Saturday. My main task involved conducting participant observations 
of the everyday court proceedings. This involved taking detailed notes 
of ongoing domestic violence cases, namely how the trial commenced, 
the nature of the arguments, what kind of evidence was presented, 
how the court dealt with such cases and how do 
lawyers/judges/litigants respond or react, and generally how the court 
proceedings were conducted and the day-to-day functioning. This 
included observing what took place in court corridors as lawyers and 
litigants chatted, and conversations I overheard in women lawyers’ 
chamber.  
Within a period of nine months I witnessed 83 cases. These 
cases were in different phases, either in the application stage, the 
evidence production stage, the argument stage, or the cross-
examination stage. Sometimes I may have merely witnessed a cross-
examination without learning anything additional about the case or I 
just attended the final arguments. There were days in court where I 
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only witnessed adjournments, that is, lawyers seeking another date to 
respond to an application made by the opposite side or sought another 
date because of an absent client or lawyer. I did not include those cases 
in the above number, unless I heard at least some argument, or the 
lawyer expressly argued for another date and provided a reason for it. 
Witnessing several cases at different stages offered an understanding 
of how cases were handled irrespective of lawyers or the paying 
capacity of litigants. I witnessed how different cases proceeded, what 
role various actors played in the case proceedings, and gained a general 
perception of how long on an average a case would take to be disposed 
of. I did not always have an opportunity to approach the lawyers whose 
arguments I witnessed in court. As for litigants, most of them were 
reluctant to talk to a researcher. The best way to approach litigants 
and gain their trust was through their lawyers. Sometimes I 
approached the lawyers in court corridors or spotted them in the 
chamber reserved for lawyers in courts. I would typically introduce 
myself and my work to every lawyer I approached. Often a lawyer 
would introduce me to another lawyer. But many introductions and 
conversations would often start in the courtrooms themselves with 
lawyers sitting next to me. It was in the courtroom that I met the 
lawyers – Tara, Nidhi, Hina, Manju, Varun – whose cases and style of 
working and practices I came to follow more closely. I followed the 
five lawyers closely through the course of my study, following the 
domestic violence cases they argued, interviewing them formally and 
informally as I hung-out in their offices at length, and interviewing 
their clients.  
The lawyers I closely followed appear at various stages in my 
chapters, including the clients I met through them. Of the five lawyers, 
at least three women lawyers, Nidhi, Hina and Manju, took cases of 
women whose financial ability to pay was limited. Hina and Manju’s 
clients primarily belonged to the Muslim community. Nidhi only took 
the cases of women litigants and did not defend men. Tara, on the 
other hand, defended both men and women who belonged to a higher 
economic stratum. Her clients would often appeal against lower court 
verdicts in the higher court. Tara had defended famous Hindi movie 
celebrities. Varun’s clients also consisted of men and women who 
came from a financially comfortable background and were highly 
educated. He was one of the few lawyers whose office was in the 
vicinity of the High Court in southern Mumbai. The women litigants 
I met through these lawyers thus belonged to different religious 
backgrounds and differed considerably in the education they had 
received. The financial backgrounds they came from were equally 
diverse. Yet, in order to survive the rigours of court – the waiting, the 
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delay, the emotional and financial strain of litigation – these women 
had to be economically, socially and emotionally capable.  
In addition to my extended case-study method that followed five 
lawyers and a series of women and their cases through the period of 
the fieldwork, 76  I also conducted semi–structured interviews with 
twelve lawyers during the period. With some of them I had lengthy 
interviews that I conducted in their offices, and with others our 
conversations took place in the courtroom itself or in the lawyer’s 
chamber in the court building that was part of the common area. 
These included conversations that started in courtrooms, and 
sometimes led to long unstructured interviews outside of the 
courtroom. At least five of the twelve lawyers I met and interviewed on 
several occasions, and this included attending their cases. None of the 
interviews were audio recorded as many participants were not 
comfortable about giving a recorded interview.  
It was through the five lawyers mentioned above (who for ease 
of reference I call lawyer informants) that I met the eight women 
litigants of my study. I followed their cases at different stages, 
interviewed them repeatedly and also had informal conversations with 
them. In total, I followed twelve women litigants during the fieldwork. 
Not all appear in this thesis, and not every conversation with every 
woman and every lawyer finds its way into this thesis, although almost 
all the eight women litigants I write about reappear in several chapters 
of this thesis. In this thesis, I specifically write about the stories of 
Sameera, Zarna, Farzana, Preeti, Simran, Sharon, Meenakshi and 
Swagata. Sameera, Zarna and Farzana, all Muslim women who were 
married at a young age. They had all received a basic education, and 
Zarna and Sameera had studied further and aimed to work after their 
marriages had broken down. Their respective brothers accompanied 
them to court and to their meetings with lawyers. Preeti, Simran and 
Swagata, on the other hand, were professionally qualified and were 
financially independent even prior to their marriages. Sharon, who 
lived with father, was a graduate and worked in a private company in 
an administrative position. Preeti was an award-winning dentist and 
Simran had studied management and worked for a technology 
                                                             
76 The extended case method entails following cases involving the same actors 
through a certain period of time. The purpose is to trace the case in its social 
context. Baxi, specifically, discusses the extended case method in her 
ethnographic study on rape trials, showing how it provides an opportunity 
to map changing legal norms. For more, see Pratiksha Baxi, Public Secrets of 
Law: Rape Trials in India. (OUP, Delhi 2014).    
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company in Delhi before moving to Mumbai when she married. 
Meenakshi, for her part, started working part-time after her divorce 
and lived independently with her children.  
Predictably, access to competent lawyers was based on the 
women’s socioeconomic status and education. Higher status in these 
respects increased their access to courts, ensuring quicker relief and 
sometimes better monetary relief. Yet, almost all the women I studied 
who lasted the court hearings had social support, the financial 
capability to come to court for a hearing, and had accommodation in 
the interim period before they received any relief. Post-colonial 
feminist scholars such as Chandra Mohanty have challenged a 
common analytical category of ‘women’ that can be cross-culturally 
and universally applied, arguing that not all accounts of gender 
inequality are homogenous.77 Similarly, women’s access to courts is 
determined by a number of potential factors, such as the women’s 
socioeconomic status, caste, religion, and education. Such factors 
affected the degree to which they were able to wait-out and access 
courts, or not to wait and to opt out. These options were based on 
who they were and were subject to the gendered dynamics and 
inherent power that is vested in the Indian legal system. Greater 
financial capability often meant that their time was more valued both 
by lawyers and by the courts. 
Not all the cases I write about were completed by August 2015, making 
it all the more imperative that the name of the court and its exact 
geographical location in Mumbai remains concealed. It is also 
important to note that in at least seven of the eight cases I followed, 
the cases were already ongoing. I witnessed these cases after the interim 
application stage, apart from Simran’s case, where settlement 
negotiations were still ongoing when I met her. The purpose of my 
visit in August 2015 was to follow up the women litigants and their 
lawyers concerning the status of their cases. 
In all cases, I have used fictitious names for both lawyers and litigants, 
and have made every effort to erase identifiable institutional or social 
markers. 78  As far as language is concerned, in places where the 
                                                             
77 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship 
and Colonial Discourses,” Boundary 2 12/13 (1984): 333–58, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/302821. 
78 This thesis has also benefited from a formal interview I conducted with 
two Magistrates. Both Magistrates spoke to me reluctantly. I also attended a 
mediation meeting between parties along with Varun, one of my informant 
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conversation took place in Hindi or Marathi, I have translated these 
conversations into English. As far as interviews are concerned, the 
majority of my interviews with litigants took place in Hindi. In certain 
cases, I have retained the original language or phrases in the original 
language to ensure that the gist is not lost in translation, but in most 
cases I have translated these conversations into English.  
 
Researcher Positionalities 
After two days of being seated on the back rows of the courtroom, I 
began to wear the barrister’s bands that lawyers practising in courts 
wear, and that forms an insignia of the legal profession.79 This white 
neckband afforded me a privileged spatial position in the courtroom 
spatial hierarchy, that is, the front row seats reserved for lawyers only. 
From the first row I could witness the proceedings more closely, being 
now able to hear the arguments and exchanges between lawyers, the 
Magistrate and litigants that otherwise could not be heard in the back 
rows. However, even from the front row seats I often had to strain to 
hear what was being said. Then again, some of these proceedings were 
lost either due to my initial inability to keep up with the fast-paced 
arguments or because the constant switching of languages by all 
participants made it difficult to follow the trail of words, as an 
argument or dialogue could start in one language and end in another. 
But while the benefit of being seated in the front row was the audibility 
of ongoing matters, at the same time it distanced me from the litigants 
seated behind.  
The barrister’s bands provided legitimacy for my presence in 
the courtroom, and a sense of purpose in the eyes of other lawyers. It 
                                                             
lawyers. In addition, I attended a meeting between a High Court judge and 
Tara and her client, where the judge was persuading the woman litigant to 
agree for a lesser settlement, since her husband was unwilling to budge, and 
the case would go on endlessly without any possible resolution. I also 
interviewed the same judge at a later stage.  
79 An oblong two-piece neckband is worn by both lawyers and judges in India. 
Made of white cloth, it is referred to as barrister’s bands. Chapter IV of the 
Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 specifically lays down the dress code to be 
followed for male and female lawyers when appearing in court, and one of 
the requirements is these white bands. It additionally regulates that the 
colours and design permitted in court may be “white or black or any mellow 
or subdued colour without any print or design.” For more, see “Bar Council 
of India Rules,” http://lawmin.nic.in/la/subord/bci_index.htm.    
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regulated the gaze that can otherwise be intimidating. Nevertheless, as 
a new lawyer and a woman lawyer in a criminal court, I stood out. 
Lawyers tend to practise in the same courts, and thus are familiar with 
judges and court staff and other colleagues. The gaze that followed me 
was often the lawyerly gaze that did not recognize me as a ‘regular’ in 
the court, nor did I accompany a senior lawyer, that would have 
immediately located my ranking and area of practice. My lack of files 
or cyclostyled green dockets and my frantic note-making often drew 
the attention of lawyers sitting next to me. I was a subject of attention 
and generated much curiosity, unlike litigants. From the court staff to 
lawyers, my lack of familiarity and my not having been seen before led 
to questions and stares. Was I apprenticing with a senior lawyer? Who 
did I work for? Was I a sole practitioner? What was I writing in my 
notepad? These were among the questions I often fielded. Often, the 
lawyer sitting next to me would peer into my notebook to see what I 
was writing. Sometimes I would be mistaken for a law student. On one 
of the late evenings when I was waiting for a mediation that was to 
take place after court hours, the court staff waiting outside the 
Magistrates’ office asked me why they had never seen me before and 
what kind of matters or cases did I specialise in.   
Inside the courtrooms, it took a while to understand the 
bureaucratic and administrative functioning of the court proceedings. 
As someone who has studied law, I assumed that the court day-to-day 
functioning would immediately be understandable. However, it took 
me a week in court to learn that court procedure began the day by 
‘calling all matters’, and then ‘keeping back’ matters for arguments for 
later in the day. Thus, lawyers would typically first run through the 
day’s board to see what matters were coming up, and I started 
following this lawyerly rhythm of studying the board to see what 
matters are to come up later in the day as it helped me to plan my day 
better. I could arrange meetings when the board was being ‘called out’ 
and return to court when matters were ‘kept back’ for arguments. The 
‘calling of the board’ often meant announcing all matters reserved for 
that day. Often matters reserved for a date did not take place either 
because of absent parties, absent lawyers, lack of time in court for an 
argument or lawyers wanting to adjourn the matter to another date. 
Matters for arguments are usually ‘kept back’ after all the matters on 
the board for the day have been called out. The purpose is to save time 
and it lets the court set the agenda for the day. Lawyers that seek an 
adjournment do so when the board is being ‘called out’. 
Reading the board also established my position in court as 
someone who was there with a ‘purpose’. Unlike the lawyers, who 
often shuttled from one courtroom to another or one court to another 
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in a constant hurry, holding onto their dockets or case files, I rarely 
displayed any such urgency. In her ethnography of a trial court in 
Ahmedabad, Pratiksha Baxi similarly records how her pace as a 
researcher palpably differed from the pace of a practising lawyer. In 
her initial days in court, Baxi recalls being chided by a lawyer for 
walking too slowly, with the warning that if she wanted to learn the 
law she would have to learn to walk faster.80 The gait and the pace, she 
adds, also represented the urgency of a lawyer’s time as opposed to 
that of litigants for whom time drags, and whose gait is marked by 
‘boredom and exhaustion’.81 My training as a lawyer, and not merely 
as a researcher, afforded me a more privileged position in the eyes of 
lawyers, who despite my lack of experience in legal practice saw me as 
a colleague. This position in certain cases also meant sharing trade 
secrets, such as delaying cases to achieve certain ends or to frustrate 
the other party. These were shared in confidence and with the 
knowledge that we belonged to the same profession. Professional 
privilege was also a feature of my interactions with the women 
litigants, who often sought my legal opinion on their case. In the 
courtroom, much like the litigants, I as a researcher waited for 
‘something to happen’, for a trial to ‘take place’ and for cases to move 
forward in the hope that another date would not be allocated to the 
case I was currently following.  
For the purpose of this thesis, I did not choose the cases I 
would follow. The cases I focus on in this thesis are not landmark trials 
whose stories spilled outside the courtrooms into media platforms and 
op-ed pages. These stories never entered the public discourse. It is 
cases such as these that are unlikely to be cited as precedents, a legal 
discourse that forms the essential day-to-day affairs of lawyers and 
judges. Instead, I observed ‘ordinary or everyday cases’ that took place 
within a period of nine months.  
As mentioned previously, my ethnographic study had two 
parts, my second field trip being much smoother than the first. I was 
already in contact with the lawyers I would follow, and the location of 
my study was fixed. On the first day of my second field trip as I got off 
the foot-over bridge near the court, a male lawyer approached me 
asking me if I needed any work doing. I said I didn’t. Two other 
                                                             
80 Baxi, Public Secrets of Law. 
81 Pratiksha Baxi briefly refers to the feeling that nothing seemed to happen 
but does not delve any further. In my thesis, the perceptible feeling of 
nothing happens emerged mainly from talking to litigants in my study.  
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lawyers approached immediately after. I was not wearing my barrister’s 
bands that would immediately locate me as part of the profession, 
though I was dressed in sober colours of black and white. When I 
responded that I was a lawyer, they lost interest and walked away 
before even giving me a chance to ask any questions. They seemed 
unaware of whether Magistrates in the four courts had changed. When 
I entered the court, in two courtrooms the first Magistrate had gone 
for a jail visit and the second Magistrate was on juvenile court duty 
every Monday and Wednesday. Both courts on the lower floor heard 
domestic violence cases on all other days from 2.45 pm onwards. I 
stepped onto the dais to speak to the sari-clad woman court clerk to 
find out about the board in courtroom No 12. “What are you doing?” 
she yelled angrily. “Get off!” I stepped back, a little surprised. The male 
court clerk sitting next to her joined her in the reprimand. “You’re 
lawyer, how can you climb on the dais?” he asked. “But the judge isn’t 
there,” I replied. “So what, do lawyers ever climb on the dais?” (lawyer 
kabhi dais pe chadta hai), a police official sitting below the dais added, 
“Even we don’t ever climb the dais. Only court staff and the judge 
can” (hum bhi nahi chad sakte hai. Sirf court staff or judge). I smiled and 
apologised for my mistake. My lawyer informant Manju later 
explained that mounting the dais, even when the judge is absent, is a 
mark of disrespect to the court since it is a position that can be only 
occupied by the judge. This response is representative of how the court 
is seen as a sacred place, and the seat of the judge as deserving of the 
respect and devout and ceremonial rituals that are often reserved for 
revered places. The court is after all called a nyay mandir (temple of 
justice). The ceremonial and almost theatrical collective shudder by 
the court staff in response to a lawyer stepping onto the judge’s dais 
marks a ceremonial reverence for the law. Ritual and the ceremonial, 
observes Peter Goodrich, “give credence to the law, and effect to the 
rule.”82 The ceremonial is not merely ornamental in nature, for rituals 
give law authority and make it effective.  
What I finally did learn was that a Magistrate in the ground 
floor courtroom No. 1 had been transferred to another court, and 
there was a new Magistrate in his place. Courtroom No 2 on the 
ground floor had the same lady Magistrate as before. As for the 
courtrooms on the first floor, courtroom No. 3 also had a new male 
magistrate and courtroom No. 4 had the same Magistrate. The two 
Magistrates that were still present and I was familiar with would 
                                                             
82  Peter Goodrich, Lior Barshack and Anton Schutz, Law, Text, Terror 
(Routledge 2013), 18. 
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eventually be transferred after ten months I was informed by the court 
clerk. Before I could register, the new Magistrate on the first floor of 
courtroom 3 was transferred and was replaced by a woman Magistrate. 
There were no domestic violence cases on the day I arrived in court, 
since such matters were still held on only Fridays in courtroom 3 and 
4 – a ritual that the new incoming Magistrate still maintained. The 
same black and white mongrel was still resting underneath the fan. I 
recognised a few litigants, such as those whose cases I had witnessed 
in the early months of the year – a mother fighting a case against her 
daughter, a bald man carrying a rucksack, who had quit his merchant 
navy job to contest the domestic violence case filed against him, the 
two sisters in their 70s who had filed a case against one of their 
daughter’s husband,83 and Sharon along with her father, who I had 
met on my first visit through Varun. Their cases were still in court, 
and I slipped easily once again into the ‘rhythm’ of the court. 
Limitations and Biases in the Research 
This thesis specifically follows the lives and cases of women using the 
Domestic Violence Act. From that perspective, the lawyers I closely 
followed and the case-study method I adopted concentrates exclusively 
on women litigants, and not on men who come before the court. 
Under the Domestic Violence Act only women as a category can claim 
reliefs as an aggrieved person defined under Section 2 (a) of the Act. 
The definition of the aggrieved person includes “any woman” who is 
or has been in a domestic relationship with a respondent and has been 
subjected to domestic violence. Such women can claim reliefs under 
the said Act. The definition of the respondent (Section 2 (q), on the 
                                                             
83 I had met two sisters in their 70s in the court waiting area in the initial 
months. We were waiting outside the courtroom on the ground floor for the 
Magistrate to return after lunch. They approached me and asked me if I was 
a lawyer, since I was wearing barrister’s bands. I responded in the affirmative 
without explaining that I was here predominantly as a researcher. The elder 
sister lived in her mother’s apartment and had filed the domestic violence 
case to evict her daughter and her husband, who were refusing to leave the 
apartment. The younger sister, however, did all the talking, arguing that the 
apartment was her late mother’s property and all the siblings had an equal 
right to the apartment. They sought my legal opinion on whether the 
Domestic Violence Act was a good law, and whether reliefs are granted in 
time. Their first lawyer rarely appeared for any hearing of the case, and the 
case was still moving slowly despite changing their lawyer. After I revealed I 
was a researcher, they lost interest and were not keen to be interviewed. They 
did, however, insist that I should write about how slowly the case moves, and 
that the court frequently grants adjournments. Fieldnotes from February 2014.        
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other hand, specifies that an application to seek relief can only be filed 
against “any adult male person”. This ethnographic project thus only 
explores the interaction between women litigants and the law. 
Questions like: Did men who are summoned to court owing to a 
complaint filed by the woman have a vastly different experience of the 
law? or What are the effects of temporal delay on their lives are not 
considered. What can be said is that it is women who initiate court 
proceedings and have the right to pursue claims under the Act, while 
male respondents are summoned to court and are compelled to 
respond to court proceedings. My omission of men in this study is a 
conscious decision, as my main focus is on studying how a civil law on 
violence where women can claim reliefs is experienced by female 
litigants. This thesis thus lacks insights into men’s experience with the 
law and courts. The focus on women litigants also extends to the 
lawyers who I came to follow most closely; with only one exception 
they are all female. I found myself at ease following women lawyers 
whose offices and in whose company I found comfort and safety. Their 
interest in my marital status or why I did not wear any visible markers 
of being a married woman, or how I had left my husband in Finland 
to do this fieldwork, did not cause  me any discomfort, nor did they 
look upon me with suspicion. In my initial months as a researcher, I 
met more male lawyers and they would typically inquire about my 
marital status since I wore no evident ‘markers’ of my marital status. 
They would often express surprise on learning that I was staying away 
from my husband for nine months and that I had no children despite 
being married for six years.  
Another omission in my thesis is the fact that my ethnographic 
project in the lower court does not reveal the impact the new Act has 
had. I do not, for example, include an analysis of how the Act is used 
in conjunction with other laws related to family and custody issues. 
Nor do I evaluate minute aspects of how the Act is being implemented 
in courts or the kind of infrastructural challenges it faces, or how the 
infrastructure provided for under the Act exists and functions in 
Mumbai courts in general. 
Less a deliberate omission and more in the nature of a general 
observation, during my nine months of fieldwork I did not once run 
into a Protection Officer, nor did any of the lawyers and litigants I 
approached meet with a Protection Officer. Under the Act, a 
Protection Officer should be appointed by the State to assist the 
woman in filing the case and making an application; the Officer is 
supposed to function as an intermediary between the court and the 
woman. From that perspective, this is not a study to survey how the 
Act is ‘implemented’ in the court.       
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As far as my positionality is concerned, my training as a lawyer 
and the spatial privilege it afforded me in the courtroom and with 
lawyers changed the nature of my access, and thus also my research. 
This includes the kind of access that was available to me as a woman 
researcher. Women litigants were often at ease when talking to me and 
often sought my ‘legal opinion’ about how they performed in a cross-
examination or whether their lawyers should have adopted a different 
argument in court than the ones they did. Did I think they should 
settle their cases? These questions located me as a lawyer and as a 
woman, despite their knowledge that I was researching the Act as a 
researcher. They would often inquire if there were domestic violence 
cases in the country where I currently lived, or did cases there also take 
many years to resolve. In these situations, I was always uncertain about 
what response would be appropriate. I refrained from giving direct 
legal advice and politely explained that my expertise in court matters 
was limited. Yet in certain situations I did respond based on my legal 
knowledge of the Act. Hence I replied to questions women litigants 
asked me about what I thought about the violence they had suffered, 
or did I think they would receive the relief they sought. In my 
interviews with male lawyers, when they sought my opinion on what I 
thought of the moral character of a woman in a live-in relationship 
seeking relief under the Act or the ‘shamelessness’ of an unmarried 
woman living with a man and then seeking relief under the Act, I 
would often fall back on what the law states, citing the protection it 
guaranteed to women even outside the purview of marriage. 
Positioning the Study  
This thesis looks at day-to-day micro-level engagement with the law, 
and what happens to the law in the everyday. 84 By this I am not 
referring to the way in which the law retains its power despite the gap 
between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’,85 to quote Dean Roscoe 
                                                             
84 Law’s day-to-day micro-level engagement has been previously defined as 
‘legal consciousness’. Here law is not merely a certain consciousness of how 
law works, or what it is, but the manner in which people produce and 
experience legality. For more on this, see Sally Engle Merry, “What Is Legal 
Culture? An Anthropological Perspective Using Legal Culture,” Journal of 
Comparative Law 5 (2010): 40–58. Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and 
Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans (University of 
Chicago Press, 1990).   
85 Dean Roscoe Pound invented the expression ‘law in books and law in 
action’ that denotes the gap between what is in the books, and how law is 
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Pound’s influential distinction. Instead, my research project in a lower 
court interrogates question relating to access to the law in everyday 
contexts: What does accessing the law mean and How do we access the 
law? Here I use a sensory approach when writing about access to the 
law. Law and the senses is still a fledgling field that focuses on a sensory 
approach that is either “an object or a mode of study”.86 I move beyond 
the discrete workings of individual senses to provide a sensory 
understanding of access to the law. 87 In a recent work on law and the 
senses and possibly the most relevant source for this study, Hamilton 
et al. argue that law has been somewhat late at arriving at a sensory way 
of knowing in comparison to other disciplines, mainly anthropology.88 
Following Hamilton et al., I have sought in this thesis to both engage 
with the role senses play in law and to explore how the law senses. It 
is anthropology as a discipline that eagerly engaged with the 
exploration of the senses from the 1980s, notes David Howes.89 The 
call for a “sensuous scholarship”90  by Paul Stoller and Constance 
Classen’s alternative “sensory models” 91  shifted attention to using 
bodies and senses for ethnographic analysis. This exploration of the 
                                                             
practised. For more, see Roscoe Pound, “Law in Books and Law in 
Action,”American Law Review 44 (1910): 12. 
86 Hamilton et al., Sensing Law. 
87 For more, see Hamilton et al. James Parker, Acoustic Jurisprudence: 
Listening to the Trial of Simon Bkindi (OUP, 2015) (Intro and Ch 1), 
https://www.academia.edu/18175394/Acoustic_Jurisprudence_Listening_
to_the_Trial_of_Simon_Bkindi_OUP_2015_Intro_and_Ch_1_. Veit 
Erlmann, Hearing Cultures: Essays on Sound, Listening and Modernity 
(Bloomsbury Academic, 2004). 
88 Hamilton et al., Sensing Law. 
89  For more see, David Howes, 2013, “The Expanding Field of Sensory 
Studies,” Sensory Studies (August 2013), 
http://www.sensorystudies.org/sensorial-investigations/the-expanding-field-
of-sensory-studies/. 
90 Stoller, Sensuous Scholarship. 
91 Constance Classen, “Foundations for an Anthropology of the Senses,” 




understudied senses also revealed what other cultures think of sight, 
writes David Howes.92  
Studies on law’s preference for the ocular has been widely 
discussed. The pioneering work of Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead 
in Law and the Image analytically mapped the relationship between law 
and the image, including how law has shaped, regulated and used 
images, and how law and justice have been represented in art. 93 
Scholarship on visual legal studies that looks at law’s engagement with 
computer-generated evidentiary artefacts of photographs and images 
has received considerable attention. This is especially true with 
practices involving the ways in which the law processes images, as well 
as the ways in which the intersection between law and images causes 
anxiety about what is ‘real’.94 Joseph Pugliese’s meticulous analysis of 
how the Abu Ghraib torture photographs acquire evidentiary status 
in court because the visual record “underwrites their evidentiary and 
testimonial qualities” is another example of the status of images in 
law.95 Likewise in his recent work Experiencing Other Minds, Feigenson 
analyses how digital simulations recreate our perceptual worlds. 
Feigenson is critical of the supposed ‘accuracy’ that simulations try to 
achieve visually and aurally when they are submitted as evidence in 
court. The use of digital technologies to appeal to juries produces a 
‘similarity bias’ he argues,96 as when produced as evidentiary artefacts 
in courtrooms they make our sensual perceptual experiences vividly 
present.97 Questions relating to how a rape victim looks or behaves 
similarly have relied on the sensory even before photographs were 
presented in court as evidence. Desmond Manderson has called this 
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93 Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead, eds., Law and the Image: The Authority of 
Art and the Aesthetics of Law, 1 edition (University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
94 See, for instance, Richard K. Sherwin, “Visual Jurisprudence,” NYL Sch. L. 
Rev. 57 (2012): 11; Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital 
Baroque: Arabesques and Entanglements (Routledge, 2011). 
95 Joseph Pugliese, “Abu Ghraib and Its Shadow Archives,” Law and Literature 
19, no. 2 (2007): 247–76, https://doi.org/10.1525/lal.2007.19.2.247. 
96 Feigenson, “Experiencing Other Minds in the Courtroom.”  
97 Sonal Makhija, “#review: Experiencing Other Minds in the Courtroom,” 




the ‘aesthetic analysis’ of law, taking into account the fact that the 
consumption and circulation of law itself appeals to the senses.98    
Similarly, James Parker has recently argued for taking 
cognizance of sound and the need for an acoustic jurisprudence in his 
work on the sonic environs of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). Parker argues that sound is important in the 
administration of justice, including not merely architecture, and the 
phenomenological aspects, but the question of hearing and listening 
as well. For Parker, this acoustic environment of the ICTR includes 
its physical environment as it is “constructed, understood and 
perceived”.99 I bring in Parker’s work here because in my thesis I also 
take into consideration the soundscape of the court, and the many 
dimensions that hearing and listening have. This thesis moves beyond 
the emphasis on one sense or even beyond the five senses. Instead my 
ethnographic project attempts to understand how we make sense of 
the law, in particular how women litigants trying to access the 
Domestic Violence Act and reliefs under the Act ‘make sense’ of the 
law and how women’s access to the law in the everyday is governed by 
‘who’ is sensing. A trial is merely “a tip of a giant iceberg”, writes Susan 
S. Silbey. The law spills into everyday and mundane mediations and 
yet remains indiscernible. It inflects and is sedimented in the lives of 
those who access the law, and hence what law does needs to be 
observed.100 The force and power of law is unravelled through an 
ethnographic project, not so much in observing ‘the trial’ in a 
courtroom, but in observing what happens everyday and what law does 
to the everyday.  
My study queries what everyday access to the law means, and 
how we reach the law. I take an ‘embodied sensory’ approach to the 
question of what access to the law means and how embodied this 
                                                             
98 Desmond Manderson, Songs without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and 
Justice (University of California Press, 2000), 
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/25662.  
99 James Parker, “Towards an Acoustic Jurisprudence,” Critical Legal Thinking 
(blog), 27 September 2011, 
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access to the law is. As I have argued, questions on how law senses are 
contingent on how we sense, and who this ‘we’ is. This thesis starts 
with the dense sonic environs of the courtroom, quite different from 
a quiet, distant sterile space that previous work on courts have written 
about.101 This exploration relies on the workings of all the senses, and 
above all the ‘gut instinct’. To give an example, anthropologist Charles 
Hirschkind writing on hearing cassette sermon recordings in Islamic 
Revival movements in Cairo, focuses on the senses as a prerequisite to 
a more embodied experience of listening.102. Similarly, in my thesis, I 
explore the question what an embodied sensory approach to the 
everyday accessibility of law reveals and how this approach questions 
the very notion of what accessibility is. This study contributes to the 
evolving field of law and the senses, and what has been called the 
‘sensory turn’ in law.  
The objective of this study is to understand what happens to a 
well-intentioned and ambitious law in a courtroom. Scholarly work on 
what transpires in an adjudicatory site beyond doctrinal law, and the 
ethnographic engagements with the law reveal how law constitutes 
truth, or how adversarial conflicts are resolved and the law 
transforms. 103  Baxi, in particular argues how the law transforms 
beyond recognition. Taking the argument by Baxi on the 
transformation of doctrinal law in courts forward, I move beyond the 
debates on the ‘localisation’ of law to focus on the everyday and how 
what happens in everyday adjudicatory practices has a bearing on how 
litigants think of and perceive the law. What, moreover, qualifies as 
access and what does reaching the law mean. Scholars such as Austin 
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Sarat and Thomas R. Kearne and Patricia Ewick and Susan Sibley104 
have written widely on experiences and perceptions of law; the 
practices and encounters with law in society; and what law is and 
means to people beyond positivistic definitions of law. To that extent, 
this study contributes the law and society debates, yet it departs in its 
approach by focusing theoretically on how the very nature of 
‘everyday’ adjudicatory practices has a bearing on a progressive and 
ambitious law, such as the Domestic Violence Act. The repetitive and 
unremarkable notion of the everyday is thus critical to my analysis. 
Theoretically, and from the perspective of policy and advocacy debates 
on access to justice, I contribute to debates on access to justice, and 
the impossibility of having one single meaning for what ‘access’ means 
and to who and for what purposes, given the nature of law itself. 
In its simplicity, ‘access’ to justice means the right of any 
person to invoke the legal process and receive a fair and just treatment, 
irrespective of the person’s social, cultural and economic factors. This 
implies that free legal aid should be available to those who cannot 
afford private lawyers, legal costs should be reduced or removed, and 
physical access to courts should be made easier. After these barriers 
are mitigated, access to legal forums will make justice more accessible. 
In India in particular, the discourse on access to justice has primarily 
focused on judicial delays, pendency in courts, corruption among 
judges, badly trained and unethical lawyers, frequent adjournments, 
recurrent transfers of judges that further delay a case and often require 
that arguments be repeated, the lack of clerical staff, a slow procedural 
system, and failure to adopt technology.105 As a consequence, legal 
                                                             
104 For more see, Sarat and Kearns, Law in Everyday Life; Patricia Ewick and 
Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life, 1 edition 
(Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1998). 
105  The 230th Law Commission of India Report, 2009 argued for the 
establishment of High Court benches in states where there are no High 
Courts. Other reports and reform measures have focused on e-courts, 
adopting case management and digitisation, and calling for better tabulation 
and recording of cases in the lower courts, in order to assess and evaluate the 
problem. The 245th report, in particular, recommended the need to have a 
yardstick to measure whether the case was delayed or not. The report also 
recommended that data be provided that would lead to a more evidence-
based reform rather than a focus on increasing the number of judges, and 
encouraged mediation in adversarial proceedings as a solution to resolve 
judicial backlogs. The recourse to informal courts and settlements, and their 
lack of effectiveness in administering justice has been highlighted by scholars. 
For more, see Law Commission of India (Report No. 245): Arrears and 
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reform efforts have focused on the reform of the civil and criminal 
justice system. Amendments to civil court procedures have been made, 
such as limiting the time and number of appeals and adjournments. 
In the criminal justice system, reform efforts have focused on setting 
up fast track courts, and the introduction of plea bargaining without 
addressing issues of delay, and the social and economic factors that 
contribute to pendency and overall inequity in the judicial system.106 
Other reforms have focused on mediation units set up in courts and 
the establishment of non-adversarial courts in rural India.  
Pratiksha Baxi has pointed out how legal reform discourse 
focuses on the understaffing and underfunding of lower courts as the 
primary reason for judicial delay without considering how temporal 
delay in civil and criminal cases differ. Citing Upendra Baxi’s work on 
the crisis in the Indian Legal System107 from the 1980s, Pratiksha Baxi 
argues that delay is also a function of due process of law. She writes 
that while the presumption of innocence and the nature of procedural 
law may not be temporally efficient, its purpose is to be just. The 
language of competency and effectiveness in access to justice discourse 
has to be seen in the contexts of global economic growth and good 
governance. 108 The discourse on ‘access’ to ‘justice’ is thus under-
theorised. I agree with Baxi that temporal efficiency alone does not 
assure justice. This thesis is thus an attempt to take some of the 
conversations on access to justice forward by exploring questions on 
what is a hearing, how is evidence assessed on a day-to-day basis and 
what is the fallout of temporal delay under the Domestic Violence Act 
in formal court proceedings. The diversion is from formal proceedings 
into formalised ‘settlements’. I call these settlements formalised 
because they take place in ‘the shadow of law’; even more importantly 
formalised settlements take place in an atmosphere of fear, a fear that 
the case in question may drag on endlessly. The problems that affected 
other women-centric laws still apply under the Domestic Violence Act, 
                                                             
Backlog: Creating Additional Judicial (wo)manpower, July 2014; Law 
Commission of India (Report No. 230): Reforms in the Judiciary- Some 
Suggestions. 
106 Pratiksha Baxi, “Access to Justice and Rule-of (Good) Law: The Cunning 
of Judicial Reform in India,” Indian Journal of Human Development 2, no. 2 (1 
July 2008): 279–302, https://doi.org/10.1177/0973703020080202. 
107  Upendra Baxi, The Crisis of the Indian Legal System (Vikas Publishing 
House, 1982). 
108 Baxi, “Access to Justice and Rule-of (Good) Law,” 10  
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as the Act is besieged by the same problems. Other than the evaluation 
of the Domestic Violence Act by NGOs funded by international 
organisations, 109 there has been little focus on how a new law and legal 
reform needs to pay attention to the everyday of the law.  
I start with an ethnographic exploration of the court and the 
law, in this case, the lower court and the Domestic Violence Act, 
although it is also a focal point from where I depart to respond to 
questions relating to the interaction of everyday law and the everyday 
from a sensory perspective. In my study, women’s first encounter with 
the law is an oral rendition of a doctrinal law by their lawyers. The 
preamble to the textual law that announces the intention of the law 
to provide for “more effective protection of the rights of women 
guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any 
kind occurring within the family,” and guarantees various reliefs is the 
first-time women hear the ‘law’. That the case should be disposed of 
within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing is a spatio-
temporal jurisdiction that all women cite.110 This speech of the law is 
what philosopher J. L. Austin called a ‘performative utterance’, that 
is, stating and stipulating the law makes it true by just saying it. Thus, 
by ‘naming’ the victim and giving a platform to seek reliefs the 
doctrinal text of the Domestic Violence Act has a performative 
linguistic power that for both Austin and Bourdieu is law’s 
constitutive power to legalise, formalise and affirm. 111 
Thesis Structure 
There are six chapters in this thesis. Chapters two, three, four and five 
are based on my fieldwork.  
Chapter Two, “The Ethics of Listening and Narrating from 
the Field: Negotiating between ‘the Perfect Victim’ and ‘the Half 
Lawyer”, is a brief overview of the Domestic Violence Act, presenting 
the history prior to its enactment, and the objective behind it. The 
chapter briefly lays down the main rights and guarantees of the 
Domestic Violence Act. The chapter sets the stage for what is to follow 
                                                             
109 For more, see Collective, “Staying Alive.” 
110 Section 12 (4) of the Act stipulates that: “The Magistrate shall fix the first 
date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the 
date of receipt of the application by the court.”  
111 For more, see John Langshaw Austin, How To Do Things with Words 
(Harvard University Press, 1975); Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: 
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” Hastings LJ 38 (1986), 805. 
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particularly from the perspective of how women using the law often 
straddle between playing victims or ‘half-lawyers’. In the chapter I 
foreground the discourse surrounding the supposed ‘misuse’ of the 
Act, and how the ‘misuse’ of the Act is a prevailing circulating 
discourse in courts and among lawyers and litigants that accuses 
women of manipulating the law, and falsely accusing the man 
concerned and his family. I shed light on how stories of misuse travel, 
and how narratives of violence have to be formulated not to 
demonstrate ‘truth’, but what kinds of narratives are suitable to 
specific acts of violence.  
Chapter Three, “Spatial Arrangement and Hearing in a 
Courtroom”, as the title indicates, is about the multiple meanings of 
hearing, and how one attains legibility in law. I reflect on the kind of 
hearing that the law provides, in opposition to what women seek in 
the courtroom and what they perceive as ‘hearing’. How does this 
hearing stand in contrast to the right to a fair trial? I demonstrate how 
the courtroom spatial hierarchy determines to whom the proceedings 
are audible, and for whom the proceedings are beyond reach. The 
hierarchal spatialisation in a courtroom itself denies audibility when 
the placing of litigants on the margins of the courtroom makes the 
proceedings themselves inaudible. I argue that access to ‘hearing’ 
eludes women litigants when they struggle to comprehend both the 
language of the law and how language itself shields hearing. At the 
same time, the ‘hearing’ that the law promises either never arrives or 
arrives too late for the women litigants.    
In Chapter Four, “How Do Lawyers Know?” I discuss the role 
narratives play in presenting evidence, and how the stories women tell 
bear the imprint of the law and its affinity to the chrono-temporal 
precision of what events should follow what. When evidence is 
questionable or does not sound quite right the law notes that a story 
has been mis-told.112 What came ‘after’ or ‘before’ in the story, or how 
the ‘file’ is privileged over oral narrations in cross-examinations are 
some of the questions I explore through ethnographic vignettes. The 
file (and the record of events) occupies both subject and object 
positions. The production of evidence demands coherence and 
consistency, and this is measured in the temporal placing of ‘befores’ 
and ‘afters’. The coherence and consistency the law demands stands 
in contrast with how stories are told, and how story-telling is a 
subjective experience of both events and time and their happenings.  
The sensing and happening of these events do not remain static, but 
                                                             
112 Brooks, “Narrative Transactions –Does the Law Need a Narratology.” 
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keep changing for the women litigants in their constant re-telling. I 
argue that the seeing and knowing lawyers refer to in identifying 
credible evidence of a ‘victim’ is based on how narratives are told and 
retold by women litigants of domestic violence, and whether it meets 
their sensorial normativity of what stories of violence should sound 
like.  
In Chapter Five, “‘Being Stuck’: Delay and Waiting”, I 
examine judicial delay through the waiting experiences of women 
litigants. I further analyse the feeling of ‘nothing happens’ described 
by women litigants from the perspective of the spatio-temporal 
experience of waiting in courts. I specifically analyse the different 
temporalities and how judicial delay is measured by the law, and how 
this differs from what women consider delay and ‘reasonable time’. 
This delay in receiving reliefs, and the waiting in court has an impact 
on women’s experience and perception of access to justice.  





Chapter Two   
The Ethics of Listening and Narrating from the Field: 
 Negotiating between the ‘Perfect Victim’ and the 
‘Half Lawyer’ 
 
This thesis, as previously argued, is not a specific study of the 
Domestic Violence Act itself or the ramifications of the Domestic 
Violence Act on the lives of women using the law, although, my study 
does shed light on both the use of the law and how it has an impact 
on women’s lives. The Act serves as the backbone to my study on how 
women ‘sense’ the law. Like the aural, spatial and temporal encounter 
with the Act that takes place in courtrooms, the Domestic Violence 
Act itself is a necessary doctrinal experience, without which the 
experiences I narrate of women’s engagement and encounters with law 
would ring false, since women first learn what the Act is, does and can 
do from what the written Act stipulates and guarantees. Their first 
encounter with the Act is textual. That is the decisive factor in using 
or not using the Act, whether in conjunction with other laws or the 
Act alone, and it is an outcome of what the Act promises. This chapter 
therefore is a prelude to understanding what follows in the later 
chapters, and how and why women litigants who use the Act 
experience the Act differently in courtrooms from the Act’s textual 
promise. In this chapter I provide a brief history of the Domestic 
Violence Act and an overview of the Act, and what the Act guarantees 
and secures for women applicants. I will trace back what led to the 
enactment of a civil law, in addition to other existing laws. This brief 
history of the Act is critical when comprehending the hope and 
expectation with which the Act was drafted and enacted. It is also 
required to understand the failure of the Act in meeting some of its 
objectives of quick relief, at least with respect to questions relating to 
‘access to justice’, as the Act struggles through the adjournments and 
delays that are commonplace in Indian courts.  
The drafting and enactment of the Domestic Violence Act was 
fiercely contested within the women’s movement itself, with a few 
women’s organisations and prominent leaders either in favour of a 
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new civil Act or challenging the need for it. Would more laws113 solve 
the problem at hand, namely the problem of a protracted legal system? 
Or, is there a need for a separate law that guarantees women equal 
rights to property and economic resources within marriage? As 
feminists have argued, this is the primary reason for women’s status in 
society. These were critical questions raised in meetings held by civil 
society organisations to discuss the draft law. As the chapters that 
follow will reveal, the Domestic Violence Act despite its intentions to 
provide quick relief is slowed down for the same reasons – a slow and 
laborious court system. Likewise, similar to other women-centric laws, 
the Domestic Violence Act faces similar challenges, that is, the 
narrative of ‘misuse’ of the Act. I address this narrative of misuse of 
the Act, and highlight some of the landmark judgements that in the 
initial years of the Act viewed certain provisions, rights and reliefs with 
distrust, a problem other women-centric laws have faced too. This 
despite many scholars underscoring the fact that the majority of 
women refrain from using formal state law in times of need. If they 
do, it is only after other efforts and measures have failed, such as family 
intervention. Scholars studying women’s courts in India, like Sylvia 
Vatuk and Livia Holden, have pointed out that out of court 
arrangements and unofficial strategies are preferred by women despite 
women-friendly laws, as opposed to the formal state law which entails 
legal costs, a long wait, and shame in resorting to legal recourse 
concerning an intimate family matter. 114  It is only when they are 
unable to reach a resolution through informal means that women turn 
to ‘official’ laws.115 
For this thesis, I have not exhaustively analysed the appellate 
court verdicts, instead I have briefly examined them in order to draw 
attention to the dominant narratives on women-centric laws and the 
suspicion with which they are received in courts. I will start the chapter 
                                                             
113 All matters relating to marriage, adoption, inheritance and divorce are 
governed by personal laws in India. The Domestic Violence Act provides 
protection to all women irrespective of religion.  
114 Sylvia Vatuk writes that for Indian women approaching the court is the 
last resort, most women preferring informal intervention rather than going 
to court. Sylvia Vatuk, “The ‘Women’s Court’ in India: An Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Body for Women in Distress,” The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 45, no. 1 (March 2013): 76–103, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2013.774836.  
115 Livia Holden, Hindu Divorce: A Legal Anthropology (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2008). 
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with a brief overview of the Domestic Violence Act and what preceded 
its enactment, and provide an overview of the Act. The outline of the 
Act specifies what are its primary features, definitions and remedies 
that it seeks to redress. The mirroring of an internationally modelled 
law in India and how it was transformed in local court settings were 
among my primary reasons for studying the Act. I briefly mention this 
in the Introduction, but it is worth repeating here too because it is 
closely linked to the history of the Act. From there, I move to ‘perfect-
victim’ discourse, drawing on critical analysis by anthropologists of 
rights-based and human rights discourse. I argue that the legal 
subjectivity of the ‘perfect-victim’ is closely tied to the narrative of 
misuse. I apply Charles Briggs’s ‘communicable cartography’ to analyse 
the narrative of ‘misuse’ and I particularly draw on his argument that 
narratives of violence have to be formulated in order to be believable. 
Briggs critically observes how narratives of violence are interpellated 
by mainstream discourses and how they travel infectiously as stories 
about stories, hence achieving a degree of truth.116 I use his argument 
in particular to argue how narratives of misuse of the Act acquire an 
infectious resonance from court hallways to the media and among 
women litigants themselves. Stories of violence mandate dramatic 
revelations of brutally abused women, while stories of misuse of the 
Act by women stem from failing to meet the ‘perfect-victims’ 
threshold. Briggs argues that specific acts of violence recruit discourses 
specific to it, as well as familiar modes of speaking about violence. 
Thus, he urges researchers to see beyond these ‘communicable 
cartographies’, and for us to listen and to narrate narratives that 
disrupt our ways of seeing and listening.  
Brief history of the Domestic Violence Act and its enactment 
Law as an instrument of ‘social change’ has been central to the 
women’s movement both in pre-independent and post-independent 
                                                             
116  For Louis P. Althusser, the interpellation process is complete when 
subjects are complicit in their own domination. Althusser gives the example 
of a police officer hailing “Hey, you there” and in response the individual 
accepts and becomes a subject. The interpellation process relies on the 
acknowledgment of the individual and response to subjecthood. For Judith 
Butler, on the other hand, interpellation precedes the hailing. The hailing 
by the nurse “It’s a girl” for Butler is a performative utterance in the 
Austinian sense, where the utterance is assigning sex and gender to the body 
and constitutes the subject. For more, see Louis Althusser, Essays on Ideology 
(Verso, 1976); Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative 
(New York: Routledge, 1997); Austin, How To Do Things with Words. 
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India.117 From the 1970s onwards, the women’s movement rallied to 
introduce new laws and reform existing laws concerning violence 
against women; this included domestic violence and rape law reform. 
It was in this period that a new provision protecting women from 
cruelty was introduced in the Indian Penal Code. Section 498A under 
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 addressed the issue of cruelty against 
women, and defined cruelty against the wife by a husband and his 
family to include both physical and mental cruelty. Cruelty under 
Section 498A is defined as including any wilful conduct that is likely 
to drive a woman to commit suicide or cause grave harm or injury or 
endanger her life or health, mental or physical.118 Writing on Section 
498A, Basu critically notes that ultimately, women lawyers found that 
the purpose with which the criminal provision was used was to 
negotiate civil remedies of maintenance,119 custody issues, as opposed 
to dealing with the question of violence. It is to address this gap that 
the Domestic Violence Act was enacted.120 Women’s organisations 
observed that what women primarily want are civil remedies, such as 
economic rights and an independent shelter to escape the cycle of 
violence and avoid being left destitute, as opposed to penalisation of 
their husbands. The focus in enacting a civil law therefore was 
primarily to provide civil remedies to all women irrespective of religion 
                                                             
117  Shilpa Phadke, “Thirty Years On: Women’s Studies Reflects on the 
Women’s Movement,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 43 (2003): 4567–
76. 
118 Under Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code, a husband or relative of 
husband subjecting a woman to cruelty can be punished with imprisonment 
for up to three years and a fine. Cruelty is defined as: “(a) any wilful conduct 
which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide 
or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or 
physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such 
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet 
any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account 
of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” For 
more, see “Section 498A in The Indian Penal Code,” 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/538436/. 
119  Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was drafted 
specifically to prevent destitution. The Section provides for an order of 
maintenance to be granted if any person having sufficient means neglects or 
refuses to maintain his wife unable to maintain herself, his parents unable to 
maintain themselves and legitimate or illegitimate minor children. 
120 Basu, The Trouble with Marriage. 
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and enact a secular law that protects women, and to give domestic 
violence a legal name and legal definition. 121  
Thus, the history of the Domestic Violence Act is intimately 
linked to the women’s rights movement and the fight against violence 
to women. The enactment of the Domestic Violence Act also 
coincides with the proliferation of NGOs, 122  global networks and 
global exchange of ideas. If anything, its enactment is evidence of the 
strength and power non-governmental organisations exercise both 
locally and globally. 123   The Act was drafted by women’s rights 
organisations and was successfully lobbied in the Parliament by forging 
networks with the State Women’s Commission124 and Members of 
Parliament to enact a new law drafted solely by them. Modelled after 
the UN Model Code on legislation to prevent violence against women, 
the Act provides a detailed and comprehensive definition of domestic 
violence that was adapted to and for the Indian context.125 The debates 
in the Parliament prior to its enactment argued that the state’s 
commitment to women’s rights and the responsibility to enact the new 
                                                             
121 The Act gave domestic violence a legal name and definition. Indira Jaising 
argued that “an injury was not an injury until it had a legal name and 
definition.” Jaising and her NGO played a formidable role in drafting the 
new civil law and in assessing its impact post-enactment. For more, see Indira 




122 The size of the non-profit sector in India has been calculated as 1.2 million 
organisations. For more, see S. S. Srivastava and Rajesh Tandon, “How Large 
Is India’s Non-Profit Sector?,” Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 19 (2005): 
1948–52. 
123 The current Government has banned foreign funding to organisations 
that are specifically critical of government policies or human rights and 
environmental issues. For more, see Deborah Doane, “The Indian 
Government Has Shut the Door on NGOs,” The Guardian, 7 September 
2016, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2016/sep/07/the-indian-government-has-shut-the-door-on-ngos.  
124  The national commission for women and the state commissions for 
women are statutory bodies set up to promote and protect the rights of 
women and to advise the government on policy. They were set up under the 
provisions enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of women.  
125 Provisions relating to dowry harassment is one such example of how the 
Act has been adapted to provide protection for women in India. 
55 
 
Act was framed in the language of Constitutional rights that 
guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws, and 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth. While the ratification of the Convention on 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)126 and the guarantee that State parties are duty-bound to 
protect the rights of women found a certain rhetorical strength, it was 
the Constitutional guarantee of equality irrespective of sex or 
religion127 accorded under Article 14 and 15 of the Constitution that 
NGOs referred to when campaigning for the new Act.  
International human rights conventions and movements have 
also played a central role in campaigning for the law and in pressuring 
the government. In fact, the Indian women’s movement appropriated 
the anthem of ‘women’s rights as human rights’ from the global 
movement that took centre-stage in the 1990s, specifically after the 
Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993 and the UN’s Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. In Beijing it was 
argued that violence against women has to be recognised as a human 
rights violation because it impedes women’s enjoyment of essential 
rights that are fundamental human rights, and a failure on the part of 
States to protect women from violence qualifies as a human right’s 
failure. 128  This argument was critical for the Indian women’s 
                                                             
126 The CEDAW’s 12th general recommendation required “the States parties 
to act to protect women against violence of any kind occurring within the 
family, at the work place or in any other area of social life”. For more, see 
OHCHR “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women,” 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx. 
127  Under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution women are guaranteed 
equality before the law and the equal protection of laws. Article 14 prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, 
while Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex or religion. 
Under Article 15 (3) the State can take special measures for women and 
children.  
128For more, see Ratna Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: 
Resurrecting the Native Subject in International/Postcolonial Feminist Legal 
Politics,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, 17 August 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=779824. Peggy 
Levitt and Sally Merry, “Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of 
Global Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States,” Global 
Networks 9, no. 4 (2009): 441–461. 
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movement to persuasively claim that domestic violence was not a 
private matter, but a public issue that requires State intervention – a 
mindset that the women’s movement had been fighting since the 
1970s.129 
Ultimately, the passing of the new law protecting women from 
domestic violence achieved both economic rights and the right to 
reside in a shared household, a right that would be more difficult to 
achieve in personal laws as that would mean confronting a highly 
politicised debate on personal law reform and the Uniform Civil Code 
(UCC).130 In India, different communities (such as Hindus, Muslims, 
                                                             
129 Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric.”  
130 Under the Indian Constitution Article 44, a Directive Principle directs 
the State to enact a Uniform Civil Code that is a uniform set of family laws 
that governs marriage and the rights between parties, the custody of children, 
divorce and inheritance. It is, however, merely a directive principle. The 
demand for a Uniform Civil Code was articulated in pre-independent India. 
As the political debates on building a new nation state took centre stage, the 
women’s question was relegated to the margins. The 1970s and 1980s 
particularly saw a rise in the saffronisation (right-wing Hindu nationalist 
views) of the debate on the uniform civil code. This was followed by the Shah 
Bano judgement in 1985, where an all-Hindu judiciary commented on a 
Muslim woman’s right to maintenance and on the Koran aroused anger and 
suspicion within the Muslim community. This development led to a 
rethinking and reframing of the women’s agenda. Since then, the debate on 
the uniform civil code has been treated cautiously by the women’s movement 
recognising the danger in the saffronisation of the debate and its effects on 
other minority communities. The discussions on reforms of laws moved away 
from a demand for the UCC, and instead, reforms within personal laws and 
harmonisation between different sets of laws that are in consonance with the 
equality provisions of the Constitution have been ongoing.130  
Post-independence a family code for Hindus was enacted under the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955. There is also a secular law under the Special Marriage 
Act, 1954 under which marriage is secular and takes place outside of religious 
rituals so the parties are governed by the said law, and not by their personal 
laws in matters of divorce and for succession governed by the Indian 
Succession Act, 1925. The tension between the two Constitutional 
provisions of equality and secularism that guarantees legal pluralism without 
denial of equality has since then been widely argued as essential to the Indian 
state. That women negotiate multiple laws, both codified and outside of the 
legal framework, has been widely argued by scholars. See, for instance, Basu, 
“Judges of Normality.” That the UCC is the only path to gender-justice, 
specifically for minority women, has been widely contested by many women’s 
organisations, who have challenged the common category of ‘women’ as 
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Christians, Parsis, Jews) have different personal laws based on religion 
that govern matters relating to marriage, the dissolution of marriage, 
custody and adoption, and inheritance. The Domestic Violence Act, 
on the other hand, successfully circumvented the discussion on reform 
of existing laws and enacting a uniform civil code, by broadly defining 
‘domestic violence’ and including the right to reside under its rubric – 
the right to reside in particular is one of its chief successes.131 The Act 
is now ten years old, and what it essentially did was open the gates for 
similar reforms in personal laws and a broader interpretation of cases 
in personal laws since the rights are already available under the Act. 
Even though the rights are not ‘permanent in nature’ 132  they are 
already being granted to women irrespective of what rights they may 
have under their respective personal laws.  
Overview of the Act 
The Domestic Violence Act came into effect on 26 October 
2006. The statements and objects of the Act specifically state that the 
law is “for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed 
                                                             
advocated by the UCC. The common category strips away the social-cultural 
contexts of the personal laws, and the complex negotiations women make at 
the local and community level outside of the formal state law. Nonetheless, 
the Domestic Violence Act in many respects is a path-breaking law that 
provides exhaustive remedies to all women irrespective of group or 
community-specific rights. For the purpose of this chapter, I will not trace 
the debates on the uniform civil code and the aftermath exhaustively since 
they are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
For more see, Flavia Agnes, “Redefining the Agenda of the Women’s 
Movement within a Secular Framework,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian 
Studies 17, no. sup001 (1 January 1994): 63–78, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00856409408723216. Flavia Agnes, Law, Justice, 
and Gender: Family Law and Constitutional Provisions in India (OUP India, 
2011). Flavia Agnes and Shoba Venkatesh Ghosh, Negotiating Spaces: Legal 
Domains, Gender Concerns, and Community Constructs; in Association with Majlis 
Legal Centre (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
131 The relief under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code is 
similarly accessible to all women irrespective of community based laws.  
132 The right to reside is not a right that assigns any right to property to 
women nor does it adjudicate on any dispute relating to movable or 
immovable property. It only grants women the right to reside in a shared 




under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind 
occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto”. Unlike the criminal provision under the Indian 
Penal Code, the Domestic Violence Act is a civil law that is filed before 
the Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate 
within whose local limits either parties reside or are gainfully employed 
or where the domestic violence has allegedly been committed. The 
Magistrates’ courts,133 are lower courts in the criminal side, as opposed 
to the family court where cases relating to maintenance, custody and 
divorce are decided. 134  
The Domestic Violence Act is the first law that named and 
defined ‘domestic violence.’ 135  As previously mentioned in the 
Introduction, the Act provides for a wide definition of what 
constitutes domestic violence, thus taking cognizance of the nature 
and depth of violence that women can suffer. This includes both acts 
of omission or commission or conduct meted out by the respondent 
that include physical and mental abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and 
emotional abuse, repeated threats, and economic abuse. 136  Under 
                                                             
133 Under the Act, violation of a protection order granted by the Magistrate 
is deemed to be a punishable offence. A protection order can restrict the 
respondent from contacting the woman and/or children or entering the 
property.  
134 The Family Court Act was enacted in 1984 in order to enable easy and 
informal access to courts, and provide reliefs relating to divorce and custody 
matters under a single court. Family Courts were specifically aimed to 
establish lawyer-free courts, where joint counselling was adopted, so as to 
arrive at speedy settlements. The utopian establishment of Family Courts 
where mediation without the interference of lawyers is one such illustration 
of the nature of settling, and the failure of justice somehow being more 
accessible.  
 
135Jaising, “PERSPECTIVES Concern for the Dead, Condemnation for the 
Living.” 
136 The definition of domestic violence is stipulated under Section 3 of the 
Act as: “any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall 
constitute domestic violence in case it — (a) harms or injures or endangers 
the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the 
aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, 
sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b) 
harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to 
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand 
for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or (c) has the effect of 
threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct 
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Section 2 (q) of the Act, a respondent is defined as “any adult male 
person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the 
aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought 
any relief under this Act”. This also includes the right to file a 
complaint against a relative of the husband or male partner. Economic 
violence is widely defined under the law to include deprivation of 
economic or financial resources which the woman is entitled to under 
any law or custom, or disposal of movable or immovable assets with 
the intention of depriving that woman. This includes denial of access 
to a shared household. 
In an attempt to provide all reliefs under the same law, and 
account for the wide variety of abuse women suffer in intimate 
relationships, the Act also includes dowry demands  despite a separate 
law that criminalises dowry demands.137 The Act was drafted with the 
objective to provide protection and relief to all women in ‘domestic 
relationships’138 who have suffered violence or continue to suffer from 
violence irrespective of the religion they belong to. Domestic 
relationship under the Act is defined to mean two persons who live or 
at any point of time have lived together in a share household. This 
includes women in marriage, live-in relationships or relationship in 
the nature of marriage, daughters, and other family members. Prior to 
this, women whose marriages were not registered or who lacked legally 
acceptable proof of their marriage, or the marriage ceremony failed to 
meet the legal requirements of what constitutes a valid marriage, could 
                                                             
mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d) otherwise injures or causes harm, 
whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person. The explanation to the 
section provides illustrations of violence, that is, physical abuse, sexual abuse, 
verbal and emotional abuse, and repeated threats to cause physical pain to 
any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested, and economic abuse. 
137The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 penalises both the act of giving and 
taking dowry. Another relevant provision is Section 304B in the Indian Penal 
Code, which concerns prosecution of a husband and in-laws if a wife dies as 
a result of burns, or any other injury, within seven years of marriage, provided 
it can be shown that she was subjected to cruelty, or harassment by the 
husband and in laws on account of a dowry demand. 
138 The Act can only be used by women against anyone she has shared or is 
sharing a domestic relationship with. This includes “two persons who live or 
have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they 
are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the 




not seek relief under personal laws since the validity of the marriage 
itself was suspect. With the Domestic Violence Act, women can fall 
under the rubric of ‘live-in relationship’, thus taking away the burden 
of proving a valid marriage to seek relief under the law. The only 
requirement is that live-in relationships should have been in the 
nature of marriage, that is, the parties had the intention to live like 
husband and wife. 
The primary purpose of the Act was to provide civil remedies 
that women in violent relationships needed in order to move out of 
violent homes, rather than penal consequences that failed to remedy 
the situation of women who were also often economically dependent 
on the relationships that were violent. The Act provides for a wide 
variety of civil reliefs: protection and restraining orders (Section 18) 
that prevent and stop violence,139 the right to monetary relief (Section 
20), the right to reside in a shared household  and prevention from 
dispossession of the shared household (Section 19), custody orders 
(Section 21) and compensation orders (Section 22). This includes the 
Magistrate’s power to grant an interim and ex parte order as deemed 
fit (Section 23). A monetary order takes into consideration loss of 
earnings and medical expenses incurred owing to violence. A 
compensation order, on the other hand, accounts for emotional and 
mental distress caused to the aggrieved person owing to violence. The 
court can grant injunctive orders. Injunctive orders in particular are to 
prevent and stop violence and prevent women from being evicted from 
the household. The right to reside under Section 19 of the Act allows 
the Magistrate to restrain the respondent from dispossessing the 
woman from the shared household, irrespective of ownership of 
property; remove the respondent from the property or restrain him or 
other relatives from entering; and restrain from alienating or disposing 
of the shared household or encumbering the same or renouncing his 
rights in the shared household or direct respondent to provide an 
alternate accommodation for the woman. 
The right to reside in a shared household, including women in 
‘live-in relationships’, are some of the provisions that are triumphs of 
the law. Both the right to reside and ‘live in relationships’ have 
attracted attention of the apex court. The definition of a ‘shared 
                                                             
139 A protection order to prevent domestic violence can be granted. An order 
restraining the respondent from contacting the aggrieved person or 
contacting children or entering the premises of the shared household can 
also be granted. 
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household’ was challenged in S.R. Batra v Taruna Batra,140 where the 
verdict ruled that the wife did not have a right to reside in a shared 
household where the husband had no ownership rights in the 
property, and the property could not be considered a shared 
household, in accordance with the definition of the Act. 141  In 
D.Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal, 142  the apex court examined the 
definition of a ‘live-in relationship’ and a relationship ‘in the nature 
of marriage’. The sentiment the right granted to a woman in a live-in 
relationship evokes is illustrative in the words of the apex court that 
stated: “If a man has a ‘keep’ who he maintains financially and uses 
mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in our 
opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage.” The lawyers I 
interviewed echoed similar sentiments about how supposedly ‘corrupt’ 
and ‘shameless’ women manipulated and abused an Act that had been 
drafted to prevent ‘real’ violence.   
Procedure under the Act 
Under the Act, proceedings in court start from the date of the 
filing of the application. Typically, along with the application, an 
affidavit seeking interim relief is also filed. After admission of the 
application, the court orders notice to be served on the respondent to 
appear on the first date of hearing or respond to the application. As 
per the Act, the notice should be served within two days of the 
admission of the application, though that timeline is rarely met. 
Similarly, even though under Section 12 (4) of the Act, the first date 
of hearing should “ordinarily not be beyond three days from the date 
of receipt of the application in court”, it typically takes a month or 
more for the first date of hearing to be set from the time of application. 
The trial begins with the first date of hearing, where the parties and 
their respective lawyers appear before the court, and the respondent is 
provided time to file a written reply. After the respondent responds 
with a written reply, a date for interim arguments is set. This stage 
usually takes up to a minimum of three to four months, as per lawyers, 
                                                             
140 “S.R. Batra And Anr vs Smt. Taruna Batra on 15 December, 2006,” 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/594165/.  
141 In a case filed in the Bombay High Court, the court granted a woman the 
right to reside irrespective of whether she had a right, title or interest in the 
shared household. For more, see “Roma Rajesh Tiwari vs Rajesh Dinanath 
Tiwari on 12 October, 2017,” https://indiankanoon.org/doc/184037116/. 




even though the Act stipulates a shorter period. Usually, interim 
orders are passed between three to six months, based on submission 
of affidavits. In all the cases I followed, interim relief was granted on 
average within four months. On the first date of hearing, most 
respondents seek for another date to respond to the application. After 
the written response by the respondent, evidence in the form of 
affidavits is taken by the court on another date or hearing. Interim 
orders are typically passed by the court after this. It is rare for courts 
to listen to oral arguments for an interim application. Usually, interim 
reliefs are granted without arguments as such a process would delay 
the passing of interim orders and would defeat their purpose. As per 
the lawyers, the case considerably slows down after the passing of 
interim orders. 
After interim relief is granted, evidence is produced. This usually 
includes copies of the marriage certificate, birth certificates of 
children, and any medical or non-cognizable complaint143 filed with 
the police as evidence of domestic violence. The Court cross-examines 
the woman and the respondent, and any other witnesses to the 
violence, and this is followed by final arguments. With respect to any 
claims made, evidence must be produced in court by relevant parties, 
for instance in the case of physical violence, if there are any police 
reports or circumstantial evidence or neighbours or friends who can 
be cross-examined by the court on the violence claimed. Given the fact 
that violence in such cases is often of an intimate nature, evidence by 
witnesses in most cases is difficult to present and courts rely on any 
reports made by the woman to the police or the protection officer. A 
final order is passed after the completion of the final arguments, a 
separate date being fixed for each stage of the proceedings.  
As the Act is designed to provide quick reliefs, both in terms 
of interim orders and final orders, Section 12 (5) stipulates that a case 
should be closed within sixty days of filing the case. In practice, the 
ambitious temporal closure of the case within sixty dates has been 
                                                             
143 A non-cognisable complaint is often made by women at a police station. 
The police officer in charge will summarize the complaint made by the 
woman in writing and give her a copy of the complaint. The complaint is 
often appended as evidence at the time of filing an application. Since it is a 
non-cognisable offence, or an NC as it is commonly referred to, the police 
merely make an entry in the police station diary but do not make any inquiry 
unless directed by the Magistrate. The report is usually presented in court as 
evidence of the continued violence the woman has been subjected to. In the 
case of an NC, no arrest can be made without a warrant.   
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impossible to achieve. As discussed in later chapters, cases under the 
Domestic Violence Act take on average close to three years to 
complete, though this is still a shorter time than a case filed in a Family 
Court would most likely take. By completion and closure here, I do 
not mean only cases where the court has granted final orders, but often 
cases that have been ‘settled’ by parties themselves.  
At each stage, the Magistrate dictates the proceedings to the 
court transcriber in English, irrespective of the language used during 
the trial, and it is in the Magistrate’s words that a summary of what 
transpired in the courtroom is recorded.  No audio or video recordings 
are made at any stage. In the case of a domestic violence case filed 
under the Domestic Violence Act, given that it is a civil law, the law 
does not expect ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. Instead it relies on 
the principle of ‘balance of probabilities’, where the court assesses 
claims and relies on evidence of what most likely took place, given the 
facts and circumstances of the case.  
The reason why a range of remedies were provided under one 
Act was to limit the use of multiple laws and limit the use of different 
legal forums. Hence, multiple remedies can be sought under a single 
proceeding and in a single court. The thinking behind the said 
provision was to provide speedier and easier access to justice. 144 
According to the lawyers I followed and interviewed, at present the Act 
is predominantly used to claim monetary orders as well as the right to 
reside in the shared household. In order to ensure easy lawyer-free use 
of the Act, the Act provided for enforcement protection officers to 
facilitate easier access to courts. However, reviews of the Act by various 
NGOs have highlighted the lack of allocated funding at the state level. 
One of the major infrastructural problems concerning the 
implementation of the Act has been that no independently appointed 
protection officers have been assigned to assist in the legal process.145   
 
Localising global norms  
My initial interest in the Domestic Violence Act was twofold. 
Firstly, I wanted to see how an internationally modelled law was 
localised in Indian courts, and secondly, I was interested in witnessing 
                                                             
144 Indira Jaising, Asmita Basu, Brototi Dutta, Handbook on Law of Domestic 
Violence Lawyers Collective, LexisNexis, Butterworths Wadhwa 2009. 
145 For more, see Collective, “Staying Alive.” 
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how the Act was transformed in courts. How did this law translate 
global ideas of human rights and women’s rights’ violation into local 
settings, and more specifically into courtrooms? How do these ideas of 
universal human rights’ travel and to what extent are they transformed 
in transit? Do they create fissures? Global transnational flows are 
dictated by international funding organisations and agencies, the 
Domestic Violence Act being modelled on the UN Model Law on 
Violence Against Women. The law, adopted from an international 
model, is contextualised in the Indian context, and definitions of 
violence are also specific to the Indian context.146  
Questions relating to transnational flows of human rights’ norms, and 
how they are transformed and transcend their original meanings are 
not new, and previous scholarly works have addressed these questions 
of global-local flows.147 The appropriation of human rights’ language, 
Levitt and Merry write, serves several goals. It provides a certain 
legitimacy when campaigning with States, and builds networks and 
“an air of global connectedness, modernity, and progress”148. Since the 
ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human 
rights and human rights’ language has spread both in India and 
globally. Human rights language was used, too, as the primary 
vocabulary for articulating women’s rights.  
In anthropologists Peggy Levitt and Sally Engle Merry’s multi-
sited study in Peru, India and China on the ‘vernacularisation’ of 
global ideas into local language, they write about how global human 
rights’ ideas are appropriated in local language and are contextualised 
to make them culturally relevant, and how in turn the local ideas then 
assume a language of their own.149 Levitt and Merry’s study has shown 
that ‘vernacularisation’ is a two-way street. Global ideas are legitimated 
by acquiring a local tongue, making these ideas easier to advocate and 
implement them. At the same time, local ideas and the appropriation 
                                                             
146  The Domestic Violence Act was modelled after UN Model Code on 
violence against women. The definitions of violence though are localised and 
made relevant in the Indian context. For instance, harmful practices relating 
to dowry harassment are included in Section 3 (b). They include verbal abuse 
about not having a male child or forcing a woman to marry against her will.  
147 See, for example, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond 
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, 
1998). 
148 Levitt and Merry,  “Vernacularization on the Ground,” 443. 
149 Levitt and Merry. 
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of global norms travel beyond local borders, acquiring new meanings 
and relevance. Maya Unnithan and Carolyn Heitmeyer 150 have argued 
that there is no single translation of human rights, instead there are 
multiple translations that are selectively appropriated to meet specific 
goals. Moreover, the manner in which human rights is envisioned and 
produced may be guided by different ideological and practical realities.   
The global flows of ideas, knowledge and capital have been 
widely written about,151 including the globalisation of human rights 
norms and the universalisation of human rights narratives,152 and how 
this migration of ideas is actualised through global networks bound by 
common goals. 153  The proliferation of NGOs spawned by 
internationally funded organisations, such as the World Bank, the 
Ford Foundation, and global-local networks is key for the migration of 
these ideas, and the United Nations is also partly responsible for the 
rhetorical strength human rights has attained.154 Both Mark Goodale 
and Sally Engle Merry have problematised the binary nature of the 
global/local debate, where the global-local implies a vertical spatial 
metaphor where the global is above and the local is below. This top-
                                                             
150 For more, see Maya Unnithan and Carolyn Heitmeyer, “Challenges in 
“Translating” Human Rights: Perceptions and Practices of Civil Society 
Actors in Western India,”Development and Change 45, no. 6 (1 November 
2014): 1361–84, https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12135. 
151  For more, see Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the 
Global Cultural Economy,” Theory, Culture & Society 7, no. 2 (1990): 295–
310. 
152 For more, see Richard Wilson, ed., Human Rights, Culture and Context: 
Anthropological Perspectives, Anthropology, Culture, and Society (London ; 
Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 1997); Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry, eds., 
The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law between the Global and the Local 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) . 
153  Manuel Castells, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, 
Communication Networks, and Global Governance,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (1 March 2008): 78–
93, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311877; Manuel Castells, 
“Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society,” The British 
Journal of Sociology 51, no. 1 (1 March 2000): 5–24, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2000.00005.x. 
154 For more, see William F. Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and 
Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” Annual Review of Anthropology 26, no. 1 
(1997): 439–64, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.26.1.439. 
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down approach presumes that there are two levels where this human 
rights’ discourse unfolds.155 Brian Larkin has also critically observed 
how global cultural flows privilege the centrality of the West,156 despite 
the fact that the centre and the periphery are constantly shifting and 
being re-defined. As anthropologists Arjun Appadurai and Carol A. 
Breckenridge have observed, these global flows emerge from many 
centres and flow into many peripheries.157 Mark Goodale, for his part, 
suggests that the ‘betweeness’ of human rights discourses unfolds in 
locations that are difficult to pin down.  
 
Between the Perfect Victim and the Half Lawyer  
In the last few decades, the Domestic Violence Act, and 
Section 498 A in particular, have acquired a ‘draconian’ image as laws 
that rip apart families, being employed as ‘a tool to harass husbands’. 
Stories of the misuse of Section 498A and the Domestic Violence Act 
in the media and in court corridors abound. The oft-repeated story 
dramatically unfolds with an avenging wife sending her hapless 
husband and his parents to prison, or in the case of the Domestic 
Violence Act, the husband and his family being evicted from their own 
home as the wife is granted the right to live in a shared household. 
Section 498A has come to connote, argues Basu, a fraudulent or 
cheating person. Yet, what qualifies as a misuse of the law, and what 
is the legitimate use of the law is rarely defined.  
The discourse on both civil and criminal law thus oscillates 
between ‘real victims’ and ‘bogus’ women. These narratives of misuse 
travel across genres and institutional borders. They acquire what 
Charles Briggs has called an ‘infectious iterability’ moving swiftly from 
media, to courtrooms, to litigants. Briggs refers to this as 
‘communicable cartography’, meaning the way stories flow and travel 
spatially and temporally, crossing differences of gender, countries and 
institutions, by recruiting and locating people within those narratives, 
assigning them a pre-determined position, power and agency, or 
                                                             
155 Goodale and Merry, The Practice of Human Rights. 
156For more, see Brian Larkin, “Indian Films and Nigerian Lovers: Media and 
the Creation of Parallel Modernities,”Africa 67, no. 03 (July 1997): 406–40, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1161182. 
157For more, see Arjun Appadurai and Carol A. Breckenridge, “Why Public 




erasing it. These dominant communicable cartographies erase 
alternative narratives and reproduce stereotypes. The manner in which 
this dominant narrative circulates, compelling litigants to either locate 
themselves as victim-subjects or to fight stereotypes of manipulative 
scheming wives, reflects the way stories of violence are narrated, and 
how women are emplotted in them. The iterability of story of misuse, 
and the injury misuse causes, is evident in how ‘violence’ is silenced in 
oral arguments and reiterated by women litigants, who are acutely 
aware of the doubt and suspicion with which they are perceived.   
For Briggs, these ‘communicable cartographies’ of discourses 
can be rejected or accepted by those the discourses seek to reach or 
they can invoke or construct an alternative to the discourse. “As they 
receive a text, people can accept the communicable cartography it 
projects, accept it but reject the manner in which it seeks to position 
them, treat it critically or parodically, or invoke alternative 
cartographies.” 158  The performative speech utterance and the 
perlocutionary power it yields is achievable only if it is communicable. 
The discourse, suggests Briggs, can be challenged or subverted. Briggs 
illustrates this subversion with his example of an infanticide female 
victim he was to interview and ‘rescue’ refused to accept and reproduce 
a solicited narrative, thus challenging her pre-assigned subject position 
of victim/monster/martyr.     
It is here that I would like to introduce the story of Preeti.159 
Preeti a trained and practising dentist had filed a domestic violence 
complaint in 2010, approximately three years after her marriage, and 
she had been granted the right to monetary relief and the right to 
reside in her shared household by the court. I was referred to her by 
Nidhi, her lawyer, who described her as a ‘half-lawyer’, that is, 
someone who is conscious of her rights and involved in the legal 
strategising of her case. This labelling of her as a ‘half-lawyer’ was not 
said in admiration; rather, it was a disparaging introduction to who 
she was – an assertive and legally astute woman. Nidhi, who described 
herself as a ‘feminist’ lawyer, was clearly impressed with Preeti’s 
professional credentials as a dentist who had won many medals for 
being an exceptional student, and had the ability to understand the 
law and how to use it. Her lawyer Varun similarly described Preeti as 
                                                             
158 For more, see Charles L. Briggs, “Anthropology, Interviewing, and 
Communicability in Contemporary Society,” Current Anthropology 48, no. 4 
(1 August 2007): 551–80, https://doi.org/10.1086/518300. 
159Fieldnotes from August 2014. 
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someone capable of arguing her own case. “I wouldn’t worry if I can’t 
make it for an argument or a hearing. She’s capable of arguing her own 
case ”, he said with a chuckle in one of our interviews.  
Preeti had ‘experience’ of four cases, a case under Section 
498A, a case under the Domestic Violence Act seeking civil reliefs, a 
case filed for restitution of conjugal rights160, and a divorce petition 
that was filed by her husband in the Family Court. These cases were 
spread over three different courts and were at different temporal 
stages. This meant she had to navigate different spatio-temporalities to 
attend to her cases. She had filed restitution of conjugal rights with 
the help of a second lawyer, despite her first lawyer’s disagreement, 
and she was contesting a divorce petition filed by her husband in the 
Family Court.  
As cases of domestic violence are often narrated, Preeti too 
started her story with her wedding and its aftermath. After her 
wedding, Preeti had moved into her mother- in-laws’ home with her 
husband. “After getting married I lived with my in-laws. Although I’m 
educated I’m an Indian girl at heart. We lived like a happy family. I 
was head over heels in love with my husband. He was the only son. My 
mother-in law was scared I would take her son away. Even at the time 
of the wedding we met their wishes. I won’t say demands. He was their 
only son and they had wishes about their son’s wedding just like my 
mother had for me,” said Preeti. “Is she selling her son to me?” Preeti 
asked me rhetorically. I did not respond. Preeti argued that she had 
filed the case only to teach her husband a lesson. She emphatically 
stressed how the Domestic Violence Act should be used with the 
motive of stopping wrong. Describing her erroneous filing of Section 
498A, as being misled by the police and her naiveté in giving her 
statement to the police, Preeti argued that a civil law and the emphasis 
on a civil remedy under the Domestic Violence Act was particularly 
                                                             
160 Under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 “either the husband or 
the wife, without reasonable excuses, withdraws from the society of the other, 
the aggrieved party may approach the Court for restitution of conjugal 
rights.” The section specifically states: “The decree of restitution of conjugal 
rights cannot be executed by forcing the party who has withdrawn from the 
society from the other to stay with the person who institutes Petition for 
restitution. The decree can be executed only by attachment of the properties 
of the judgment debtor. In the event the decree of restitution of conjugal 
right is not complied with for a period of more than a year from the date of 
the decree, it becomes a ground for divorce.”  
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suited to her situation, since her main goal was to alter her husband’s 
behaviour and open his eyes to his and his family’s wrongdoing.  
Her criticism was also directed towards the court, which she 
said encouraged ‘money settlements’ to close the matter. “Judges also 
ask you: Do you want a conviction or your marriage? How can a judge 
ask such a question to a victim? Do you want restitution or a 
conviction? I (Preeti) said I’m highly educated, if he doesn’t improve 
what can I do? If he apologises I’ll reconcile. How can I ask for both? 
How am I wrong? If you want to stop bogus cases, stop the money 
settlement. Courts encourage money settlement. But the focus should 
be to improve the wrongdoer, or you go to the family court. The 
Domestic Violence Act can be misused. Some women are misusing it, 
I agree. The way to avoid misuse is by only allowing reconciliation.” 
The choice between money versus altering or mitigating 
violence was an interesting illustration provided by Preeti. That 
women misuse the law by claiming maintenance or making a monetary 
claim is voiced by judges and lawyers alike. Thus, the underlying 
accusation of misuse hints at how claims of violence are spurious, since 
what women really want is money. This even though the Act was 
meant to fill the gap that the criminal provisions under the Indian 
Penal Code did not provide for, namely financial reliefs so as to 
provide women with the option of moving out of violent relationships 
and their matrimonial homes. Her lawyer also suggested that Preeti 
would give up her desire to ‘improve’ her husband if she received a 
monetary settlement. Preeti had asked for 250,000 euros as a full and 
final monetary settlement. The suspicion with which her case was 
viewed, and the narrative of misusing the law was something she was 
familiar with. In my three-hour long first interview with her, she 
reiterated several times that her case and her claims of domestic 
violence were genuine. Her assertiveness and unwillingness to 
compromise struck discordantly with the legal subjectivity she was 
expected to assume, that of an aggrieved woman. The Act defines the 
‘aggrieved person’ as any woman who has been subjected to an act of 
domestic violence. Under the Act, an ‘aggrieved person’ means any 
woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the 
respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of 
domestic violence by the respondent. The use of the term ‘aggrieved’ 
which in the online Merriam-Webster dictionary is defined as being a 
person who is distressed or troubled or ‘suffering from an 
infringement or denial of legal rights’ implies a position of 
suffering, even before the case has been adjudicated. The 
definition acknowledges the applicant’s suffering and 
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vulnerability, and she is presumed to be suffering even before 
the case is heard. 
Preeti told me that her main goal was to improve her husband 
and change his behaviour. “If he changed and asked her for a 
reconciliation would you agree?” I asked. She thought for a moment 
and responded “I don’t want to any longer. I want a landmark 
judgement in my favour from the family court, that a wrong doer 
cannot ask for divorce. It will help in future litigations also.” While 
discussing details of her case, she narrated the lengths to which she 
had researched landmark cases that would support her case, and how 
she argued on the few occasions when her lawyer could not make it to 
court. Preeti was acutely aware of what the law could or could not do 
for her. She had filed for restitution of conjugal rights, despite her 
lawyer Nidhi’s opposition and unwillingness to file the case, and she 
was aware of the impossibility of executing the order, even if the court 
granted her a relief. In my interview with Nidhi, she said that as a 
feminist lawyer she strongly opposed a law that tied one down to a 
partner and was often used as a tactic to negotiate. Preeti’s husband 
was unwilling to live with her after filing the case under Section 498 
A and the Domestic Violence Act. He did not feel he could do that 
after she had filed a domestic violence case against him. “How can he 
be allowed to argue that?” Preeti asked me.  
This transformation of women into ‘half-lawyers’ and the legal 
consciousness they acquire surpasses just being ‘right-holding 
subjects’. Women like Preeti have learned to strategise, negotiate and 
navigate the legal system, at the same time they learn about the 
limitations of the law. How, for example, can Act  ensure compliance 
of payment of monetary relief from a man who cannot be traced and 
on whom a notice to appear in court cannot be served? Or, how can 
the court compel a man to remain in a conjugal relationship? That 
litigants know their facts better than their lawyers puts them at an 
obvious advantage. This close interaction with the law also demystifies 
the law, as Preeti ironically observed, “How can my mother-in-law file 
a domestic violence case against me when I have filed a similar case 
against her previously? How can the court allow that?” she asked me, 
surprised by both the irony and irrationality of it all. The questioning 
of the gap and slippages between the promise of the Act and what it 
fails to do is unexpected from women who claim the category of the 
aggrieved victim, although it is their unwillingness to accept the 
situation that primarily leads them to the law in the first place.    
Before our conversation commenced, Preeti inquired what 
exactly was I researching and what was its overall objective. After 
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understanding the nature of my research, she referred to numerous 
landmark cases I should closely look at for my research. The cases she 
referred to specifically denied women the right to a shared household 
if the property was not owned by the husband.161 Contrary to these 
cases, she had achieved the right to live in the shared household, 
despite the property not being owned by her husband but by her 
mother-in law.  
Silencing violence  
One of the foremost questions with which I undertook the 
fieldwork was to understand what happens to the Act in the day-to-day 
actions of a courtroom. How does a comprehensive legal definition 
and naming of ‘domestic violence’, which is considered one of the 
successes of the Act, change the nature of how violence claims are 
argued and represented in courtrooms. To my surprise, violence and 
the nature of violence women suffered rarely surfaced in the oral 
arguments I heard in courtrooms. Not even when lawyers argued for a 
right to the shared household did the question of what kind of 
violence did the woman suffer appear in the oral arguments. Instead, 
the predominant arguments focused on the civil remedies claimed by 
the aggrieved person, that is, the woman. The kind of violence that 
women suffered, and when and how that violence took place, 
appeared in cross-examinations of women only to question the 
truthfulness and authenticity of the written claims made in 
applications and affidavits. Otherwise, ‘violence’ was overlooked in the 
pursuit of civil reliefs, to borrow the words of Basu. 162  Domestic 
violence, as Basu notes, and many of the lawyers I interviewed 
admitted, was more a matter of legal strategy. Violence was mainly a 
ground on which women could seek civil remedies under the Act, and 
the goal of the Act was to provide remedies rather than to penalise the 
wrongdoer.  
This silencing of violence from the core arguments in courts 
and swapping it for civil remedies that women want, renders the 
nature of violence suffered insignificant. The value placed on court 
time, and the small window for oral arguments provide little time for 
                                                             
161 Preeti specifically referred to S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra and S. Prabhakaran 
v. State of Kerala, AIR 2009 (NOC) 1017. Both cases took a more restricted 
approach to the definition of a shared household, implying that a husband 
should have a right in the property for it to be considered a shared 
household.  
162 Basu, The Trouble with Marriage, 192. 
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arguments that emphasise the violence suffered. Likewise, the civil 
nature of the Act shifts its goal from underscoring violence to ensuring 
that civil remedies are granted. This was essentially the role that the 
Act played in claims of domestic violence, as women’s organisations 
and feminist activists realised what women want more than penalising 
their husbands and their families, was economic remedies.    
The silencing of violence has consequences. It mainly feeds the 
narrative of ‘misuse’ and the claim that only cases of brutal abuse 
deserve the attention of court, not the ‘one slap cases’ as a High Court 
judge told me, complaining that although the Act is necessary, it gives 
vent to petty and frivolous cases of violence that she referred to as ‘one 
slap cases’, where women file cases because their husbands just slapped 
them once. By not articulating the nature of violence women suffered 
in courts, and failing to give it voice in courtrooms, lawyers diminish 
the other forms of violence that women suffer. Veena Das in her 
poignant ethnography on the riots in Delhi subsequent to the 
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984, recalls the 
eagerness and need of survivors to tell what happened to them and 
their suffering to be known, “as if the reality of it could only be 
reclaimed after it had become part of public discourse”.163 This ‘not 
talking about violence’ in courtrooms and the categorisation of ‘one 
slap cases’ renders ‘some’ violence in marriage as normal, something 
that should not solicit alarm or questioning.      
The failure to acknowledge violence, and the lawyer and 
courtroom’s categorisation into ‘severe’ and ‘not so severe’ violence 
transforms how women come to perceive the violence they suffered. 
The constant reiteration of the notion of the ‘perfect victim’ reappears 
in conversations with women litigants, despite the Act defining 
violence broadly to include physical abuse, verbal and emotional, 
sexual abuse, economic abuse, and social alienation. The badge of the 
‘perfect victim’ is awarded to those who bear physical evidence of 
brutality. I will start with the story of Hina, one of the lawyers I 
followed during fieldwork. Like most lawyers I followed, I met Hina 
in the courtroom, she was a criminal lawyer with more than 20 years 
of legal practice. Over the months, Hina’s office became a place I spent 
free time between court hours, where I took breaks for lunch with her 
colleagues, used the toilet or dropped by to say hello if I hadn’t seen 
any of them for a while. It also was a place where I received news on 
cases that were coming up or cases that I should follow. On one of the 
                                                             
163 Veena Das,  “Anthropological Knowledge and Collective Violence: The 
Riots in Delhi, November 1984”(1985) 1 Anthropology Today 4. 
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after-court evenings, I visited her office to witness how her client Zarna 
was being coached for her cross-examination by Manju, a lawyer 
working in Hina’s office. After a brief chat with Hina in her chambers, 
she directed me to talk to her client Sameera.164 “She has suffered even 
more violence than Zarna. They burned her hand,” she said 
animatedly. “Zarna has suffered nothing in comparison”, she added. 
This itself was a revelation about what kind of violence mattered. 
Sameera was also visiting them on that day as her original documents 
were being filed in court on the following day. A 27-year-old Muslim 
woman, she lived with her brother, who accompanied her to lawyer 
meetings and even paid for her son’s schooling. Both Sameera and 
Zarna were within earshot, and had possibly heard our conversation. 
This normalisation of violence in the everyday processes of claiming 
civil remedies both in civil and criminal law are revealed in 
ethnographic encounters with the Act. The diminishing of violence 
and categorisation of degrees of severity is central to the discourse on 
who can be a victim-subject, thus expunging the other kinds of 
violence women suffer, and the acts of violence the civil Act takes into 
consideration.  
Victim-violator to right-holding subjects  
Previous studies have shown how the disempowering 
categories of ‘victim-woman’ or ‘battered woman’ make for a 
convincing case,165 and the narrative of the ‘battered’ gendered subject 
is crucial to obtaining reliefs under the Domestic Violence Act.166 A. 
Suneetha and Vasudha Nagaraj claim that courts require evidence of 
violence, of ‘good wifely behaviour’ and ‘the cruelty of husbands’, in 
the courtroom.167 They argue that when women file claims in courts, 
they have to follow established conventions of the adversarial system. 
Setting up a claim requires narrating and marshalling evidence that 
strengthens the woman’s story or claim, ensuring that any conflicting 
or contested episodes that impact her claim and that can be negatively 
                                                             
164 I continue the story of Zarna in Chapter Four. 
165 Rosemary Hunter, “Narratives of Domestic Violence,” Sydney L. Rev. 28 
(2006): 733. 
166 Basu, “Playing Off Courts.” 
167 A. Suneetha and Vasudha Nagaraj, “A Difficult Match: Women’s Actions 
and Legal Institutions in the Face of Domestic Violence,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 41, no. 41 (2006): 4355–62. 
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perceived are erased.168 This also meets the criteria of reliable evidence. 
The victim/violator narrative, Richard Wilson argues, appeals to a 
universal narrative and lends an aura of authenticity. Wilson in his 
ethnography recounts how a murder of an elite local politician in 
Guatemala was ignored by global human rights’ reportage, as the 
victim did not match the required profile of ‘social or global 
marginality’. In order to be recognised as a human rights violation 
perpetrated by the state, both the victim and the nature of the murder 
have to fit a pre-determined criterion. The murder, concludes Wilson, 
was possibly therefore not publicised as a human rights’ case, since the 
victim was neither poor nor uneducated. He was simply in the wrong 
category.  
The victim-violator narrative that Wilson recounts was pared 
down to ensure plot coherence and was stripped of multiple meanings 
and narratives in order to present legal facts. How else can rights be 
claimed? The language of rights requires a commonality of experience 
from the category of the victim. ‘Half-lawyers’ complicate the stories 
we narrate, disrupting the plot of a good and convincing victim. Was 
Preeti misusing the law or was she negotiating ‘under the shadow of 
the law’? This right-consciousness that was also  displayed by the 
women I interviewed, stemmed from their textual understanding of 
the Domestic Violence Act - a recognition that the violence they 
suffered had a legal name, and entitled them to monetary relief and 
compensation. The women I met were sure of their rights and claims, 
even though those claims might stand in contrast to the rights of their 
personal laws, because the present law defined wrongs and bestowed 
rights. 169  However, the rights consciousness demonstrated by the 
women did not easily fit into the category of the ‘aggrieved woman’. 
In Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Kim Longinotto’s insightful documentary, 
Divorce Iranian Style, they show how Iranian women in small courts in 
Tehran use the law to obtain what they want and negotiate laws that 
                                                             
168 Suneetha and Nagaraj. 
169  Cases challenging the use of the Domestic Violence Act by divorced 
Muslim women applying for monetary relief under Section 12 of the Act 
have been widely reported by lawyers. The argument is that, as per the 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, Muslim 
women have no maintenance rights after divorce. However, a similar relief is 




favour men, either to escape their marriages and be granted a divorce, 
teach their husbands a lesson, or receive custody of their children.170  
In the months of my fieldwork, all the women who filed an 
application under the Act were predominantly Muslim and Hindu 
married women. One of the chief reasons often provided for seeking 
relief under this law as opposed to personal law, was that women felt 
they had a greater chance of justice under a secular law where they had 
rights and matters were adjudicated in courts.171 The Act was mostly 
used, however, because it promised early relief. It was also the 
stipulation that the case should be closed within sixty days of the first 
hearing that raised women’s hope of a speedy resolution. The use of 
the Act, however, was also a quicker forum for receiving reliefs while 
divorce or custody cases were pending in Family Courts. In contrast to 
the personal laws, the Act provided quicker reliefs in the nature of 
interim relief. Almost all women I interviewed, apart from Muslim 
women, had cases simultaneously ongoing in Family Courts, mostly 
divorce cases. The Domestic Violence Act permits reliefs while other 
legal proceedings are ongoing before civil courts, family courts or 
criminal courts.172   
Similar to Sally Engle Merry’s study on how women become 
right-holding subjects,173 the women I spoke to often saw themselves 
as right-bearing subjects. This legal consciousness174 and the language 
of rights they appropriated from their interactions with the law, and 
                                                             
170 Divorce Iranian Style. 1998. Documentary film directed by Kim 
Longinotto and Ziba Mir-Hosseini. 
171 Zarna specifically mentioned that she had clear ‘haq’ or rights under the 
Domestic Violence Act, and this Act recognised that domestic violence was 
not acceptable and wrong. To her the Muslim law favoured men and 
therefore she had little faith in the Muslim law.  
172 Under Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act, the female applicant can 
file a case under the Domestic Violence Act with other ongoing proceedings 
in other courts. The purpose is to reduce multiple proceedings ongoing in 
different courts, though in practice the women are often forced to run from 
court to court and attend multiple cases.   
173 Sally Engle Merry, “Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing 
Women’s Human Rights to Protection from Violence,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 25, no. 2 (6 May 2003): 343–81, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2003.0020. 
174 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even. 
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the various stakeholders was shown in the cases of women I followed. 
Typically, their first interaction was with lawyers who instructed them 
about their rights and encouraged them to file the First Information 
Report (FIR)175 or a non-cognizable report for an act of violence, hence 
providing evidence for the domestic violence they suffered. The first 
interim relief granted to them often instilled their faith in the law and 
their rights. The women first approached the law to mitigate violence 
and seek reliefs, but to contest that their positions are in a fixed 
category of ‘victimhood’ or as the Act defines an ‘aggrieved woman’ 
would be erroneous. Their status as ‘victims’ keeps shifting in the law, 
mainly depending on the stage of their litigation, whether they have 
been granted reliefs, and how many years have they spent in the courts, 
are whether they are fighting parallel cases in another court. The 
women I interviewed and whose cases I followed spent on average close 
to three years in court. Ultimately, it was often the bewildering and 
protracted legal system in which the case dragged on through 
adjournments, appeals, and revisions to application that caused the 
women to question the law.  
When the women I interviewed referred to their rights under 
the law or when they illustrated the violence they suffered, they 
referred to the Act and reiterated how the wrongdoing or their rights 
were covered by the law. From early on women litigants learn that in 
order to claim or seek relief in the law, their narratives and 
descriptions of violence have to fall within legal definitions of violence. 
When they refer to Act, they are not necessarily referring to sections 
of the law or what it stipulates, as lawyers do, instead they are referring 
to how their grievances fall within the realm of the law – the first legal 
lesson most lawyers learn in framing legal petitions and plaints is how 
can a grievance be framed as a legal issue or problem. What the women 
I interviewed learned from the law was not limited to their own active 
interactions with it, it also included the observations they gathered 
from cases they had witnessed in court while waiting for their turn to 
come up, or how their lawyers negotiated and used the law. Similar to 
lawyers  whose knowledge of the law goes beyond the legal textbook, 
but they learn from court corridors and colleagues, by attending cases 
argued by senior lawyers, and by observing legal argumentation and 
technique. Women litigants learn from what they see and hear in 
                                                             
175 A First Information Report (FIR) is filed at the police station by the 
complainant, and the police officer records this in writing. After the 
complaint is recorded, the investigation begins and the FIR recording and 
the investigation have to follow the procedure stipulated in section 154 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
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courtrooms and this is important in their acquisition of legal know-
how. But how does this image of domestic violence victims as ‘half 
lawyers’ coalesce with the notion of the vulnerable victim? And more 
importantly, who is the other half and how is the other half 
represented? This image of ‘half lawyers’ and ‘half victims’ is not 
an easy amalgamation.  
The Ethics of Listening and Narrating    
Preeti was an interlocutor and an aggrieved woman. Preeti’s 
case showed how narratives of domestic violence prompt a particular 
subject position, and how connections between narrative and violence 
take a pre-determined trajectory, but also how such narratives can be 
both conformed to and challenged/questioned.  By disrupting the 
narrative as a ‘half lawyer’, and then assuming the role of a victim 
Preeti disrupted the seamless domestic violence narratives that both 
activists, media, and courts perpetuate. These stories of violence, 
Briggs adds, are objects of their own making, dissemination and 
reception, as they discursively seem to unfold once the target human 
interlocutor is listening. Preeti in a way knew that I was the ‘listener’. 
I was researching domestic violence cases from the perspective of 
women litigants, and yet I was also a married woman of a similar age 
to her. We discovered we belonged to the same community, shared a 
common language and got married at the same age. Her unexpected 
revelation as we stepped out of the women’s toilet that she liked short 
hair like mine, but did not clip her hair short because her husband 
likes her with long hair, took me by surprise, but it was also a window 
into her desire for what Anthony Giddens describes as ‘romantic 
intimacy’ within modern marriages, rather than a relationship that 
involved community, duty and obligation. Preeti’s marriage was 
arranged by her parents, as opposed to a long ‘courtship’ identified 
with modern romantic love, yet her articulation and desire for an 
equal and intimate relationship that was her own choice and that 
positioned her equally in the marriage, played out in how she 
employed the law.176 As an educated Indian woman with considerable 
                                                             
176 Anthony Giddens notes that for ‘romantic love’, intimacy, choice and 
individual interest take precedence over connections with the community, 
kin and other members. Thus, with romantic love there is less concern for 
the values of duty, obligation, kin and family norms, rather it is intimacy and 
individual preferences that are primarily valued. Similarly, Henrike Donner 
writing on love and marriage observes that the popular celebration of 
Valentine’s Day and its global appeal reinforces the narrative of romantic 
love that is essential to Western ideas of marriage. For more, see Anthony 
Giddens and Christopher Pierson, Conversations with Anthony Giddens: 
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financial mobility, she was articulating what she thought her marriage 
should have – both equality and intimacy.    
I did not directly ask her about the violence she had suffered, 
respecting her silence on the matter that led her to court in the first 
place, and was instead led by her into the conversation we shared. This 
respecting of silence and listening to what is not said is what Jennie E. 
Burnet calls deep empathy.177 Part of this also involves, Burnet adds, 
suppressing your natural reaction to ask questions that may be 
contrary to your belief. I had let go of my natural reaction to question 
Preeti why did she want to grow her hair for her estranged husband, 
or why for that matter, did she want to be with a man who did not 
want her? Instead, our conversations revealed how she wanted an 
acknowledgement from her husband about the wrong he had done. 
By not consenting to divorce and by seeking restitution of her conjugal 
rights, she was challenging the unfairness of how in Indian society her 
husband could re-marry, but she was doomed to be alone, despite 
being the wronged party. She reiterated the unfairness of Indian 
society, where despite her education she was relegated to a lower 
position. Using the metaphor of ‘swachh bharat’ (clean India), a slogan 
adopted by the current Government to clean the streets, she 
emphasised how a country can clean its outside filth, even though “our 
hearts are corrupt”. Preeti was essentially using the law to remedy the 
gender imbalances that the husband who had mistreated her would 
get away with. Unlike her, she could easily remarry without any 
hindrances and without it affecting his remarriage prospects. 
At the same time, this ‘empathetic listening’178 revealed how women 
who are able to play the part of their own interlocutors invite suspicion 
and contempt from both lawyers and judges alike. Preeti’s refusal to 
accept her pre-determined position as a victim, her questioning 
whether her lawyers should take a certain argument that might be 
more suited to her case, and as an educated woman her constant 
                                                             
Making Sense of Modernity (John Wiley & Sons, 2013); Henrike Donner, 
“Love and Marriage, Globally,” Anthropology of This Century 4 (2012). 
177 Jennie E. Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in 
Rwanda (University of Wisconsin Pres, 2012). 
178 In her dissertation, Henni Alava writes about empathetic listening from 
the perspective of silence, and what listening to ‘silence’ means. For more, 
see Alava, “‘There Is Confusion. ’”  
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refusal to accept violence, broke away from the way in which narratives 
of domestic violence usually played out in discourses.  
Briggs reminds us how ‘disrupted narratives’ open up the 
complicated nature of both listening and narrating stories of violence. 
By presenting these narrative disruptions, I hope these ‘narratives of 
violence’ complicate the stories that I unfold. My partial reluctance in 
sharing this case was the fear of simplifying the narratives of violence, 
and giving vent to either the perfect victim or the half lawyer position. 
As a researcher, the ethics of being silent and knowing when to speak 
and how the narrative is structured are as essential as the ethics of 
withholding names or not geographically locating the court or parties 
to ensure that my informers both lawyers and litigants are not harmed. 
The ethics of how we should listen, though, are difficult to articulate 
and difficult to regulate. Both my role as a woman researcher, and my 
previous work as a women’s rights lawyer working on the Domestic 
Violence Act does colour the kind of questions I asked, what was 
shared with me, how I listened to stories, and how I choose to narrate 
stories. The fact that this thesis primarily focuses on women’s stories, 
and recounts and narrates their story, is a limitation I am aware of. 
Yet, given the nature of the Act, which permits only women to apply 
for reliefs under the Act, the focus naturally moved towards how the 
Act was used by women and towards what end.  
Recounting stories we are told, the researcher is often 
reminded of the ethics involved in revealing their informers or how 
pushing those who have suffered violence to recount their stories can 
cause further harm. The complicated nature of what can be narrated, 
when and how puts the researcher in a unique position. As Burnet 
argues, the multiple voices we present are critical to the nature of 
ethnography itself, exposing the contradictions and complexities in 
discourses and social relations. It is by taking into the consideration 
multiple and inherently contradictory voices that we arrive at 
particular ways of seeing, what Donna Haraway calls ‘situated 
knowledge’,179 even though ethnography and the way we sense and 
how we narrate is unique to us.  
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That women negotiate in “the shadow of the law’”180 is not 
new, nor is the way in which the law transforms the women a new 
argument. Litigants do not alone transform, but law and its 
definitional meanings and what becomes of the law is also transformed 
beyond legal amendments or judicial pronouncements. The law that 
women litigants talk about is not an ‘object or instrument of social 
change’, as feminist legal activists have defined it in their advocacy and 
campaigning of the law. Neither, does it effectively meet the feminist 
goals of gender-equity and empowerment. The emancipatory goal of 
feminist politics and rights discourse181 is limited by the category of 
‘victimhood’ and the gender and cultural essentialism involved in 
defining women as a ‘coherent group’, 182 and the interventions in 
saving the third-world women victim and the pitfalls this entails have 
been critically examined by scholars.183 The victim category, though, is 
crucial for credibility when accessing rights in courts, providing as it 
does the necessary language to approach the court in the first place. 
The question of the role that the Domestic Violence Act plays 
in my thesis brings me back to why the law was a starting point in my 
study. This study is not located in the normative inquiry of domestic 
violence nor the enforcement of the domestic violence law in 
courtrooms. Nor is it about feminist jurisprudence or how the law is 
used as an instrument or a social tool for accessing justice, or how it is 
subverted or transformed. The Act, if anything, is a focal point for 
departure, it aids in narrowing down the scope of the study, and in 
specifically responding to what happens when women come ‘before 
the law’. When I write about the law, I am not solely referring to the 
Domestic Violence Act. Law, as I show, eludes narrow definitional 
frameworks, since it is difficult to capture and pin down despite its 
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textual framing in legal books and files, 184  or its spatial-temporal 
locations in courts as places of adjudications. Indeed, as shown, the 
law escapes women as they struggle to reach it.  
It eludes us also largely when we learn that women access it 
through multiple forums, not just through the many state codified 
laws, and not just through courts alone, but also through community 
interventions. The manner in which women reach resolution for their 
cases, as previously argued, falls outside of the narrow definitional 
framework of what law is, since their experience of ‘law’ is multi-
dimensional, spilling outside of the textual, spatial and temporal 
frames, and challenging the uniform experience of law. This rendering 
of the law is beyond the local-global debates of how the ‘local talk back’ 
or the spatial metaphors of local and global.185 The diffusion of the law 
and the state is what Shalini Randeria has called ‘scattered 
sovereignties’. Contrary to the globalisation rhetoric that advocates the 
minimising of the state role in rule and law making, Randeria argues 
that the state has rarely been the sole producer and adjudicator of law 
and this fact is not new or out of the ordinary, given the postcolonial 
plural legal landscape.186 How ideas travel and are transformed, and 
what is local or global can no longer be located in a single encounter.187 
In this chapter, I have attempted to present the complex nature of 
using the Act, when and why the Act was enacted, and how the 
question of violence, and its articulation in courtrooms and dominant 
discourses is silenced.  
It is, as Vismann has written, literary fictions that highlight the realities 
of the law.188 Likewise, in this thesis it is in the stories that I follow that 
law makes its appearances in its many forms.   
 
                                                             
184 Vismann and Winthrop-Young, Files. 
185 Levitt and Merry,  “Vernacularization on the Ground.” 
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Chapter Three  
Spatial Arrangement and Hearing in a Courtroom 
 
I step down off the suburban railway station foot over bridge leading to the lower court 
in the Northern suburbs of Mumbai, male lawyers cloaked in black and white peddle 
their services. “Affidavit”, says one, “Notary”, mutters another approaching me 
discreetly. Yet, another male lawyer shoves a visiting card into my hands. I dodge them, 
and shake my head in response to their offers. The jumble of honks, careening buses 
screeching to a halt at a traffic signal, the toots of cars and bikes seems to get more 
persistent and angrier, drowning a few other words thrown at me by the male lawyers 
concerning the services they offer. A metal rattle of the peddler selling sweet lime water 
and the temple gong cut through the dense sounds of the rush-hour traffic. I make my 
way onto the second floor of the eight-storeyed court building into one of the four 
courtrooms, where every Friday domestic violence cases are heard. The traffic honks 
follow me up as I am hit by a mix of stale sweat and the unmistakable smell of a 
disinfectant that overrides the smell of urine. More than a dozen people stand chatting 
in the landing area. I enter one of the two square courtrooms overlooking the foot over 
bridge that connects the railway station to the road, the Magistrate is seated at the 
centre of the room on a podium and lawyers stand before him. I enter head bowed 
down and make my way around the standing crowd to seat myself on the third row 
on the left-hand corner closer to the window. The traffic jumble crescendos, a cry of a 
child emanates from the waiting area but fades away soon enough, the fast-paced 
clacking of typewriters from court administrative offices knifes through other sounds, 
the garbled, static chatter of people inside the courtroom and outside continues without 
any pause while the court proceedings are ongoing.    
 
 
The soundscape of the lower courtroom in Northern Mumbai, 
the field of my study, was sonically dense and alive, deeply rooted in 
the fabric of the city. What the court sounded like, as opposed to what 
it said, is not of significance in court reporting in legal journals and 
newspapers alike. And why should it be, after all, it is what the court 
pronounces that has a profound impact on law and legal precedents. 
Was the judgement in line with recognised principles of law? Did the 
court overrule a previous ruling or how does this impact future cases 
dealing with similar questions of law and fact? What were the facts at 
issue? Certainly, stock images of the court do make it into newspaper 
publications, thus reinforcing the gravity and authority of the legal 
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judgement – what Peter Goodrich has called its ‘visiocracy’.189 On the 
other hand, the question of sound has received less attention. Sound, 
though, is critical to questions of how the law hears and what it lends 
its attention to. It directs our attention to an architectural element of 
how spatial arrangement, in addition to laying the foundation for both 
visual, spatial, and temporal boundaries erected in legal proceedings, 
dictates how aurally accessible court proceedings are. 190  Both the 
structure of a legal proceeding and the spatial location participants are 
allocated in a trial influence the role of participants in the trial. As 
Linda Mulcahy observes, the spatial layout of the courtroom either 
undermines the role participants play or confers them with dignity.191 
Who appears where and when in the trial is a key indicator of their 
role in legal proceedings. The judge and lawyers, and the spatial 
‘well’192 occupies a prominent space in the courtroom layout. The 
positions of these two key actors neither shifts nor diminishes in the 
course of a trial, and that explains why they are afforded the space they 
are – they have to be heard. As for the litigants, they come and go. 
Their spatial-temporal positionality is contingent on the juridical 
                                                             
189Peter Goodrich illustrates his argument of the power of visual rhetoric by 
citing an example of how first-year law students in a course on legal research 
and case analysis in the New York Law School have to argue a case. Divided 
into two groups, one group of students argued in an informal setting and 
with a judge in plain clothes, while the other group argued in a formal setting 
that was adorned with Latin inscriptions, murals, bench, thrones etc and had 
a robed judge. When students were questioned on the legitimacy of justice 
in the first case, they said that justice was more likely in the second setting 
where the visual and ceremonial rhetoric of law was visible. Thus, for 
Goodrich, the ceremonial and sartorial rhetorics of the everyday visual of law 
have to be considered, for what the students saw in the insignia, robes and 
elevation affects our perception and apprehension of law, legal authority and 
the justice of judgement. For more, see Peter Goodrich, "Visiocracy: On the 
Futures of the Fingerpost," Critical Inquiry 39, no. 3 (2013): 498–531, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/670043. 
190 Linda Mulcahy writes on what the implications of physical and spatial 
boundaries on justice are. See, Mulcahy, Legal Architecture. 
191 Mulcahy. 
192 The ‘well’ or space I refer to here is not a barricaded space, but is basically 
a space where lawyers arguing the matter stand facing the magistrate or the 
judge. See the courtroom layout below, which is a visual sketch of how the 
courtroom is arranged.  
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identities that they occupy in a legal proceeding. 193  For instance, 
whether persons are an applicant/complainant or a respondent or 
whether they are responding to a complaint determines their role in 
the trial. The role they play in the trial governs the spatial-temporal 
position they occupy, that is, whether they take centre stage in the trial 
procedure or are relegated to the margins. Do they have to be cross-
examined? Do they provide insight into the facts of a case? In short, 
do they have something of value to say that may shed light on the facts 
of a case?  
In this chapter, I will start with the soundscape of the 
courtroom and the hearing in law. The image of justice is that of a 
blindfolded woman, but what about her ears? That is, how does the 
law hear and do we in turn hear the law. When I write about the ear 
and hearing in law, I argue that law has many kinds of ‘ears’ and it 
‘hears’ in different ways. Firstly, I make a distinction between what is 
audible and what is inaudible. I begin with what Clifford Geertz 
describes as a ‘thick description’ of the court I studied, which was 
sonically dense. ‘Thick description’ as opposed to ‘thin description’, 
Geertz explains, means placing what we observe in context, not merely 
observing. Essentially thick description is “an interpretative search of 
meaning”, it is there he argued lies the objective of ethnography, to 
provide a meaningful structure and to make sense of what we see.194 
Thus, by focusing on the description of the sonic environs of the lower 
court, I demonstrate that the court proceedings were not audible to 
everyone, so the question is to whom were the proceedings audible 
and to whom did they remain out of reach. Secondly, I make a 
distinction between the many ‘hearings’, that is, the hearing that is 
stipulated by the law and implicit in debates on access to justice and 
the right to a fair trial, and the many hearings that take place in the 
courtroom. This hearing, as I demonstrate, is a function of who hears, 
who is heard and what is ‘heard’ and ‘unheard’ in the lower 
                                                             
193  When I use the term ‘juridical identities’ I am referring to the legal 
position one assumes in a trial. Under the Domestic Violence Act, the 
juridical identity is defined by law as the ‘aggrieved person’, or complainant 
seeking redressal under the law. Baxi writes, however, that juridical identities 
are not static, and shift in the trial. Thus, a rape victim can occupy multiple 
juridical identities at the same time and at different stages during the trial. 
For more, see Baxi, Public Secrets of Law. 
194 For more, see Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive 




courtroom, and I differentiate this from ‘listening’ – which is, what 
the court takes notice of.  
I rely on Paul Carter’s argument here, that listening is 
intentional or engaged hearing, what he describes as an equivalent of 
“eyes meeting and the sense that this produces of being involved in a 
communicational contract”. 195  Unlike hearing that is monological, 
listening is always in dialogue since it involves a response from the 
listener. Judges in court do not hear by choice, but listening is still 
intentional. Listening, thus, is not merely communication by a speaker 
to a listener, as Charles Hirschkind writes, it is ‘a collective 
performance’ for which both the speaker and the listener are 
responsible.196 What becomes of interest then is whether the court 
must hear or listen to meet the principles of a fair trial. Can it still 
qualify as a fair hearing if a court hears, but does not necessarily listen 
to its litigants? Is it even reasonable to expect the court to listen, given 
listening relies on intersubjectivity. Of particular relevance here is 
what are the conditions of subjectivity in a court that is not arranged 
in a spatially equal manner? These are some of the critical questions I 
consider when I evaluate what hearing and listening means, as well as 
the conditions under which they are exercised in lower courtrooms. 
Hearing itself is a trained activity. Not everyone is ‘heard’, and 
not all cases deserve the same attention. Judges are trained to hear, 
and differentiate between ‘garbage cases’197 and important cases, thus 
listening to what deserves attention and omitting what does not. I 
argue that how the law attunes its ears to ‘hearing’ is not in line with 
the human sensory perception. Does the law hear what is being said 
or is it unheard? I juxtapose the sonic denseness and aural leakiness of 
                                                             
195  Paul Carter, "Ambiguous Traces, Mishearing, and Auditory Space," 
Hearing Cultures : Essays on Sound, Listening, and Modernity, 1 January 2004, 
43–64. 
196 Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape. 
197 Most cases under the Domestic Violence Act are viewed as matrimonial 
bickering that can easily be ‘settled’, instead of taking up court time. 
Impatience with listening to arguments or proceeding with cross-
examinations when the case can be easily resolved by striking a compromise 
is evident in the manner in which judges bring up ‘settlement’ throughout 
the proceedings. In Sally Engle Merry’s monograph on lower trial courts in 
America, Merry writes about how the court staff view the cases brought to 
court as trivial, frivolous, or ‘garbage’ cases. For more, see Merry, Getting 
Justice and Getting Even.    
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the courtroom with the denial of ‘audibility’ and hearing, where the 
women litigants I studied were not ‘heard’. In contrast to the ‘aural’ 
denseness where the outside/inside sonic worlds intersect in the lower 
courtroom, the law as I demonstrate denies ‘hearing’ to women 
litigants. By ‘aural leakiness’, I mean how sound fails to comply with 
the regulations of ‘silence’ and ‘solemnity’ that are expected in a 
courtroom space. Instead, as Hamilton et al point out,  it “leaks out of 
those efforts or dances around them altogether”.198 These slippages in 
the courtroom are firstly what is lost owing to inaudibility, and 
secondly, they are a result of the language of law and the multiple 
languages used in the courtroom and its subsequent interpretations. 
Thus, to borrow the words of Srimati Basu, the focus in this chapter 
is not “teleology of judgment but on the dynamics of hearing”.199 I am 
not interested in ‘judgement’, but in the process of judging and its 
correlation to hearing and what a right to a fair hearing implies both 
from the perspective of what is stipulated in law and what it translates 
to sensorially.  
The dynamics of hearing, as I demonstrate, are affected by how 
a courtroom is spatially designed, that is who sits where, who stands 
and who speaks. Whether one is spatially foregrounded by occupying 
the front seats in the courtroom, or pushed into the back rows, is 
critical to aural access of court proceedings. The language of the law 
and the many languages in the courtroom, with constant switching 
between languages, translations and silences are similarly critical to 
hearing and legibility in law. The back and forth where ‘the spoken’ in 
court is translated into the official language of the court, in this case 
the English language, and into official record by the court, where it is 
stripped of its colloquiality. Cross-examinations are critical 
illustrations of these translations where the court often reminds 
litigants of the structured question-answer format that is further 
reduced into writing in the formal mode of question and response 
without the interruptions, prodding, scolding and silences that are 
commonplace in courts. This erasure of interruptions and silences in 
‘hearings’ depict seamless hearings and legal processes, the purpose of 
which is mainly to produce a courtroom record for reading.         
This takes us back to the question of what constitutes ‘hearing’ 
in the courtroom and what speaking or legibility in law entails. As 
                                                             
198 Hamilton et al., Sensing Law. 
199 Srimati Basu, The Trouble with Marriage: Feminists Confront Law and Violence 
in India (University of California Press 2015). 
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previously discussed, much of the discussion on ‘access to justice’ has 
been limited to physical and monetary access to courts in India 
without exploring what happens once we enter the precincts of a 
courthouse. But what happens if ‘hearing’ itself is denied? What if the 
definitional meaning of ‘access’ is met, but hearing remains elusive 
and ‘out of reach’? Is the failure of a ‘hearing’ in a courtroom a denial 
of ‘justice’ and access? In a court, where the outside sounds are not 
discriminated against the aural failure is even more accentuated. I 
earmark these questions here mainly to underscore that they are 
critical to the question of hearing.   
I ask these questions from the institutional setting of the court 
I located myself in. Limiting the question of audibility and hearing to 
the court and the courtroom alone, however, will be akin to narrating 
half the story. Given this chapter is about hearing and listening, the 
acoustic architecture of the courtroom and the city are important to 
attend to the question of ‘hearing’. We witness the undercurrents of 
the city in the court, and it is an essential part of our perceptual 
experience of the courtroom, even if it is unrecognised. Thus, this 
chapter brings to the fore the aurally charged city and suburb where 
the court is located. Such factors are essential to the dynamics of 
hearing and the implications they have on listening, and the kind of 
listening practices that emerge, the slippages and distractions, and how 
the listening is altered. The aural world of the city is essential and 
integral to the kind of listening that emerges; it affects what gets lost 
or slips out, and it alters the way in which we ‘listen’. 
I started this chapter with the ‘sonic intensity’ of Mumbai.200 
What does Mumbai sound like? As difficult as it is to reduce sounds 
to a textual medium, I present a brief history of the city of Mumbai. 
From there, I move on to the question of audibility and hearing in the 
court itself and present an ethnographic description of the court. I 
focus on the spatial layout of the courtroom and the legal procedure 
in particular. That is to say, the acoustics of the courtroom that 
heighten certain sounds while others are ignored is a result of spatial 
arrangement and legal procedure that dictate who occupies what 
                                                             
200 As Hirschkind in his ethnographic study of cassette sermons observes, ‘the 
sonic intensity’ of Cairo forms an essential part of the listening practices of 
his informants, even if they are aurally unconscious of it. Listening to 
sermons in the chaos of Cairo, Hirschkind demonstrates, is far from the 
calm, quiescence and silence associated with the act of listening. Instead, 
Hirschkind shifts our attention to the other sensorial dimensions of listening 
that go beyond the cognitive. See Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape. 
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space. The third section deals with the many layers of ‘hearings’. By 
hearing I do not merely mean what is audible, I mean what constitutes 
a hearing and the many languages that impede or foster a better 
hearing. This includes what does the right to a fair hearing as 
stipulated in law mean sensorially, and, more importantly, I 
differentiate hearing from listening.  
The city 
Let me start by taking you to Mumbai.201 Mumbai, the capital 
of the state of Maharashtra, is a large metropolitan city with a 
population of around 18 million.202 A financial and entertainment 
capital of India, the cosmopolitan city attracts economic migrants from 
across the country and the evidence of this is the number of languages 
that are spoken on its streets. Conversations switch from Hindi to 
Marathi203 to English to Gujarati, and what emerges from it is typically 
called bombaiya – a language of its own, a language that its dwellers 
speak. Much like its street lingo, the daily rush to get things done is 
                                                             
201  It was only in 1995 that Bombay became Mumbai, when the ruling 
political party Shiv Sena and the Bhartiya Janta Party compelled the name 
change. Shiv Sena in particular claimed to be representing the local people, 
that is the ‘Maharashtrians’. The name was changed on all bureaucratic state 
documents, and all local shops and restaurants were ordered to have the 
name written in the local script, Marathi, the state language. This change in 
name from Mumbai to Bombay to many effaced the cosmopolitan character 
of the city. Political parties, however, claimed that ‘Mumbai’ was more 
honest to its local origins, since it referred to the Goddess Mumba Devi that 
the Koli fisher folk, the first inhabitants of the city of Mumbai, worshipped. 
The name itself has seen many changes. Thomas Hansen considers that the 
renaming of the city was a way of affixing identities. The re-naming of the 
city, he writes, is about the question of which space and whose history should 
it make a reference to. In a city and a state that is spectacularly multilingual, 
this naming of the city also has to be appropriated and demarcated 
linguistically, though the questions remains “in which language should the 
name properly be enunciated?”. See Thomas Blom Hansen, Wages of Violence: 
Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay (Princeton University Press, 2001), 
3. 
202 According to the last census of 2011, the metropolitan population of the 
city is around 18 million.  
203 Given its very cosmopolitan demographic, Marathi, Gujarati, English, 
Hindi, are all very widely spoken languages. Although the state’s official 
language is Marathi. All bureaucratic documents are available in English and 
Hindi too, and they are both widely spoken languages.   
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also typical of the city. The urgent honking of cars, the entrepreneurial 
spirit of its peddlers hawking pirated books, fruits, magazines when 
the street lights turn red, and the jostling for space as commuters 
throng the commercial centre to the South of the city and return back 
to their far suburban homes on local trains, buses and cars is also 
typical of Mumbai. As a city that harbours many dreams: from 
Bollywood glitz to migrants who make it to the city to seize what 
Bombay has to offer in terms of livelihood, Mumbai or Bombay is also 
where the East India Company set up trade in 1668. A port city, made 
up of seven islands, trade grew rapidly in the city, bringing cotton 
merchants and mill workers in the 17th century. The island, thus, has 
long been considered a bastion of fulfilling dreams, whether cinematic 
or otherwise. Songs have been picturised, featuring the vast expanse of 
the Arabian Sea in a monsoon, visuals of tall towers and slums in the 
same frame depending on the plot, and stories of its ruthlessness and 
apathy abound. Throbbing and pulsating till the early hours of the 
morning, its description as a city ‘that never sleeps’ is clichéd but is 
nevertheless true. “Why do people still live in Bombay?” asked Suketu 
Mehta in his book on Bombay, Maximum City, lamenting how solitude 
is a luxury in a city where the assault on the senses is persistent. In 
Bombay, Meri Jaan (meri jaan means my sweetheart) titled after the 
famous Bollywood204 song by the same name,205 editors Jerry Pinto and 
Naresh Fernandes 206 have selected a collection of texts that capture 
the mad rush of the city with its all-embracing attitude. They write: 
                                                             
204 Bollywood, as it is popularly called, has come to mean commercial or 
popular Hindi movies made in Mumbai. The name is derived from Bombay, 
and the American film industry Hollywood which is its famous counterpart. 
Although, movies are made and produced in other languages in India, 
Bollywood cinema, as Rachel Dwyer writes has a more global appeal and is 
famous worldwide. For more, see Rachel Dwyer, "Bollywood’s India: Hindi 
Cinema as a Guide to Modern India," Asian Affairs 41, no. 3 (1 November 
2010): 381–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2010.508231.  
205 The song is about the difficulties of living in Mumbai. The lyrics in its 
quintessential bambaiya language say how it is a city where you can find 
everything but a heart and a place for people. It warns you to be careful since 
this is Bambai meri jaan (yet another name for the city). Picturised in the elite 
neighbourhood of Marine Drive with its art deco buildings facing the 
Arabian Sea, the song is from the film C.I.D., released in 1956, when 
Mumbai was Bombay. See, C.I.D. 1956, directed by Raj Khosla. 
206 Jerry Pinto and Naresh Fernandes, Bombay, Meri Jaan: Writings on Mumbai 




“If you are late for work in Bombay, and reach the station just as the train is 
leaving the platform, you can run up to the packed compartments and you 
will find many hands stretching out to grab you on board, unfolding outward 
from the train like petals. As you run alongside you will be picked up, and 
some tiny space will be made for your feet on the edge of the open doorway. 
The rest is up to you ...” 
 
Not much, however, has been said about the ‘sounds of 
Mumbai’. What does Mumbai sound like? While the city makes for a 
great backdrop and subject in fictionalised worlds or documentaries 
or even the Harvard case study on the clockwork precision with which 
the dabbawalas of Mumbai deliver tiffin boxes, the focus is on what we 
see and what Mumbai and its spirit of having things done is all 
about. 207  The monotone, screeching sounds of the crowded local 
trains plying across the city coming to a halt, the loud impatient 
honking and traffic snarls as cars and autorickshaws ‘cut’208 each other, 
and the call for prayer from the mosque do not happen in isolation 
but are interlaced with each other, even though in films the ambient 
sounds of the city are faded out to foreground the plot. So, when I talk 
about audibility and hearing I cannot do so without the backdrop of 
Mumbai, where the lower court is located. How do we ‘hear’ in 
Mumbai or how does Mumbai hear us is after all essential to the 
hearing in courts, as the outer and inner worlds intersect. Thus, being 
heard is akin to squeezing in through the doorway, the ‘rest is up to 
us’, where much of what we hear and how we are heard lies in a 
contextual specificity of what hearing is, and what it means.   
 
                                                             
207 The Harvard Business School case study on the dabbawallas of Mumbai 
who deliver more than 130,000 lunchboxes per day across the city of 
Mumbai from homes to offices six days a week with rarely an error. This 
delivery service is performed by the dabbawallas without the use of any 
technology or IT systems. For more, see Stefan Thomke, "Mumbai’s Models 
of Service Excellence," Harvard Business Review, 1 November 2012, 
https://hbr.org/2012/11/mumbais-models-of-service-excellence. 
208 Mumbai is known to have a terminology of its own. ‘Cut’ here refers to 
how vehicles constantly overtake each other on the streets to ensure that they 
miss the red light, or reach the destination a few seconds earlier. It is this 
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Spatial design and accessibility  
Courts are set away from busy roads where the courthouse or 
a court precinct disconnects the outside from the inside world.209 
Contrary to the court designs of hallowed court gates, ceremonial 
doors, and avoidance of the public gaze, the lower court I situated 
myself in stood practically on a public highway. A nondescript 
building with mould on its façade like many Mumbai buildings, if it 
was not for the black-robed lawyers hounding potential clients on the 
street, the court could be easily missed. The court lacked any 
extraordinary characteristics to set it apart, nor did it have any 
additional ritual to compensate for lack of grandeur to render its 
proceedings significant.210 Paul Rock in his seminal work article on 
Crown Court in London, describes how courts are designed in a 
manner that we make a transition from the outside world to another 
place, both in space and time. 211 He writes: 
The courtrooms are insulated indeed. Around them there are double 
sets of ceremonial doors advertising the scale of the transition that 
must be made when people quit public space for an area reserved for 
a set of very special activities, when they leave the smoky, sometimes 
bustling world of the waiting areas for the decorum of the court. The 
doors mark a frontier between a private, sober inside and a wilder 
outside, between the orderliness of the trial and the disorderliness of 
the lobbies, between the sphere of the civilian and that of the 
professional. (1991, 275)  
In the court I studied, the bustling city made its way into the 
courtroom. Like lower courts, especially trial court, the court I studied 
was crowded and intense. It had none of the imposing architectural 
grandeur associated with higher courts, such as the High Court of 
Bombay and the Supreme Court of India, and like most lower trial 
courts it was situated on the main road and in close proximity to a 
railway station, for ease of access. This meant that the sounds of the 
outside world of traffic snarls, commuters and vendors and lawyers 
                                                             
209 Mulcahy, Legal Architecture. 
210 Mulcahy writes that what a site of adjudication lacks in characteristics it 
makes up for with ritual in order to hammer in the significance of the 
proceedings. For more, see Mulcahy.  
211 Rock, "Witnesses and Space in a Crown Court."  
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hawking services crept into the courtrooms, partaking in the legal 
proceedings. The windows of the courtrooms stayed open all year 
round.  
To ‘hear’, as I discovered, was a challenge. It is these sounds 
that would commonly be described as ‘noise’ that made it into the 
courtrooms. ‘Noise’ is what slips in where it is not permitted. Noise, 
James Parker argues, does not exist in itself but in relation to where it 
is inscribed.212 So, in relation to what should be ‘heard’ in court - 
intelligible hearing and silence - chatter, traffic snarls and vendors 
screaming become noise. To give an example, for a thirsty person in a 
public space the vendor selling sweet lime water on the pavement 
would not qualify as noise, nor would a car that honked to alert its 
presence when one crosses the street, since it communicates and 
means something essential to the said person. The honking and 
vendor’s call becomes noise when it creates dissonance, disharmony 
and disruption, both socially and in relation to other sounds.213 From 
the perspective of the court, the ‘noise’ of traffic, of chattering litigants 
and lawyers do not interrupt the trial, however they make the court 
proceedings ‘inaudible’ for a certain section of the audience, 
depending on where they are located in the courtroom. Sitting in the 
public seats, the outside sounds disrupted the courtroom proceedings 
for me, since I strained to hear or could not hear what was being said. 
What makes certain sounds noisy is essentially that they have no 
business to be there, and instead of adding to the communication they 
disrupt it.     
As in all courts, the lower court I studied also regulated sounds. 
The faded printed sheets plastered on doors and walls make known 
the appropriate behaviour - “Keep Silence”, “Don’t spit”, “By court 
order turn off mobile phones”. That silence is crucial for the 
administration of justice was evident in the way every now and then a 
court clerk, a paan(betel leaf)-chewing stocky, balding man, would step 
out of the courtroom and shush crowds waiting in the foyer into 
silence. The foyer would fall silent for a few minutes, and then the 
noise would rise again. Much of the court ritualism of respect was like 
that - alive between intervals. Silence, if anything, was evasive.  
                                                             
212 James E. K. Parker, Acoustic Jurisprudence: Listening to the Trial of Simon 








Mulcahy in her monograph on court architecture shows how 
in the earliest illustrations of the court space there were four categories 
in a courtroom: the judge accorded the highest status sitting on a 
raised platform for higher ranking officials, then court officials of 
varying categories, and followed by lawyers and litigants as the third 
                                                             
214Unlike the drawing, the lower court I studied was crowded and the above 
image of a neat, light filled room was not how the lower courts were. 
Typically, lawyers whose matters were to come up in the first half of the day 
would stand in the front rows after the seats would fill up. There were 
litigants standing everywhere in the courtroom since space was limited. The 
crowded courtroom would make the overwhelming heat worse, since the 
only air circulation was in the form of whirring fans and open windows on 
one side of the courtroom.  
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category, the last category was assigned for spectators, who were seated 
outside at the margins of the courtroom.215 The magistrates are often 
the only people to occupy the aerial view of the court. The 
architectural focus is on the visibility of the audience, as opposed to 
that of the proceedings. 216 This gives the judge what Mulcahy calls 
“visual control”. 217  Victoria Brooks, similarly describes the spatial 
arrangement in court arranged vertically on the basis of descending 
power.218 It is an arrangement, as she says, for the purpose of smooth 
and orderly functioning of the court organism. 
Apart from establishing unquestionable authority and 
hierarchy, the seating ensures how voices reach the judge’s ears with 
clarity, since the isolation ensures both a visual and aural elevation free 
from ‘ambient noise’ encountered at the ‘ground’ level. In essence, 
how sound travels is an essential consideration for architecture, since 
it moulds the acoustics of a space. The magistrates are the only ones 
engaged in the act of ‘hearing’ who remain seated throughout the 
proceedings, unlike lawyers, who stand during proceedings with their 
backs to the audience. As Mulcahy points out, the spectators have an 
unhindered view of the judge but a restricted view of the 
proceedings.219 In Indian trial courts, even the view of the magistrate 
is blocked by standing lawyers, who form a visual barricade between 
the spectators and the proceedings.  
In the lower court, the spatial hierarchy ensured only certain 
voices were amplified, and only those privileged spatially heard what 
was being said. Seated in the back rows and pressed against the walls, 
litigants rarely hear the proceedings as lawyers occupy the front rows 
in the courtrooms. Courts regulate not merely who is heard, who sees 
and from where, but hearing itself is a position of privilege. Lowest in 
the spatial hierarchy, the place litigants occupy signifies their status in 
the legal system. The court determines who is heard and who hears, 
                                                             
215 Mulcahy, "Architects of Justice," 396. 
216 Mulcahy. 
217 Mulcahy, 396. 
218 V Brooks, "Interrupting the Courtroom Organism: Screaming Bodies, 




219 Mulcahy, Legal Architecture. 
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who partakes and who does not. The spatial design disempowers 
litigants and undermines their status in courts, but also reinforces the 







Courtroom Illustration220  
The spatial hierarchy is possibly why magistrates often 
discourage litigants from arguing their own case or intervening in the 
                                                             
220 The illustration above with the ‘hearing symbol’ is to denote from where 
the court proceedings are more clearly audible. The last row of seats fair badly 
in terms of audibility, and the first two rows where lawyers are seated and the 
bench for the police are where the proceedings are most clearly audible.    
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proceedings when they have a lawyer. The assumption is that if you 
have hired a lawyer, you have renounced the right to speak in court. 
“Why should you talk if you have a lawyer,” a High Court judge I 
interviewed responded to my question of litigants being allowed to talk 
in courts. So, it is not uncommon for lawyers to snap at their clients 
attempting to speak during proceedings or ask them to leave the 
courtroom if they fear they would offend the judge or say something 
that may harm their case or undermine the authority of the lawyer. 
“Of course, as I go six steps higher my behaviour will change,” 
admitted the same High Court judge.221 This spatial privilege changes 
the nature of hearing and listening for magistrates, as the hierarchy is 
spatially etched and reinforced. Magistrates are thus trained to ‘hear’ 
and ‘listen’. In his monograph on courtroom soundscape of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Parker observes 
how the experience of listening through headphones in the ICTR 
produces a highly individuated, and bureaucratic listening practice. He 
argues that the audio technologies do not just record proceedings in 
courtrooms, they change the sounds.222 Sounds travel differently in 
different corners of the room, and at different times of the day, so for 
instance, the morning hours of the trial courtroom were sonically 
dense and demanding but as the crowds thinned out and the day 
progressed, courtrooms became comparatively more audible. The 
everyday rhythm of the city with its rush-hour traffic coincides with the 
everyday rhythm of the court, where all matters are called out, and only 
those ‘kept back’ for hearing, evidence production or an order are 
reserved for later in the day. Likewise, sound travels differently on the 
dais where the judge presides. The carrying of sounds and hearing 
them provides limited discretionary power to judges, but whether one 
listens or not is a matter of choice.  
Spatial hierarchisation not merely disproves the maxim that 
everyone is equal before the law, but actively denies prestige and 
dignity. It enhances the acoustic disability faced by litigants. The 
demarcation of space is an “articulation of social, cultural and legal 
relations”, argues Mulcahy.223 It inhibits participation, but also actively 
                                                             
221 I had met the High Court judge on two occasions. The first time was 
during a private session with the litigant and her lawyer, when trying to 
convince her to agree to a settlement. The second time was an interview on 
13 November 2014.  
222  James Parker, "The Soundscape of Justice Special Issue: The Laws of 
Technology and the Technology of Law" (2011) 20 Griffith Law Review 962. 
223 Mulcahy, "Architects of Justice, 386."  
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the lack of space for litigants is suggestive of the diminutive role 
litigants’ play or should play in courts. Audibility in courts is intimately 
connected to where litigants stand, it is also coloured by what is 
underscored or disregarded in court. This denial of ‘hearing’ and 
‘witnessing’ extends to the quality of legal aid most women users of 
courts can afford. It often also determines who is heard, what appears 
in court records, and which case is thought worthy of court time. 
While delay in cases and not being ‘heard’ was a common and 
recurrent complaint in my interviews with litigants, what was often 
overlooked was who was heard more and why did certain voices 
acquire greater audibility in courts more than others. 
This demarcation of space and hierarchisation extends not 
merely to courtrooms, but to other areas of the court building – the 
segregated washrooms that are locked with keys by the court staff, 
canteens only for the use of court administrators like the staff and 
lawyers, and the common chambers where lawyers read, relax, store 
their files and use them as an office space. During the time I was at the 
trial court, the women’s and men’s public toilet was either locked or 
not functioning on many occasions, or in a complete state of disrepair. 
An extra toilet for men was available at the entrance on the ground 
floor, but none was available for women. A female litigant with a child 
who requested keys to use the toilet just after I had returned the keys 
on one of the court days, was denied access, with the explanation that 
the washroom was only for court staff and lawyers, and yet another 
woman who clearly came from an affluent background was given the 
keys to use the toilet.  
 
A fair hearing  
“The invitation to speak in court fetishizes speech as the mark 
of legal empowerment.”224 Speech and being heard are cornerstones of 
the right to be heard. The right to be heard in law specifically entails 
the right to an impartial and fair hearing, and the right to be heard 
within a reasonable time. This includes the right to present one’s case, 
access to legal aid, and access to submissions by the opponent. In 
criminal cases specifically, the accused has the right to effective 
participation, and is entitled to be present during the hearing and has 
the right to be legally represented and to give evidence. Do the 
submissions in court count as speech and its acceptance as being 
                                                             
224 Basu, The Trouble with Marriage, 230-232. 
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‘heard’? Almost all key legal texts define the right to a fair trial, such as 
article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 225  and article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.226 The key principles for the right to a fair trial include: equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law. Thus, being treated 
equally is integral to the right to a fair trial. Additionally, it entails the 
right to an interpreter or being communicated in ones’ language, being 
tried in a court of law without undue delay, or being heard within a 
‘reasonable time’, having legal representation, and being provided an 
opportunity to defend oneself, and an impartial judiciary.   
The right to a fair hearing though may comply with all the 
tenets of what qualifies as a fair hearing, and yet not be a fair trial. Can 
one have a fair hearing if all the requirements for a right to fair trial 
are fulfilled? A fair hearing does not necessarily imply ‘listening’. To 
attain audibility in law, and to be recognised that you are ‘heard’ also 
entails being legible in the written record of the law, i.e. to be taken 
seriously. This makes the definition of ‘hearing’ itself contentious. 
Does courtroom talk that fails to appear in the written record mean 
one has been ‘heard’ or not? And what about the right to be provided 
with an interpreter or communication in a language that one 
comprehends? In practice, ‘interpretation’ and ‘translation’ and their 
implications for ‘hearing’, as I demonstrate, are not straightforward 
matters. The language of law and procedural complexities, moreover, 
can make the trial inaccessible. That access to justice may be available 
within a ‘reasonable time’, or without delay itself are broad 
requirements of what is within a reasonable time, for who, and under 
                                                             
225 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
states: “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.” Other aspects concerning a fair trial include presumption of innocence 
until proven guilty, to be tried without undue delay, communication in the 
language of one’s choice, legal assistance and an interpreter to be provided 
in court. For more, see "OHCHR | International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights," 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
226 Under Article 6 §1 of the ECHR the right to a fair trial is found in both 
civil and criminal matters, and it stipulates that a fair hearing should be 
provided within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 




which law. I discuss the many dimensions of what a ‘reasonable time’ 
means in Chapter Five.  
‘Hearing’ in law, as I argue in this chapter, is far removed from 
the ‘hearing’ that women litigants describe. It is how this hearing 
translates and what it translates into sensorially that is of interest in 
this chapter. Following the definition of what is a fair hearing, the 
cases I pursued met the legal requirement of a competent and 
impartial judiciary, yet as far as the legal interpretation of the 
proceedings are concerned and what might be considered ‘within a 
reasonable time’ as defined by Article 6, the ‘hearing’ often fell short. 
A ‘hearing’ in court has many layers. This includes the trial where 
arguments are heard, cross-examinations are conducted, and replies 
and counter-replies submitted. A ‘hearing’ also includes what does not 
appear in the official record, that is, ethnographic  observations of the 
courtroom, such as courtroom talk that includes clarifications, 
reprimands, rephrased replies, negotiations, and the multiple 
processes of translations. By translations I refer firstly to translation 
from the local language into English. Secondly, translating also entails 
converting ‘courtroom talk’ into the formal record of the law, thus 
erasing and expunging interruptions in speech, emotional outbursts, 
silences, converting courtroom talk into recognised legal categories, 
and reframing and rephrasing of cross-examinations into structured 
and seamless question-answer responses in formal speech. In her book 
on rape trials, Pratiksha Baxi discusses at length this silencing and 
expunging of courtroom talk from the official legal record. 227  By 
translating courtroom talk into formal legal speech and erasing what 
is considered superfluous to the facts of a case and to law, the 
translation converts courtroom speech into language and formality 
that is more befitting to the written record of the law, namely what is 
considered worthy for the court and for future readers to lend their 
attention to. The written record of the law is what is perused by higher 
and appellate courts, by judges and lawyers alike. 
The trial exists in manifold linguistic worlds, from opening 
statements, arguments, cross-examinations and closing arguments, and 
the multiple translations reveal how the trial is what Robert P. Burns 
has called a “consciously structured hybrid of languages”. 228  The 
tensions created by this ‘hybrid of languages’ is what reveals the ‘true 
                                                             
227 For more see, Baxi, Public Secrets of Law. 




law’, writes Burns. The often competing meanings where translations 
bear little resemblance to what was said is another kind of hearing, or 
mis-hearing of what was said or not said. This translation of courtroom 
speech is yet another version of what happened in the case, since the 
first formal record of oral narratives that is reduced into an application 
by the lawyer and submitted in court to initiate a trial as a translation 
of narratives is done according to legal categories. Consequently, to be 
heard in law requires litigants to speak in the language of the law, 
though as I will demonstrate. this ‘hearing’ may be entirely different 
from what the women litigants I followed expect. As Basu writes, “If 
you can speak in law, who can hear you. If you don’t speak, can you 
be heard at all.”229 Speaking in law, as I argue, is not merely speaking 
in the language of law and in legal categories, for ‘speaking within law’ 
is itself a status of privilege.       
In the everyday discourse of hearing among litigants, the right 
to a hearing often involves the right to speak and be heard in court. 
This does not include the right to access and file a complaint in court 
in written petitions, where arguments and openings statements are 
formulated and made by lawyers and heard in court. Instead, the 
hearing women litigants make a reference to is not to a hearing of the 
trial, but an opportunity to articulate the wrongdoing and violations 
in their own voices, language and an acknowledgment of this by the 
court. “I have not yet told my story yet”, is a statement that 
encapsulates women’s experience with courts and their desire to be 
heard. Even female litigants who have been granted interim reliefs 
might not be ‘heard’ in court or might be denied access to an 
understanding of the procedural aspects of the trial. The fact that 
‘violence’ is never addressed in cases, and does not occur in the 
arguments except at the cross-examination stage itself questions the 
sincerity with which the court ‘listens’ to domestic violence cases. As 
Sameera, a 27-year-old litigant who I introduce in the following pages, 
described her experience of court proceedings: “I don’t know what was 
said. There were just some documents that were exchanged.230 The 
                                                             
229 Basu, The Trouble with Marriage, 59. 
230  Under section 12 (4) of the Domestic Violence Act the first date of 
hearing should be no later than three days after the receipt of the application 
in court.   
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court has not asked me anything nor have I got an opportunity to say 
anything. I just go and wait there for the whole day.”231  
The tensions from the ‘hybrid of languages’ dramatically 
unfold in cross-examinations, where multiple languages, their 
conflicting meanings, and the manner in which the cross-examination 
is structured to ensure what the court ‘hears’ and ‘listens to’ comes 
into conflict with what witnesses (in this case the woman litigant) 
wants the court to ‘hear’. The dramatic unfolding reveals the 
conflicting and contested ‘truths’ that are lost in multiple translations 
of ‘what was said’ and ‘what happened’. The trial, as Burns points out, 
is already an interpretative understanding of a past event that has many 
sites and is “necessarily multivalent”.232 Correspondingly, the multiple 
interpretative versions of ‘what happened’ and ‘what is of value’ reveal 
the complexity and incommensurability of the nature of a ‘hearing’ 
itself.     
In this section, I will examine the dramatic tension that 
unfolds in cross-examinations in multiple languages. A hearing, as I 
previously claim, is not limited to the aural. Thus, the denial of hearing 
questions what constitutes ‘a fair hearing’. In the lower courtroom in 
Mumbai, three languages were used in most trials: Marathi 
(Maharashtra’s official state language), Hindi, and English. 233 All 
parties involved constantly switched languages through the trial. This 
includes cross-examinations, where the language used is determined 
by the witness being examined, and the questions for cross-examining 
may be framed in the language the witness is most conversant and 
comfortable with, but can switch to English or Marathi depending on 
the magistrate and the lawyer. It is critical to remember, however, that 
the switching of languages and the manifold translations cannot be 
presumed to be how multilingual courts function, as often the 
                                                             
231 The interview with Sameera on September 2015. She had already spent 
two years in courts without being granted any relief. Field Notes from September 
2015. 
232 Burns, A Theory of the Trial, 231. 
233 The Supreme Court and the High Courts officially operate in English, 
that is, orders and judgements are written in English, and arguments are in 
English. Lower courts, especially district courts can use the state language as 
the primary language. Nonetheless, in all courts arguments take place in 
multiple languages or there can be switching of languages, such as the 
language of the presiding judge or the language of the state. This language 
switching is common in everyday courtroom talk. 
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constant switch in languages by lawyers is also an attempt to deny 
access and knowledge to the witness of what is being said and 
exchanged between the lawyer and a magistrate. Given during the 
cross-examination witnesses stands in the witness box and are not 
within the reach of their lawyers and cannot be appraised or prompted 
by their lawyers, the failure to understand the exchange in court 
becomes a legal strategy to confuse and intimidate witnesses and deny 
them participation. This code-switching and speaking in legalese, 
especially to witnesses being cross-examined, is often objected to by 
witnesses’ lawyer and judges alike. I am going to start with one such 
cross-examination that I recorded.     
I met Farzana through Hina. She had filed a domestic violence 
application claiming for monetary relief two years ago. Farzana was a 
graduate in Bachelor of Arts and in her early 20s. She had received a 
small sum of interim relief and was currently living in her parent’s 
home along with her married brothers. Both her brothers usually 
attended the court hearing with her. The cross-examination was 
previously delayed on three previous dates.234 As the cross-examination 
was about to start, Manju, her lawyer, argued in Marathi for an ‘in-
camera’ cross-examination. By this Manju implied not in-camera 
proceedings, but a cross-examination not in an open court but behind 
closed doors with just the lawyers and the parties concerned present, 
Manju reasoning that Farzana was scared and nervous. The Magistrate 
rejected the request after the other side lawyer raised an objection, 
stating “I’m not asking any embarrassing questions.” The cross-
examination was thus held in a fully-packed courtroom after lunch 
hour. Farzana had spent the morning in the back rows of the 
courtroom reading through her files.    
This was the first time that Farzana had stood in the raised 
wooden witness box adjoining the Magistrates’ table overlooking the 
audience. Her head bowed down, she held onto her faded green plastic 
bag that contained her case files.235  
 
 
                                                             
234 I continue Farzana’s story and waiting experiences in court in Chapter 
Five. There I specifically catalogue her ‘wait’ and the delay in her cross-
examination.  
235 Field Notes from October 2014. 
104 
 
AL: applicant’s lawyer 
RL: respondent’s lawyer 
M: Magistrate 
 
M: What is your full name?  
F: Farzana Khan. 
M (in Hindi): Swear in the name of God and say you will tell the 
truth.   
F (mumbles under her breath): I swear (kasam).  
M (in Hindi, repeats): Say in the name of God you will tell the 
truth.  
Farzana mumbles but does not say ‘khuda’ (God).  
M: You don’t want to tell the truth? (Sach nahi kehna hai ?) Looks 
at the litigant. Farzana looks on without saying anything. Farzana 
nods.  
M: Say in god’s name (Khudha kahiye). 
F (barely audible): I swear in the name of God that I will tell the 
truth. (Main khudha ki kasam sachh kahunghi).  
 
Farzana refused to swear on the holy book. The intervention 
by the Magistrate to ensure that she swears on the Quran prior to the 
cross-examination was surprising, given in most cases the oath is 
usually rushed over and rarely attracts any attention. The question by 
the Magistrate about whether Farzana was not inclined to tell the truth 
was finally what forced her to perform the swearing procedure. The 
performative felicity of speech acts where words do things, that is by 
uttering something one is performing it or what J.L. Austin called 
speech acts, specifically unfolds in the oath taking ritual that all 
witnesses must undergo.236  
The linguistic power of the oath swearing, and its felicity is 
specifically what Farzana attempts to circumvent by swearing without 
saying ‘God’ or without clearly uttering the said words or mumbling 
under her breath so as to be barely audible. The Magistrate’s insistence 
on the words being repeated word for word, and audibly if anything 
underscore the performative linguistic power of the swearing 
procedure. It was only after Farzana had repeated clearly and audibly 
                                                             
236Austin, How To Do Things with Words. 
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that the Magistrate proceeded to translate the oath into English to the 
transcriber. Although the Magistrate questions Farzana’s intention to 
not tell the truth when she intentionally fails to repeat the oath, the 
sincerity between the words and the obligations attached to it are rarely 
questioned. In most cross-examinations I witnessed, oath taking was a 
ritual that was rarely questioned, or required any intervention. Yet, as 
it turned out, the oath was critical to proceed, as the power of the oath 
and that ‘words do things’ in Austin’s sense came to a head in 
Farzana’s refusal to swear. Writing on the oath ritual that precedes 
witness examination, James Parker similarly writes, that it is not the 
sincerity that is essential but the submission to the institution and 
authority that matters most. In repeating the words out loud in court 
in the presence of a judge and in an open court the procedure becomes 
a submission that is enacted “by means of one’s speaking body: 
resonant and audible”.237   
Subsequent to the spoken oath, the cross-examination 
proceeded with Farzana’s husband’s lawyer Sarab asking Farzana what 
her preferred language for the cross-examination was. Farzana 
responded she prefers Hindi.  
 
Respondent’s lawyer (Sarab) (in Hindi): In what language should I 
ask the questions?  
F: Hindi. 
 
After initial questions where the lawyer asks Farzana about her 
education, and how her marriage was arranged, the lawyer switches to 
English. 
 
Respondent’s lawyer (Sarab) (in English): If I say 18 November 
marriage happened is that right? 
Farzana stands quietly and does not respond. She stares at the 
lawyer.  
Respondent’s Lawyer (Sarab) (in Hindi): Do you not know that 
your sister in law was married before you? 
Farzana: Yes (Ha). 
                                                             
237 Parker, Acoustic Jurisprudence, 2015, 141. 
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Magistrate (dictates to the transcriber in English): It is correct I did 
not know that my sister-in-law was married before. 
Respondent’s Lawyer (Sarab) (partly in English and partly in 
Hindi): Did you know that she lived in Mahim? I am saying that 
you are lying, you knew that she lived in Mahim.  
Respondent’s lawyer (Sarab) (in Hindi): You are lying. 
Farzana (mumbles): No. 
Magistrate (in Hindi): I can’t hear, say loudly. 
Manju (in English): Your ladyship, she is scared. 
Magistrate (visibly irritated and responding in English): What is 
there to be scared! You don’t want me to take the cross?  
 
The Magistrate looks at Farzana with irritation and says in Hindi: 
“There’s nothing to be scared about. If you do not respond the case 
will not go ahead.”  
 
At the start of the cross-examination, the trial lawyer asked 
Farzana about the language she would prefer the cross-examination to 
be in. Despite stating that her preference would be Hindi, the lawyer 
switches to English and Marathi without providing any explanation. 
Manju, her lawyer, does not protest when the languages are switched 
in mid-cross-examination. In places where Farzana responds, and then 
asks that the question is repeated, the cross-examining lawyer tells her 
that the Magistrate has already taken her response in record. ‘Already 
‘taken in record’  here implies that the record cannot be denied or 
erased. The multiple translations and the structure of the cross-
examination where monosyllabic responses are converted into formal 
complete sentences already change the nature of the responses and 
what was said since words are not recorded verbatim. The Magistrate 
changes the nature of the response, first by translating it into English 
and then into formal passive sentences that are usually different from 
a colloquial response. The written record of the cross-examination is 
available after a few weeks. There is no audio recording of the cross-
examination. The Magistrate dictates both the questions posed by the 
cross-examining lawyer and the responses by the witness. 
 
Respondent’s Lawyer (Sarab) (in English): I am saying that the 
dowry was bought for your brother not for you.  
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Farzana nods without saying anything. 
After a few seconds, Farzana asks him to repeat the question. Her 
lawyer at no point intervenes.  
Respondent’s Lawyer (Sarab) (in English): Madam, has already 
made the entry. 
Magistrate: What question?  
Respondent’s Lawyer (Sarab) (in English): I am saying that the 
dowry was bought for your brother not for you. 
(Repeats the question reluctantly.)  
Farzana (in Hindi): No, this is a lie.  
Magistrate (translating into English for the transcriber): It is not 
true that the dowry was not bought for me but for my brother.  
 
 As shown here, language, especially in cross-examinations, is used to 
obscure and confuse witnesses. Often questions begin in one language 
and then the lawyer switches to another language to either 
communicate something to the Magistrate or to ask questions in a 
language that the witness may not fully comprehend. Here, Sarab, the 
respondent’s lawyer intentionally misleads the witness on a number of 
occasions. By referring to paragraphs in the application to which the 
witness had no access to standing in the witness box, he further 
confuses and terrifies her, ensuring that what comes out on record is 
contrary to what she had admitted in her affidavit. The multiple 
languages, above all, provide the lawyer with an easy cover to switch 
languages to confuse and intimidate the witness, this along with the 
procedural requirements of recording and the strict script where the 
oral examination has to follow the written submissions, adds further 
confusion to the proceedings. To my surprise, Farzana’s lawyer did not 
intervene, especially given that Sarab had a particularly questionable 
reputation in the court. On the following day of the cross-
examination, Sarab approached me to say he was pleased with his 
cross-examination, boasting how well he had done although he felt bad 
for the witness.       
Pat Carlen has suggested that courts paralyse its non-regular 
users. 238 The presence of strangers in the audience, along with the 
                                                             
238 For more, see Pat Carlen, Magistrates’ Justice (M. Robertson, 1976), 12. 
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formal architecture of courts that create distances in the courtroom 
that disrupt conversational practices, are both intimidating. People in 
everyday discourse generally talk in intimate and closed spaces, rather 
than narrating personal information over longer distances as in 
courtrooms. Moreover, newcomers to such proceedings are 
unaccustomed to the language style of courtrooms. The Magistrate 
ordered Farzana’s husband to stand behind his lawyer out of her field 
of vision. That did not help matters, however, as the question-answer 
format of an examination does not allow the witness to put in 
additional facts or details that may benefit the case. The witness has to 
respond to what needs to be ‘heard’. In all cross-examinations that I 
observed, magistrates discouraged the witnesses’ natural tendency to 
provide details that were not asked for. Given that this is the only time 
that litigants’ ‘voices’ are heard in courtrooms, most litigants during 
cross-examination articulated their desire to talk to the judges directly 
or provide details that may not have been sought.  
 
Respondent’s Lawyer (Sarab) (in English): I am saying that these 
dates and months in the application are with the help of lawyers.  
Magistrate: Mention specifically. 
Respondent’s Lawyer (Sarab)(switching from English to Marathi, 
which the witness does not understand): The contents of paragraph 
7 of the affidavit are a lie. It’s not in the application.  
The search for ‘authentic’ and ‘unmediated’ narratives of 
violence where no details are added with the help of lawyers is ironical 
given that the cross-examination itself is mediated and translated into 
another language, and into passive sentences that contain the formal 
solemnity expected of law rather than everyday conversational style. 
This translation from informal conversational style into formal passive 
sentences changes the nature of what is heard. Since the official record 
of the law does not resemble ‘word-for-word’ what the litigants actually 
stated in court. Naturally then, the official record of the law is partial 
to a certain kind of ‘hearing’, and does not record what is actually 
being said. The court puts on record what it considers to be of value 
and what adds to or sheds further light on the facts of the case.  
In the episode above, Farzana did not understand the 
suggestion the cross-examining lawyer had made, although her lawyer 
Manju objected and contested the suggestion made by him. He 
wrapped up his cross examination by implying that Farzana had falsely 
deposited, and that the Magistrate had that on record. Quite 
frequently, I could barely hear Farzana, who, standing in the witness 
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box, appeared terrified. The public spectacle of her cross-examination, 
and the spatial elevation of the witness box, placed in the corner of the 
room facing the Magistrate no doubt did not help. Srimati Basu in her 
ethnographic study of family courts in Kolkatta, writes how courts are 
suffused with the “tension and terror of public spectacle.”239  
The Magistrate heard the cross-examination in three 
constantly changing languages. This obfuscation, however, was not 
merely linguistic. Cross-examinations are structured to obtain the 
answers ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The result is that the witness is not allowed to 
add details or provide any explanation. The narrative of the cross-
examination that becomes the formal written record of the court has 
a story of its own to narrate, independent of the facts of the case. It is 
the story that cross-examining lawyers wants to extricate for the benefit 
of their clients, and to present a certain side of the story. Add to that 
the three languages spoken at the trial and the constant switching 
between them litigants in the witness box understandably become 
nervous. The court records the proceedings in a different narrative 
structure than that of the cross-examination, usually in English, which 
often may not be the language that the witness has been cross-
examined in or that the witness understands. Further, the cross-
examination format involves playacting, where the cross-examining 
lawyer feigns a lack of knowledge about the details of the events that 
transpired and poses questions to the witness to draw out answers that 
may be contrary to what has been stated in the application or affidavit. 
Questions are framed in a way that only monosyllabic answers can be 
given by the witness. So, typically the magistrate will record a 
monosyllabic answer of Yes or No in passive sentences using double 
negation, making the response confusing and overly complex.  
For every monosyllabic answer given by the witness, the 
magistrate dictates the recordings to the transcriber into English and 
in a passive formal sentence. In the case above, Farzana did not 
comprehend English completely nor did she understand that the 
question was misleading. Though a lawyer can object to the record 
during the proceedings. The hearing then is not limited to what the 
court hears, but what is recorded in the formal legal record.240 What 
                                                             
239 Basu, "Judges of Normality."  
240 What appears or does not appear in the court record is critical, for that is 
the final record of the case. It is not only a formal legal record of ‘what 
happened’, it is also what a magistrate will rely on when arriving at a verdict 
after perusing the court files. In “Justice is a Public Secret”, sociologist 
Pratiksha Baxi demonstrates how the story that unravels in courtrooms is 
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goes on record is critical to how the case progresses and how it is read 
in the future by the magistrate actually presiding over the case or a 
later judge who may preside over the case in the future.  
I attended a cross-examination of a 30-year-old Catholic 
woman (Sharon), who was unable to follow the structure of the cross-
examination. Sharon lived close to the court with her father, who 
often accompanied her to court. She had already received an interim 
order. She had a job, but in court claimed not to be working. Her 
responses to the cross-examination did not conform to the usual 
expectations of legal process, for she responded to questions with 
other questions and failed to playact that this was supposed to be the 
first encounter of the lawyer with her narrative. Her unintentional act 
of resistance in this sense denied what the court wanted to hear.  
Respondent’s Lawyer (in English): In paragraph 5 you said that 
after a month my in-laws started troubling me for a dowry. 
Sharon (referring to the Magistrate as madam): Yes, madam, after 8 
days of marriage here. 
Magistrate (dictating to the transcriber in English): It is correct, 
that after one month of my marriage my in-laws started troubling 
me for a dowry.  
Respondent’s Lawyer (in English): There is no police complaint for 
that.  
Sharon (often looking at the Magistrate while responding, though 
the Magistrate does not look her way): Yes, as a newly-wed woman, 
how can I?  
Magistrate (in English): Just answer the question. What are you 
being asked? Don’t give a question to a question.  
(looks at Sharon’s lawyer and asks in Marathi): Did you not tell her 
what is a cross-examination?  
                                                             
transformed in the process. She observes that the everyday violence of the 
spoken law, with such questions as how long were you raped for, did the 
accused ejaculate, was the penetration complete, are silenced in or effaced 




(Magistrate irritated with the witness and the lawyer, addressing 
Sharon in English): How does he know what happened in your 
case? You have to tell him.  
 
Listening and hearing  
In the transcription of the cross-examination the scolding by 
the Magistrate was left out. The recording effaces any instances that 
are deemed improper. Hence, courtroom talk, such as sarcasm, 
insulting comments directed at women, the reprimanding of the 
magistrate and the irritation at the litigant being scared do not appear 
in the official record of the case. Pratiksha Baxi in her study on rape 
trials in a Gujarat trial court in India, writes how courtroom talk is 
effaced from the formal legal record, such as enacting of the rape in a 
courtroom or the taunting or shaming of the rape victim. 241 What it 
is replaced with is a formal recording of the proceedings that read 
nothing like what took place in the courtroom. When cases are read, 
what we see, read or hear are not the voices of the parties concerned, 
but the formal record of the law, of how it should be spoken or how a 
legal proceeding should materialise. Judgements offer few or no 
insights into what transpired in the courtroom or how the verdict was 
reached. How a magistrate reprimands a lawyer for misleading, or 
scolds a witness for not responding to a question or failing to 
understand how a cross examination functions is not recorded.  
The ‘hearing’ by the court, then, is not just the sunwayi 
(hearing), but what the law takes into its record. After all, what the law 
records is what is worth listening to. The court file of the case is the 
formal account of the law that goes beyond the hearing since what is 
recorded on file is an acknowledgement on the part of the court of 
what it listened to and of what is of value and relevant to the law. As 
Cornelia Vismann points out, the file functions as a recording device. 
Files are everywhere in the courtroom – under the tables, on top of 
cupboards, piled up one on top of each other. They are not, however, 
silent bystanders to the courtroom proceedings, for they record what 
the courts listen to. What is not in the file did not happen.242 It was, 
as Vismann notes, only in the twentieth century that the inaccuracy of 
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files became apparent with the availability of modern technology.243 
Yet, what is in the file or the formal record of the law is never put to 
test or contested in the court. It is simply believed to be true; in the 
files facts become facts. The law, as Vismann points out, works with 
files and “creates itself from them” but does not comment on its own 
record.  
Writing about mistranslations in the family courts in Kolkatta, 
Basu observes a similar tidying-up of court records so that contain 
none of the ‘jaggedness’ of courtroom speech survives. She writes: 
“Voices are made to be appropriate, forcefully. Litigants are reminded 
that a deposition or witness testimony is a form of iteration, not a 
speech act in itself.”244 These translations, additions, alterations in 
excess of what the witness deposes introduces new meanings, and the 
translations into English fail to represent the multiple languages in 
which the case unfolds.245 In addition to altering what litigants say, 
they almost ‘un-hear’ what was said.  
Listening in law acquires ‘legibility’ when the spoken word is 
re-represented in the official documents of the court. Unlike ‘hearing’, 
which may or may not appear in the written record, listening is more 
about ‘legibility’ and the practices of making yourself ‘legible’ in law. 
The women litigants in my study did not refer to this kind of listening 
that acquires ‘legibility’ in law, such as submitting affidavits, 
challenging or appealing against a court order or submission of 
documentary evidence that are necessary procedural stages to ensure 
the fairness of the trial and the progression of a case. Instead, they 
referred to receptive empathetic ‘listening’ by the court. Hirschkind 
describes listening as a complex sensory skill as opposed to just hearing 
that is passive;246 it requires intention. For the pious Islamic listeners 
of his study, listening involved a state of “ethical receptivity”247 that 
entailed the development of the “body as an auditory instrument”,248 
that is, what his participants called ‘listening with the heart’. It is the 
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‘listening with the heart’ that lawyers referred to when they discussed 
whether the judge was ‘given to emotion’ or sympathetic to the cause 
of women’s rights.  
The courtroom I studied actively discouraged women from 
speaking when they were represented by lawyers, although the law 
empowers litigants to fight their own cases to decrease the costs of 
engaging a lawyer. However, the act of being heard in court is more 
than just seeking relief. As mentioned previously, the High Court 
judge I interviewed admitted that often women just want a platform 
to tell their stories, but she discourages women from arguing their own 
case because it ‘wastes’ court time, since unnecessary details are 
brought to the court’s attention. These narrations are seen as not 
benefitting the case in any way and are seen as wasting the time of the 
court. It is said that a trial is a ‘hearing’, that a court should ‘hear’ 
voices. But, these voices are those of lawyers. How stories are told and 
what is told when is the prerogative of lawyers. For litigants, a cross-
examination is often the only opportunity where they occupy centre 
stage and narrate their ‘story’. This often means including details that 
are viewed by lawyers and judges as ‘unnecessary’. The word commonly 
used for courts is a ‘hearing’. Aaj meri sunwayi hai (It is my hearing 
today), litigants often say. A words like sunwayi (hearing), implies that 
the function of a court is to provide a platform where one is heard. 
The process of the court and the narrative of the trial is expected to be 
that of audibility. Yet, in the anonymous space of a crowded, public 
courtroom, women are rarely ‘heard’ or ‘listened to’, even if they 
manage a favourable verdict.  
 
Conclusion  
A ‘hearing’ in court takes place within fixed hours. Once the 
magistrate presides over the court, his or her task is to ‘hear’, to ‘listen’ 
to what is being said. ‘Hearing’ one can say is a judicial obligation. 
Persuasion and rhetorical flourishes are keys to a successful legal 
practice and to wining cases. Most lawyers will admit, however, that 
they argue cases depending on who is listening and what kind of judge 
is presiding over the case. Is the judge likely to give a favourable 
‘rational’ verdict or give in to ‘emotion’? Is the judge known to give 
favourable verdicts to women litigants? Not surprisingly, lawyers often 
delay a case by taking adjournments if they know that the presiding 
judge would not deliver a favourable verdict and is likely to be 
transferred. In Aristotelian terms, the listener is one of the key 
elements in speech making, other than the speaker and the subject. It 
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is the hearer, as Aristotle observes, that determines the end and the 
object of the speech-making or argument.249  
Having said that, the onus of being heard in court is on the 
speaker; if you want to be heard, you have to be audible and legible. 
Judges say what they want to say, and hear what they want to hear. The 
inaccessibility of the ‘law’ I experienced in the court is almost 
Kafkaesque. Visman points out that in Kafka’s short story “Before the 
Law”, the inaccessibility of the law and of the story determine each 
other, since both are ambiguous and beyond interpretation.250 The 
gate to the law, like law itself, holds promise and has lured the man of 
the country into gaining access, but the law in this case cannot be 
heard. Kafka’s metaphor of the gate and the gatekeeper suggests that 
the unreadability and inaccessibility of law rests upon the sense of 
sight. Gates or borders serve as potent metaphors for admission, 
inclusion or exclusion. The sight of the gate and the ‘gatekeeper’ of 
law conjures up images of inaccessibility. As Paul Raffield writes, the 
gate and the gatekeeper are essential to reinforce the grandeur, stature 
and promise that ‘law’ holds, but also serves as the “immutable 
determinant of access to law”, adding that a gate is a recurrent and 
resonant symbol of law.251 Kafka does not waste words describing the 
gate, though he does suggest the ‘illumination’ of breaking through 
the gates. Instead, he writes about the gatekeeper in his fur coat with 
his large pointed nose and black Tartar beard – clearly an imposing 
man who towers above the man from the country. In fact, the gates of 
law are open in the story; it is the gatekeeper who functions as a symbol 
of the impenetrability of law.252 But who are the gatekeepers of law – 
the legislature, the judiciary and the lawyer? Vismann, refers to the 
preamble of a legislative text as an interpretative gate that articulates 
what the law ‘endeavours’ to do. Like gates, it guides the application 
of the law and how it should be accessed. 
If law was visible, how would Kafka show it, especially, in a 
textual representation? And would law look the same to all of us? As 
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there is no universal way of perceiving or knowing law, it would no 
doubt look different to Kafka than to say a court functionary. 
Consequently, Kafka fittingly leaves the law to our own imagination. 
Just as each sense advances its own notion of the law, law is accessible 
or inaccessible in more than one way. In the courtroom I studied, it 
was ‘ear’ that I had to attend to more than other senses. This is not to 
imply that senses work independently of each other, if anything, as 
many other scholars have observed, our sensory experiences do not 
work independently of each other but are interconnected. To speak of 
hearing as something only attained through our ears or to assume the 
universality of our hearing is questionable. Hearing, just like other 
sensory experiences, is grounded in what Hirschkind calls cultural 
practices that give them meaning. 253  Hirschkind argues that our 
sensory receptivity and our capacities are shaped by a disciplinary 
context or are informed by a specific community we may be a member 
of.  
Hearing in most of these cases fulfils the tenets of a fair 
hearing. Yet, given cases rarely finish within the prescribed time and 
the interpretation of and access to proceedings remain out of reach, 
the fairness of trials is seriously in doubt. It is little wonder then that 
most women leave courts disgruntled by a long-drawn out and 
complicated legal system, even if or when they receive relief. The 
quality of legal representation they have access to is equally suspect, 
especially in lower courts where litigants do not have deep enough 
pockets, and legal ‘superstar lawyers’ rarely make an appearance. Marc 
Galanter for instance, has argued that, the ‘grand advocates’ who are 
praised for their legal prowess rarely appear in lower courts. It is they 
who exercise ‘control’ in how the case progresses, or how to secure an 
interim relief in a slow-moving legal system through the use of “human 
capital they have developed within the court system and their nuanced 
knowledge of both formal and informal judicial procedure”.254 Lower 
trial courts, thus, are replete with lawyers who have little experience, 
poor lawyering skills, and little motivation owing to the poor monetary 
benefits. Women litigants, often owing to their limited finances fare 
worse than men in litigation. The legal representation they can afford 
is of poor quality. At least two women litigants I came to follow, Zarna 
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and Sameera, had changed lawyers owing to their dissatisfaction with 
their previous lawyer. This included factual mistakes in drafting the 
application or failing to appear in court on appointed days. 
Corruption among lawyers who are paid off by the complainant’s 
husband and corruption among magistrates is something of a ‘open 
secret’ that lawyers I spoke to shared in confidence. 
A ‘hearing’ in many ways resists being defined. What hearing 
do we refer to when we speak of sunwayi in court? Is it the one that the 
law stipulates? Is it where litigants are accorded time, dignity and space 
to articulate their grievances in plain language? The constant reference 
to ‘divine justice’ and ‘the last judgement’ in courts when magistrates 
and lawyers persuade litigants to ‘settle’ tells if anything the inherent 
limitation to the ‘hearing’ and justice that can be provided by courts. 
A ‘hearing’ by its nature, and its reliance on language and the senses, 
cultural proclivities, class, etc., resists being defined.255 Describing the 
listening practices with sermons, Hirschkind draws attention to 
listening as a responsive act that recruits the sensorial attention of both 
the listener and the speaker.256 For, how can I attest to hearing except 
with my own hearing? The ‘listening’ and ‘hearing’ in law requires 
responsiveness from the speaker as much as from the listener.  
In this chapter, I have argued that ‘hearing’ is hinged on the 
basic premise of how we all sense law differently. It is understood that 
how we know is the only way we can know. And much of this also 
centres on why is the law sought for in the first place or what have 
people come before the law for. The litigants who struggle to be heard 
or make sense of what is being said have an individuated experience 
of the law. A ‘hearing’ is a complex process, it involves not just what 
the law is hearing but also entails how and what we hear when the law 
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hears. What we hear and what the law hears may not be compatible or 
commensurate with each other. For instance, the formal record of the 
law is attentive to a different kind of ‘hearing’ than what is heard in 
the courtroom, in fact it would appear to ‘hear’ what is not being said. 
It records in the language recognisable to the formal case recordings 
of the law, as I demonstrated the ‘hearing’ in a trial follows a trajectory 
of its own, and it has to hear what it has to hear to render the trial 
valid in law. Cross-examinations illustrate this. Their fixed structure of 
questioning renders only a particular kind and structure of narration 
and ‘hearing’ possible.  
At no point am I suggesting that the ‘hearing’ required here is 
of one kind. Its complexity is revealed in the many layers that we have 
to attend to. Opposed to the audio-technologies used in modern 
courtrooms, such as cameras, mics, recording devices along with 
sound-proofed doors that stop outside ‘noise’ from creeping indoors, 
the courtroom I refer to appears less discriminatory when it comes to 
the outside world. Brooks suggests that interruptions in courtrooms 
can function as an act of de-territorialisation, by ‘interruption’ she is 
not referring to disruption of the legal process, but that each 
interruption may result in a rearrangement and resistance that it ceases 
to be perceptible to be an interruption.257 In the case of listening, 
though, the interruptions of the courtroom pass by imperceptibly 
since the law listens to what it wants to listen to. To direct the question 
Erlmann poses about the ethnographic ear, this chapter was an 
attempt to respond to the questions why do we need to bother about 
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How do lawyers know 
 
In this chapter I show how law hones a ‘lawyerly sense’ and 
how lawyers ‘make sense’ of ‘truth’, and how the ‘legal sensing’ lawyers 
I refer to are tied to how stories are told and retold in narratives. 
Narratives must be ‘narratively believable’, observe Anthony G. 
Amsterdam and Jerome S. Bruner. Thus, in order to access law 
narratives they must be scripted following the requirements of 
adversarial proceedings. In this chapter, I examine the practices 
followed by lawyers in assessing and sifting through claims of violence 
on a day-to-day basis. The question of how lawyers recognise ‘real’ or 
‘truthful’ claims from false ones frequently came up in my 
conversations with lawyers I closely followed and with lawyers I 
interviewed during my fieldwork. In referring to their ability to 
recognise true victims from false or dubious ones, lawyers did not rely 
on any kind of documentary proof, instead they referred to the legal 
sense they acquire in their practice in courts. I closely examine this 
‘legal sensing’ that lawyers referred to and argue that the practice of 
law hones a certain ‘narrative sense’, namely what stories are believable 
and what kind of stories have a foothold in a particular culture.  
Lawyers refer to how they employ and recruit their senses in 
determining truth claims. I examine this ‘legal sensing’ that lawyers 
referred to, and ask what does that mean when it comes to constituting 
facts in law and in establishing truth. I will explore what lawyers mean 
when they refer to how they can sense and identify truthful claims 
from false ones. In assessing their practice, I essentially relook at how 
narratives are told and retold. Clients tell stories to lawyers, who in 
turn convert the stories into legally acceptable narratives. These 
narratives demand coherence in which ‘truth-telling’ is often 
sacrificed, and instead lawyers look for ‘stories that fit’. 259  In 
adversarial trials, stories are ‘facts’ that appeal to evidence. I argue that 
‘facts’ are created to appeal to a sense in law, namely a sense of legal 
normativity and what appears believable. Thus, as Briggs has pointed 
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out, specific violence recruits specific narratives.260 When the lawyers 
spoke of how they sensed true claims from false ones, they referred to 
an overall sensing that cannot be relegated to one particular sense, 
instead they referred to what appears believable in a particular culture 
and can be ascertained without doubt in courtrooms. ‘Without doubt’ 
does not rely on incontrovertible evidence, instead it relies on what is 
a believable narrative.261 The vignettes below are illustrative of what 
happens to facts in adversarial legal proceedings and how the 
narratives women tell bear an imprint of what matters in law.  
Stories, as I demonstrate, construct facts, and in turn it is how 
stories are constructed and how they unfold that persuade people to 
see what counts as truth. This legal sensing is an ability to assess what 
‘makes sense’ and what is believable, such as can a marriage be good 
just for one night or can accusations of verbal violence hold in a 
courtroom? The legal sense then as I argue is whether a story is 
‘narratively believable’. This aspiration to make it ‘real’, Amsterdam 
and Bruner argue is when we subordinate the story for persuasion, and 
I argue this in turn influences how women can access the law. 262 
Drawing on nine months of ethnographic fieldwork, I demonstrate 
how stories told by litigants are replaced by stories that count as ‘truth’, 
and what has persuasive value in court. This skill and need to make 
one’s stories ‘legally believable’, further determines the access women 
have, or fail to have, to courts and to civil relief. In the pages that 
follow, I demonstrate how narratives change from what women ‘want 
to tell to what women have to tell’ in order to attain access to legal 
relief.  
Ankhon dekhi, kahno sunni: Seen with my own eyes and heard 
with my own ears   
In the very first month of my fieldwork, I realised that no 
discussion on the Domestic Violence Act was possible without the all-
pervading discourse of how women supposedly misuse the law. As I 
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have argued in Chapter Two, the term ‘misuse of the law’, especially 
in the context of the Domestic Violence Act, implies that women file 
false charges against men or falsely accuse men and their families of 
domestic violence to claim relief under the law. More specifically, with 
respect to domestic violence, the criminal section under the Indian 
Penal Code has been publicised as being misused by women.263 The 
oft-repeated argument against the use of the woman-specific law is that 
it is mainly used to ‘grab property’ or manipulate and control the 
husband. That women file false cases, or women misuse the law was a 
statement that was often bandied around by practising lawyers I met 
in my fieldwork. But, how do you know and what evidence do you 
have, were questions I often found myself asking the lawyers I followed 
and interviewed in my fieldwork. In many of our conversations, they 
narrated anecdotal experiences of how they could distinguish ‘true’ 
stories from fabricated ones. These stories were stories they had 
amassed in the use of the law and from experiences their colleagues 
had narrated to them. The response to my questions was often that 
they had witnessed an event first hand or had dealt with cases where 
their women clients were trying to misuse the law. It was ankhon dekhi 
they would say, which translates as ‘seen with my own eyes’. This 
‘seeing for oneself’ and attaching objectivity to sight is not new in law 
from an evidentiary perspective. It lends certainty and truthfulness to 
evidence, as opposed to hearsay evidence. Writing on anthropology’s 
reflections on evidence and the ethnographic record as some sort of 
objective evidence derived from ‘seeing’ first-hand, as opposed to 
‘hearing’, Mathew Engelke adds, “So, what we say is subjective, while 
what we see is objective” (18).264 Maurice Bloch, writing on the relation 
between truth and sight, comments that sight avoids the 
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treacherousness and intentionality of the kind of language used in 
social life.265 
Interestingly, though, when lawyers mentioned having ‘seen 
with my own eyes’ they were specifically talking about an oral story 
they had heard. Even when lawyers refer to a narration they heard 
rather than an aural referencing like ‘heard with my own ears’, their 
natural tendency is to refer to sight.266 This referencing to sight also 
has much to do with how evidence is assessed. The term ‘evidence’ 
derives from the Latin word videre, which means to see. The natural 
tendency to refer to sight or ‘seen with my own eyes’ as something you 
can attest to goes back to the relevance and doubt that hearsay 
evidence occupies in evidence law. For oral evidence to be admissible, 
the law requires that oral evidence be direct, namely that it refers to a 
fact that can be seen or heard or perceived by a sense; it must be the 
witness who saw it or heard it, or perceived it through any other of the 
senses. The evidence has to be direct and from personal knowledge as 
opposed to being passed on.  
Under the Indian Evidence Act 1872, oral evidence must be 
direct, that is, the witness should have perceived a fact directly either 
through his or her physical senses, that is seen it, heard it, or perceived 
it through any other sense.267 It also includes opinions or the basis on 
which that opinion is held. Senses thus play a critical role in witnessing 
and narrating what is ‘witnessed’ . This witnessing can be through any 
of the perceptual senses. Although, the word ‘witness’ itself has a visual 
suggestion, as something observed or seen, the law itself includes what 
witnesses may have perceived through any of the senses, including an 
opinion that may have been formed. As opposed to direct evidence, in 
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hearsay evidence, as Haldar sharply observes, the source of the hearsay 
information or statement cannot be verified through procedures of 
oath and cross-examination.268 The law cannot thus verify statements 
or confirm its authenticity, since procedures of oath-taking cannot be 
taken into account.  
Haldar writes elsewhere that hearsay evidence itself is a 
repetition of an original statement and that leaves the evidence open 
to uncertainty. 269  The witness’s direct evidentiary gaze is therefore 
critical when arriving at verdicts in law. Recently, Sameena Mulla’s 
study shows that the first step in a forensic examination in a sexual 
assault case is to interview and record the assault in the victim’s words. 
It is this aural account, Mulla writes, that serves to train the nurse’s 
gaze to look for certain types of evidence, such as dirt in the fingernails, 
gravel on the skin, injury to the genitals, and so on. This aural 
narration guides the gaze of the nurse collecting evidence, and this 
evidence can be recorded through a photograph, or sent on for further 
examination. This sifting and recording of the victim’s words is a 
technique that lawyers also employ.270 The vignette I present below is 
an illustration of how lawyers assess true claims from false.  
In Chapter Two I introduced Hina, a criminal lawyer I closely 
followed. It was through Hina and her colleagues that I learnt which 
lawyers were ‘ethical’ or which judges were prompt and not ‘corrupt’. 
In my second meeting with Hina in her office, she told me that the 
Domestic Violence Act is sometimes misused. 271  She immediately 
added, however, that she could identify a true case from a false one. “I 
know when a woman is saying the truth,” she declared as we sat in her 
25-square-metre office that stood opposite the courthouse where she 
mainly practised. In many of my conversations with Hina she 
mentioned how the law did not work as well anymore and receiving 
interim reliefs was getting trickier. Yet, she quickly added how the law 
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was also misused sometimes. “I only take the cases of real victims.” 
“How can you identify one,” I asked. “My technique as a lawyer is to 
first understand the gravity of the situation, then I ask her to write her 
story. Once it is written down I tell my junior to prepare a story out of 
it. I ask details of how the marriage was arranged, and if any dowry was 
taken. 272 I ask her (the woman) to write it down and come back and 
then more details will come out. All of this has to come from her 
mouth,” she pointed out.   
“When the woman returns later I make her rewrite it. If there are any 
inconsistencies (between the stories) I know that she is not telling the 
truth. If in the various narratives oral and written I find the same 
events then I know it is real. If there is a mismatch, I know she is lying.” 
“But, how can you tell in the absence of any documentary evidence?” 
I asked. “After so many years of practice I can tell this much ya,” she 
smiled, nodding her head, “We can smell it,” (soogh lete hai), she 
gesticulated pointing to her nose. It was a response I had often received 
to my question, along with: “It’s easy. I can tell a real victim,” or “I’ve 
been in the profession for so long” or “I’ve seen it with my own eyes”. 
‘Seeing it with my own eyes’ or rather ‘hearing it at first hand’ was 
sufficient evidence for them to draw their inferences. For most lawyers, 
evidence of a real victim lay in how women told their stories. The crux 
of this sensing of the true from the false rested on the seamless 
narrative control that litigants were expected to have. Yet, in the telling 
and retelling of the story, what Hina and her colleagues were 
determining was whether ‘there was a case’, that is, can a wrong be 
attributed to the respondent and is the woman ‘aggrieved’ according 
to a category of law? As Amsterdam and Bruner point out, the function 
of a narrative goes beyond just communication of information, in 
adversarial proceedings it is imperative to prove that a wrong has been 
committed as per the said law. Here when lawyers refer to ‘seeing with 
my own eyes’, they refer to what the narratives make visible. Does the 
story reveal the wrong done? Is it believable without any doubt? In fact, 
the visibility they refer to is whether the story is narratively visible what 
happened to the woman. 
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property or valuable security” given directly or indirectly at the time of 
marriage or after or before the marriage from one party to the other party in 
a marriage. This includes the parents of either party, or any other person 
connected with the marriage. Dowry demands are also covered under the 
Domestic Violence Act when cruelty is concerned.  
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Narratives and oral renditions of violence suffered make what 
would have been invisible, visible to judges. Lawyers sift out stories 
that can be easily perceptible to the court. This recognising of stories 
that can easily translated into evidence of violence rests on whether 
the narratives met the legal normativity of what stories of domestic 
violence should sound like. It is here that the legal narrative and the 
crafting of facts to bolster the claims made by the woman concerned 
are made visible by the lawyer. In absence of visual proof of violence, 
narratives play the same role as ocular evidentiary artefacts do in law. 
Like visual exhibits, such as recorded images and videos, they can be 
replayed or seen again to ascertain that we see what we see. They can 
also draw the attention of the court to a certain fact, to coherence and 
consistency in narratives, and to faithful shadowing of the written 
statement in oral cross-examinations. All these can help ascertain the 
truthfulness of what is being said. 
As previously pointed out, the lawyers I met did not rely on 
any external evidentiary document, like a police complaint, or a 
medical report of mental or physical abuse, in assessing the evidence 
of ‘real’ victimhood. Instead they relied on their intersubjective 
experience of the stories women narrated to them. This reliance on 
repetitive patterns was embedded in what the lawyers had ‘heard’ in 
past instances of victimhood. The narrative control and consistency or 
the lack of it was a technique they employed as a filter to identify ‘true’ 
cases. Their skill as lawyers was to recognise any inconsistencies in the 
narratives. Such instances that lawyers referred to in conversations 
with me were often the same: the ‘mismatch of dates’ in various tellings 
of the story, the ‘changing’ of the story, and forgetting or a lack of 
consistency between various facts. The mismatch between certain facts 
or contradictory facts similarly goes back to evidentiary rules, where 
facts that contradict each other can be challenged in court. Haldar 
argues that oral and visual proof have to appeal to sight.273 He writes 
that in order to persuade, a lawyer has to “open the conceptual eyes of 
his audience”, which is primarily a matter of clarity and lucidity. Does 
then coherence and consistency refer to the sharpness and lucidity that 
                                                             
273 The precedence of the visual even gains prominence in cases of music 
plagiarism when the court leans towards a written script of the melody or 
tune rather than on how the melodies may sound to a layperson’s ears. For 
more, see Michael Mopas and Amelia Curran, “Seeing the Similarities in 
Songs: Music Plagiarism, Forensic Musicology and the Translation of Sound 
in the Courtroom,” in Sensing Law, ed. Hamilton et al., (Taylor & Francis, 
2016), 73-90.  
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is associated with an image? The narrative even though heard as 
opposed to seen, is supposed to open the eyes of the court, to reveal 
the truth underneath the careful crafting of the lawyer. 
Consistency and coherence is considered a way of determining 
truthfulness. This is the case when lawyers narrow their gaze to a piece 
of evidence in their professional interactions or a case they have 
worked on. It is also the case when they include stories of cases that 
have circulated in the court corridors among their peers. These stories 
were precedents they came to rely on in their arguments to reinforce 
their beliefs that they were right. Landmark cases that lawyers rely on 
to strengthen their case also reinforce the same ‘patterns’. 274  This 
relying on precedents by lawyers stands contrary to ‘having seen with 
my own eyes’. The precedents are not limited to what lawyers ‘see with 
their own eyes’, but what is made evident to them by others. They 
almost serve as an eyewitness to what they see and how they know – 
an objective reiteration of what they have seen without the bias of 
subjectivity. The narratives women tell and the facts that are 
constituted, thus have to appeal to this coherence and consistency, 
even when they are ‘factually’ incorrect.   
“Facts are facts” 
In law, not all facts are relevant. Lawyers often determine what 
facts are relevant or not. Facts that may appear critical to a litigant 
might not be given in the legal submission. Under Section 7 of the 
Indian Evidence Act, if a fact is an occasion, cause, or effect of the facts 
at issue, it is relevant irrespective of the timing of when the said fact 
took place. Thus, the question of what facts are relevant is dependent 
on what they add to the case or what the facts at issue are. Lawyers 
defined a fact as relevant depending on whether an event or a fact is 
of ‘value’. In courts, ‘value’ as a term is used to measure the relevancy 
of facts presented in court, it is only on the basis of their relevancy that 
facts are admissible in court. Facts that are valuable are facts that make 
                                                             
274 Under the Constitution of India, Article 141, it is expressly stated that 
the decision of the Supreme Court is binding on all subordinate courts in 
India. Likewise, the decision of High Courts is binding on lower courts 
within their jurisdiction. In accordance with the rule of stare decisis, which 
means letting the decision stand, similar cases should be decided in a similar 
fashion. In case of a precedent, where a higher court has previously decided 
on a question of law or where the facts or issues of the case are similar, the 
lower court should follow the precedent.  
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something visible to the court, and that draw the court’s attention to 
disputed facts and shed light on them. In short, ‘value’ tells us what is 
important to law and how law hears when adjudicating cases. Does, 
for example, the piece of information provide insight concerning a 
contested fact or issue? In the case of women litigants, the facts that 
they may want to present in court or include in their narratives may 
not always be relevant to the case at hand. 
Facts, I would argue, are constructed to privilege a particular 
sense. Lawyers rely on the facts of a case to frame arguments for or 
against. Indisputably, which facts are highlighted is essential to 
achieving success in courts. The oft-repeated refrain of lawyers, “it 
depends on the facts of a case”, illustrates how critical facts are to the 
fate of a case. It is after all, the establishment of a previously disputed 
fact that constitutes proof in a case. In legal proceedings, certain facts 
are made more visible, just as other facts are left unsaid. Legal facts 
differ from facts in the scientific sense, that is, as Bruno Latour writes, 
they are essentially contestable in adversarial proceedings.275 Taking 
off from the weight facts carry, and the irrefutability of the written 
record, the vignette below illustrates how facts are created and the 
written record reified in legal proceedings. Women in cross-
examinations have to faithfully recall not merely the facts they know, 
but the narratives of their account submitted in court, as these 
narratives act as evidentiary objects that are translated from the aural 
to what the court can see in a file.  
In Chapter Two, I introduced Hina, a lawyer I followed for the 
period of my fieldwork. As mentioned there, one evening after court I 
arrived at Hina’s office to witness how Zarna was being prepared for 
her cross-examination that was to take place on the following day.276 
Zarna, a 26-year-old Muslim woman had filed a domestic violence case 
two and a half years ago. After more than two years of filing the case, 
a date for her cross-examination was given by the court. I had met 
Zarna the previous day and interviewed her in the court precinct about 
her case. Her uncle, who accompanied her to all her court hearings, 
stood apart as we talked. Zarna moved out of her mother’s home into 
a rented accommodation after she received an interim monetary order. 
                                                             
275 For more, see Bruno Latour, “Scientific Objects and Legal Objectivity,” 
Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things, 
2004, 73–114.  
276 Field Notes from September, 2014.  
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Her mother and brothers were not supporting her decision to go to 
court. At the end of the interview, she suggested that I should come 
and witness her preparation for cross-examination on the next day at 
Hina’s office. That evening Sameera, another of Hina’s clients, also 
happened to be in her office, and Hina directed me to speak to her 
because she represented in many ways the ‘perfect victim’. Sameera 
had suffered even more violence than Zarna, as her hand had been 
burnt. As I sat outside speaking to Sameera, who showed me her burnt 
hand and described the nature of violence she had endured in her two-
year marriage, Zarna studied her files in great detail, making notes, 
remembering dates and rereading sections and circling what she 
required a clarification on.    
“You have to remember the dates. What is written in the paper he will 
ask that in a convoluted way. In what paragraph you have said that, he 
will ask that,” Manju, a junior lawyer who worked with Hina, warned 
Zarna. Zarna nodded. “You can ask me questions now,” she said. “I 
will ask you questions from anywhere. You have to keep in mind what 
you’ve said here.” I was told it was important for Zarna to remember 
dates and what she had stated in her application. “This is where the 
opposite side lawyer will accuse her of fabricating if there is any 
mismatch,” Manju explained to me. As the rehearsal for her cross-
examination began, Manju sat opposite Zarna with Zarna’s file open 
before her and unleashed a volley of questions: what is your full name; 
what is your year of birth; what are your educational qualifications; 
which year did you get married; where did your live before your 
marriage; and where did you live after you got married? Shortly 
afterwards, the questions became more specific about the problems in 
Zarna’s marriage. Nearly the entire exchange between Zarna and 
Manju was in Hindi, since that was Zarna’s preferred language. 
 
Manju (lawyer): Upto when was your marriage normal?  
Zarna: Only till the first night  
Manju (lawyer): You’re lying  
Zarna (Looking clearly confused and with raised eyebrows): Why?  
Manju (lawyer): I am not saying this but the lawyer will. In paragraph 
15 you have said in the application that it was normal for one week. 
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Say the same thing. Put the stress on the question he is asking not 
what paragraph he is referring to.  
Zarna: This is the advocate’s (the previous lawyer’s) mistake. 
Manju (in English): Facts are facts. We can bring additional matter 
on record. But, total facts you cannot deny, because otherwise you 
are denying what you said on oath.  
The fact however was not a fact, as per Zarna. The ‘facts’ the 
lawyer had provided in the application were constructed either for 
their believability, or they were mistakes on the part of the lawyer 
previously in charge of Zarna’s case. Possibly the fact that the marriage 
was normal for a week came across as a more believable ‘fact’ to Zarna’s 
former lawyer in contrast to ‘one night’. Since this ‘fact’ was recorded 
by Zarna’s previous lawyer, there was no way to verify whether it was 
wrongly recorded. Zarna’s contesting of the written word was met with 
disapproval by her current lawyer. Her oral recitation of facts had 
failed to faithfully shadow the documented narrative in the legal file. 
The evidentiary protocol of consistency in narratives followed in 
courtrooms is also demonstrated in legal testimony under the law. Any 
transgression between the oral testimony and written submissions in 
courts are pointed out by the lawyer conducting the cross-examination 
as a proof of lies. The file or the written record play an instrumental 
role in the creation of ‘truth’. The written record becomes 
incontrovertible evidence about what has happened.277 Files function 
like ‘recording devices’, Vismann argues278 since they make facts what 
they are, almost akin to a photograph; the legal files of the case are 
seen as bereft of any outside influence. Suresh has similarly argued that 
                                                             
277 Haldar, writes that with print, writing became the ‘eye of speech’. Unlike 
speech, the objective of vision or the image is to open the eye in a persuasive 
way. The manner in which official records are differentiated from mere 
copies through insignias, such as a seal of the court or state, an affidavit or a 
document recorded on officially stamped paper, further affirms the 
authenticity of the document and places value on both its ‘truthfulness’ and 
its importance in relation to mere copies of it. For more, see K. Drybread, 
“Documents of Indiscipline and Indifference: The Violence of Bureaucracy 
in a Brazilian Juvenile Prison,” American Ethnologist 43, no. 3 (2016): 411–
423. Haldar, “The Return of the Evidencer’s Eye: Rhetoric and the Visual 
Technologies of Proof,” 94-95. 
278 Vismann and Winthrop-Young, Files, xii. 
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if it is in the file, it is the truth; if it is not, then it did not happen.279 
Likewise, in the case of Zarna, her disputing that the marriage was 
‘normal’ for only one night, as opposed to what was claimed in the 
file, was denied, not because it was not true but because it was 
narratively more believable that the marriage was ‘normal’ for a week, 
as opposed to just one night. Narrative believability, Amsterdam and 
Bruner argue, is more critical than ‘truth’ in law. When law seeks 
coherence it seeks coherence not merely in oral and written narratives, 
but also in what Anthony Good refers to as internal and external 
credibility, that is, claims have to resonate with what is considered 
believable and what fits the story.280 Zarna’s lawyer reiterated that she 
needed to remember three points, the dowry, loneliness, and verbal 
abuse, as these wrongs were critical for her case to stand up in court 
and be constituted as domestic violence within the ambit of the law.  
Narratives thus function as recording devices that demonstrate the 
wrong done in an adversarial proceeding. They embed coherence and 
consistency in events where none exist. Brooks argues that in doing so 
they neglect and falsify the ‘real’. In Zarna’s case, her protestation of a 
constructed fact takes precedence in the legal narrative and is 
accounted true, as opposed to what happened in reality. This denial 
of her narrative in order to ‘fit the story’ in accordance with what the 
law demands tells a narrative that is different from what Zarna wanted 
the court to hear. We see this cleaning-up both in how courtroom talk 
is translated, and how stories litigants tell are expunged from law. How 
stories are scripted and what came ‘after’ or ‘before’ is important to 
legal outcomes, and the story is told and retold at many stages and in 
each retelling their narrative, structure and goals change. This is in 
contrast to how stories are actually told. We see this imprint of the law 
and its affinity to chrono-temporal precision in what events should 
follow what in how women narrate stories.  
                                                             
279 Suresh, “The File as Hypertext.” 
280 Anthony Good writes that in asylum cases, the internal credibility of 
coherence in an applicant’s own claims has to resonate and meet with the 
external ‘generally known facts of a country of origin’ that the asylum seeker 
belongs to. For more, see Good, “The Taking and Making Of Asylum 
Claims: Credibility Assessments In the British Asylum Courts,” [DRAFT: 






Let us take the instance of Swagata, who had filed a case under 
the Domestic Violence Act. I had spoken to Swagata a couple of times 
and we had rescheduled our meeting twice. Sunday was a good day, 
we both agreed, since neither of us had to be in court.281 Nidhi and 
her colleague had recommend I meet Swagata for the purpose of my 
research, since her case was particularly interesting. As planned, we 
met in her office-cum-shop where she sold accessories for physically 
disabled persons – an idea she had after her husband became bed-
ridden. We seated ourselves in her small office, she pulled the door 
shut, so that none of the other office boys could hear us. As I explained 
my work to her, she nodded in agreement about how judge-centric 
judgements reveal little about what takes place in courts. “You have to 
talk to litigants,” she conceded. A soft-spoken woman, she had 
previously worked as a school teacher. Her current work was managing 
the shop and a courier service to support herself, her daughter and her- 
husband. Like most women litigants, she started her story with her 
marriage and the circumstances in which it took place. She was 
married at 21. “I had lost my parents at an early age. My brother 
arranged my marriage. In 1993, I had my daughter. The marriage was 
not good from the start. But after my daughter was born she became 
my focus.”  
Like most women, she left and returned to her husband’s 
home many times. Brushing her hands mid-air, she added, “you know 
the usual story of abuse and problems with in-laws and them being 
very money-centric. I had grown up in Calcutta. The move to Bombay 
was a culture shock. I grew up in a conservative household. I wasn’t 
like that,” she added pointing to herself. “I was meek, soft-spoken, 
wanting to please. I was scared to express myself. I didn’t work because 
I wasn’t allowed to work. Back then, men wanted women who were 
presentable, yet domestic. Someone they were not ashamed of. Beating 
didn’t happen much so I went back with my daughter. He agreed to 
let me teach in a school. So, I started teaching. I was teaching in an 
English school close by and … .” The sentence trailed off. Sipping on 
her bottle of water, she added, “I'll just give you a realistic story. My 
husband’s business was doing well but then he lost a lot of money in 
the share market. The financial situation started going bad. Before I 
left he was drinking and smoking cigarettes every day. I don’t hold that 
against him. I also drink but don’t drink if you can’t hold it. My 
                                                             
281 I continue Swagata’s story in Chapter Five. 
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daughter does not have any affection for him. In 2009, he had a brain 
haemorrhage. His parents moved to Bombay and bought a flat next to 
me. They did not like me or my daughter. They were disappointed 
because I had a girl. They used to bitch about me. Ah, you must have 
heard similar stories before,” she said breaking away from the story for 
a moment.”  
Then she continued to narrate the landmarks of her case, 
events that led to where she is now, punctuated by what she thought 
would be of interest to me. “The trouble started in the meantime and 
my husband had an operation. He had this property,” she says 
pointing to the desk. “It was a beauty parlour and then a courier 
service. I was not part of the business or insurance policies. I was like 
a mouse,” she hunched her face down to show me. “I was taking 
anxiety pills. I’m sorry maybe this is not helpful for you.” I protested 
and requested her to continue. This was not the first time that she had 
apologised. Every now and then, she apologised for flooding me with 
what she thought might be unnecessary details and cut herself short: 
“It is not relevant for your research,” or “Ah, you must have heard 
similar stories before.” Her idea of a ‘realistic story’ I realised was 
trimming the details that were considered superfluous in court. Her 
time in court and with lawyers who had taught her what facts could be 
constituted as ‘legally relevant’, meant that she had learnt to distil facts 
that might be considered relevant. Despite my protestations that I was 
keen on hearing everything, she would often stop mid-way into a 
sentence, then go back to the ‘facts’, such as how she met her husband; 
the case chronology and travel in and out of courts; the number of 
failed mediations; and how the case now stood. She had expunged 
events from her life based on what was ‘relevant’ to the case, and 
assumed what I wanted to ‘hear’. 
Thus, in her story-telling, she was reflexively editing and 
cutting out parts that she had learnt were ‘less valuable’ or had failed 
to elicit a positive response in her previous telling, such as how well 
she was doing in her teaching job or how she was taking anxiety pills. 
In her narrative retelling she had internalised the existing politics of 
power in courts, where she as a narrator was in a diminished position 
in comparison to other actors like magistrates and lawyers. In the 
descriptions she gave of herself, she had come to resemble the victim 
in law. The term ‘aggrieved person’ is the juridical identity a woman 
assumes when filing a case under the Domestic Violence Act. The law, 
however, does not provide a definition of what ‘aggrieved’ means. The 
dictionary meaning of aggrieved is someone who is anguished or hurt 
at being treated unfairly. In filing a case under the Domestic Violence 
Act, there is an acceptance of the subject position of being aggrieved. 
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Women are interpellated, and in this process women come to inhabit 
the position of the aggrieved.282 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown how ‘legal sensing’ is closely tied 
to what narratives are believable in courts, yet the ‘legal sensing’ 
lawyers refer to in their ability to recognise what facts are recognisable 
as truth is located in a particular aesthetics of sense that is implicated 
in a particular sensing body, and embedded in a particular culture and 
what a particular culture conceives of as ‘real’, ‘truthful’ and what 
matters. 283  Lawyers come to acquire the knowledge in courtroom 
practice, specifically in cases under the Domestic Violence Act. In the 
case of identifying ‘real victims’ from dubious claims of domestic 
violence, I argue one has to consider the discourse around the misuse 
of the Domestic Violence Act and in relation to women-centric laws 
in general. In Chapter Two I argued that women constantly have to 
prove that they are ‘perfect victims’ in order to attain relief under the 
Act, and this is correlated to the discourse and constant doubt about 
misuse of the Act. The ‘legal sensing’ of true claims from false ones 
that lawyers referred to is thus also a matter of assessing whether the 
women claiming domestic violence and their narratives of violence are 
in consonance with the definition of the ‘aggrieved person’ defined 
under the Act. The legal categories of violence recognised by the Act 
implicate ‘legal sensing’, as definitions of what qualifies as domestic 
violence favours different senses. The physical violence demands an 
ocular testimony of something that is visible to the eye. Violence 
relating to the verbal and emotional are not visible yet are made visible 
through narratives and testimonies of the violence suffered and any 
medical reports that may be available. Sexual violence, however, is 
more difficult to prove. As the female victims are generally the sole 
witnesses to the violence suffered, the role these women are expected 
to occupy as witnesses to their own violence, and as victims, places 
them in a conflicted position, especially when evidence is evaluated.284       
                                                             
282 Althusser, Essays on Ideology. 
283 Amsterdam and Bruner. 
284 In Sameena Mulla’s study on sexual assault victims, Mulla writes about 
the contradictory positions that a sexual assault victim is forced to occupy, 
where she is the key witness to her assault and at the same time is expected 
to perform the role of a wounded subject. It is here, Mulla writes, that the 
‘forensic sensorium’ of the nurse comes into play. Here she makes the 
invisible visible through her eyes and turns what happened into an 
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The lawyerly ‘sniff’ and the attuning of one’s sense that Hina 
referred to was much like that, an enviable professional attribute that 
lawyers solely acquire through legal training. Lawyers even before the 
reliance on photographic evidence were aware of how visibility is 
persuasive in law. The emphasis on narrative, however, throws open 
the question of the other senses, and raises the issue that narrative 
coherence can disrupt the centrality of sight or seeing in law. 
Narratives amplify what needs to be heard. They are critical in how 
they make audible and translate the subjective experience of violence 
and victimhood into legal categories. Is then the legal normativity 
lawyers seek in stories of violence one kind of sense?  In identifying 
truth claims the lawyers relied on their gut sense of what stories ring 
true. When Hina directed my attention to a woman who had been 
burnt and who her other colleague referred to as the ‘perfect victim’, 
what sense determined this? Was it the easily visible evidentiary exhibit 
of burn marks on her hand that made Sameera a believable victim? 
Hina was clearly convinced by the visibility of the evidence of violence, 
making it easier to prove than other forms of violence that may elude 
our senses. The categorising of physical violence that bears evidence 
on the body as violence that is out of the ordinary, and therefore 
worthy of attending to, normalises other kinds of violence. The High 
Court judge who articulated how she dismissed and criticised what she 
called ‘one-slap’ cases, where a woman knocks at the door of the court 
because of minor violence is an indication of how certain acts of 
violence are seen as routine, and therefore not worth reporting. It is 
this kind of violence that is so commonplace and unremarkable that 
it escapes us, as it is not the kind of violence that deserves attention. 
My interest in this chapter is not so much to interrogate the notion of 
evidence, but to closely look at the processes and perceptual field we 
use in how evidence is assessed, and how access is determined by the 
way in which narratives are framed. Of course, the interrogation of 
how evidence is assessed opens up the question of evidence itself, and 
what counts as evidence.  
From the perspective of domestic violence cases, how 
narratives of domestic violence are shaped and situated are contingent 
on the female victim-subject. The narratives have to be categorised in 
various categories of violence stipulated by law, such as physical, 
                                                             
evidentiary artefact that is legally acceptable. For more, see Mulla, Sensing 
Sexual Assault.    
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verbal, emotional and social violence, and economic violence.285 The 
stories of violence women narrate have to conform to the legal 
categories, but also have to conform to normative experiences of how 
and what kind of violence women suffer, how victims of domestic 
violence should look and behave, and what kind of violence and 
degree of violence necessitates approaching a court. The question of 
how much violence is enough to qualify as a true case of domestic 
violence persistently remerges in discussions on violence. Evidence of 
‘burn marks’ or ‘bodily injury’ that appeal to the ocular and confirm 
the authenticity of the claims.  Yet, what we see and how we see is 
dependent on what is made visible. When lawyers I met were referring 
to what they saw and what they know it was not limited to what they 
saw with their own eyes, but what other lawyers made them see 
through stories of cases they handled or judgements they read. The 
authority of lawyerly evidence derives not merely from ‘their own 
seeing’, but from what others see too. In the cases I write about in 
particular, what lawyers see is contingent on what law lends its 
attention to. This is critical to how lawyers ‘sense’ truth claims and 
what they look for in stories of domestic violence. Evidence is what 
lawyers make visible and much of this is done with help of how 
narratives are constructed, and facts are framed. 286  
  
                                                             
285 As indicated previously, economic violence under the Domestic Violence 
Act is intended to address situations where women who are financially 
dependent on the partner or perpetrator of violence, are not left destitute 
after filing the case, or are not deterred by the consequence that it may leave 
them homeless. For definitions of domestic violence and the various civil 
reliefs available under the law, see Chapter Two.  
286 Facts in law and facts in a scientific sense have been distinguished by 
scholars. Facts in law, as Neal Feigenson argues, are facts based on which 
legal arguments and rulings operate. More often than not, these facts in law 
are often what has been perceived by the person and only known to him. For 
more, see Feigenson, "Experiencing Other Minds in the Courtroom."  
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Chapter Five   
Being ‘Stuck’: Delay and Waiting in Court 
 
Waiting is “a particular experience of time”, to borrow the 
words of sociologist Javier Auyero. Writing on how poor people wait 
in a welfare office in Buenos Aires, Auyero turned his attention to the 
act of ‘waiting’ itself.287 Waiting, he writes, is a specific experience of 
time and corresponds to power relations, as the less powerful are 
compelled to wait. In this chapter I examine judicial delay through 
everyday waiting experiences of women litigants, and how this delay is 
related to access. The female litigants I closely followed in my study 
discussed their waiting in courts at length. They described it both 
spatially and temporally as a place-time where ‘nothing happens’, but 
also as being stuck situationally considering their cases as per them do 
not move and the fact that the relief they sought remains inaccessible. 
The waiting in which ‘nothing happens’ to their cases, relates to the 
feeling of being stuck and what Ghassan Hage has described as 
‘stuckedness’.288 Hage defines ‘stuckedness’ as “a situation where a 
person suffers from both the absence of choices or alternatives to the 
situation one is in and an inability to grab such alternatives even if 
they present themselves.” Hage, specifically, describes the feeling of 
‘stuckedness’ as a feeling of going nowhere in life, especially when the 
desire to go somewhere in life is realised through physical mobility.  
From the perspective of the women litigants, the mobility and 
the changes in the lives of women in comparison to their cases that go 
nowhere, results in a feeling of being ‘stuck’. The women are stuck in 
a situation that they seek to escape from. This includes being stuck in 
violent relationships and being stuck in courts when their cases do not 
move forward. The description of ‘nothing happens’ in courts is thus 
also an expression of hopelessness, and an articulation of the arbitrary 
power that courts exercise in their lives. Despite this sense of 
hopelessness and lack of control, the women in my study frequently 
                                                             
287 For more, see Javier Auyero, “Patients of the State: An Ethnographic 
Account of Poor People’s Waiting,”Latin American Research Review 46, no. 1 
(2011): 5–29. 
288 For more, see Waiting, edited by Ghassan Hage, (Melbourne University 
Publishing, 2009), 100.  
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expressed how they were transformed in the process of seeking relief 
in court, and spoke of the freedom and independence they had 
acquired after escaping violent relationships and coming before the 
law. In contrast, as women escaped and gained control over their lives 
by leaving violent relationships, coming before the law involved losing 
control again as the wait and judicial delay in courts meant being stuck 
again.  
Examining waiting and judicial delays in courts, I argue, is 
critical since the delays and waiting have a bearing on women’s lives, 
and the ‘wait’ demonstrates the power courts exercise on litigants’ 
lives. Waiting, Pierre Bourdieu argues, reveals power in social 
relationships. “The all-powerful is he who does not wait but who 
makes others wait,” he writes in Pascalian Meditations.289 Real power, 
he says, is when you can deny people the ability or capacity to predict. 
How we wait and who waits are governed by whose time matters and 
whose doesn’t. The uncertainty that involves waiting, like delaying, 
changing dates or rescheduling, reordering the nature of things, 
confusing and making it unpredictable by keeping one on 
‘tenterhooks’ is the privilege of the powerful. The less privileged learn 
to wait. It is this denying the capacity to predict or to know how long 
the wait is that Hage described as the ‘stuckedness’ of waiting. 290 
Anxious powerless waiting, where ‘patience’ is key to waiting, is what 
Auyero’s ethnographic study in the waiting area at the welfare office 
in Buenos Aires exposes. Auyero describes the poor subjects as 
‘patients of the state’ who have no choice but to wait.291 The sense of 
arbitrariness, anxiety, and loss of control is what both Auyero and 
Hage discuss in their work when they write about waiting. Waiting, 
Auyero points out, is stratified. Its experience is not uniform since 
there are variations in waiting time and delay.292 Similar to Bourdieu, 
in Queuing and Waiting, Barry Schwartz observes how queues reveal the 
social positions of individuals depending on the extent of their 
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waiting, who waits and who is waited for.293 The more powerful the 
person is, the more access to him is regulated, Schwartz writes. In 
similar terms, the longer our wait, the more it reveals the lesser value 
of our time and the higher value of who we are waiting for. Waiting 
in court for a hearing and the power the court exercises over litigants 
reveals the hierarchal nature of accessing law itself, and what access 
means in everyday life.  
This chapter thus catalogues the waiting experiences of women 
litigants in courts as they attempt to gain access to the law and the 
reliefs promised by the Domestic Violence Act. In a cruel parody, 
women find themselves again stuck and again losing control, except 
this time to the demands of the law. The waiting experiences reveal 
the power dynamics and the hierarchal nature of accessing courts, 
especially with respect to lower courts. By drawing on an ethnographic 
examination of cases and how litigants grapple with judicial delay, I 
seek to reveal the effects of temporal delay on lives, and how the 
parameters used by litigants (in this case female litigants) to measure 
delay differs from judicial assessment of delay. I particularly 
underscore this disparity between the judicial assessment of delay and 
how litigants measure delay by focusing on differing conceptions of 
time.  
I thus analyse multiple temporalities, and I argue that how 
women perceive temporal delay and waiting in courts brings to fore 
the stark contrast between women’s perception of what is ‘reasonable 
time’ to resolve cases and that of law’s definition of what is ‘reasonable 
time’. The legal notion of ‘reasonable time’ differs from how litigants 
experience ‘reasonable time,’ and how courts measure time. 294 
Reasonable time is a central tenet of the right to a fair trial, and of the 
perception of justice. The notion of what is reasonable time differs in 
civil and criminal proceedings. Instead, what is reasonable time is 
contingent on the nature of the proceeding and the facts of a case. By 
presenting the different chronotopes, and relationally examining the 
different spatio-temporalities, I argue that the perception of ‘nothing 
happens’ is enhanced. Contrary to the experience of ‘nothing 
happens’, something does happen in courts. For women litigants, the 
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time pertaining to their cases feels static since their hopes are hinged 
on the closure of cases and being granted reliefs.   
I draw on Mikhail Bakhtin’s literary device ‘chronotope’ to 
analyse different chronotopes and how space-time are connected, and 
the effects of time on space, and the effects of space on time in turn. 
In his monograph The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Bakhtin 
specifically looked at how time is spatialised in different literary 
genres, how they coalesce, and how intrinsic they are to genre and plot 
development and progressions.295 The ‘chronotope’, in particular, aids 
in understanding how the relationality of time affects women’s 
experiences of waiting and how they measure time. Bakhtin gives the 
example of Greek romance as a genre where time is erased as heroes 
traverse distances from Greece to Egypt without ageing, transforming, 
or encountering any change. The final reunion of star-crossed lovers, 
he writes, erases time twice, as lovers do not age despite the long and 
arduous journeys undertaken, and the world remains static and 
unchanged in the time they were away. This, he points out, contrasts 
with modern-day novels, where such shifts in space-time would have 
had altering consequences for the plot and its protagonists.  
From the perspective of analysing the feeling of ‘nothing 
happens’, I find the absence of ‘suddenlys’ as plot development 
indicators and erasure of time in Greek novels particularly useful. I 
elaborate on this in further detail below. How time progresses or feels 
static is spatially materialised and space in turn effects how time is 
perceived, especially in courtrooms where time does not move when 
women wait, in comparison to the time that moves at a breathless pace 
in Mumbai. It is the nature of ‘waiting’ in court itself, which is a 
passive act that a litigant described as “I just go and sit there the whole 
day” is an experience that goes beyond mere spatio-temporality to a 
loss of control over where and how long you sit, when you speak or 
when you visit the court, in contrast to the movement outside the 
court where a lot happens in a short span.   
In this chapter, I first foreground the debates on access to 
justice, and scholarly and policy conversations on ‘judicial delay and 
backlog’. Then through an ethnographic vignette of a regular everyday 
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wait in court, I provide an overview of the nature of waiting that 
women endure in court, and the unpredictability and uncertainty they 
experience about how the day will unfold. From there on, I present 
the multiple temporalities that women encounter both within courts 
and outside of courts – legal time, bureaucratic time and court time 
on an everyday basis. The first temporality women encounter is when 
they decide to use the Domestic Violence Act, which stipulates under 
Section 12 (5) of the Act that the case should be completed, and the 
relief should be granted within sixty days from the date of its 
application. The section states that: “The Magistrate shall endeavour 
to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a 
period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.” The cases, 
however, fail to close within the said time-frame of sixty days. In 
addition, to the time-frame stipulated in the Act, women encounter 
what I term as the ‘bureaucratic time’ in which courts function. Both 
bureaucratic procedures that involve the administrative functioning of 
the court, and trial court procedures have their own functioning 
temporalities that transcend the everyday categories of measuring 
time.  
In the last section, I argue that women measure time in the 
legal trajectory of the case that appears ‘static’, and contrast the time 
taken by their cases with the progressions in their lives. The 
transformations women refer to when they articulate the changes in 
their lives and in themselves accentuate both the stillness of court time 
and their cases, but also in turn speeds up and underscores the 
changes in their own lives. The women I interviewed, and their sense 
of time, is governed by changes, transformations and ‘progressions’ 
and ‘movement’ in their own lives. The women litigants I met often 
described how their engagements with the law had transformed them 
or how their children in this ‘waiting time’ had crossed certain 
landmarks of growing up, like finishing schooling or entering graduate 
school. The foremost change in their lives is marked by how they have 
escaped a troubled violent relationship, thus gaining freedom and 
independence. In contrast, while much in their lives has moved 
forward and changed and progressed in linear fashion, their cases in 
courts appeared ‘stuck’. Consequently, the act of filing a case in court 
had failed in its movement from present to future time. The 
‘stuckedness’ experienced in waiting reveals the inequality and lack of 
control women encounter in waiting in courts, in contrast to the 
freedom and independence they gain after exiting violent 
relationships. I conclude with the suggestion that while women 
articulate their disappointments with the law and the waiting it 
involves, we see that time is an efficient negotiator. Litigation, as Tara, 
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one of my lawyer informants I followed observed, is who ‘breaks first’. 
I had reached out to Tara after her name was recommended by many 
lawyers, since she had many Domestic Violence cases, and argued in 
the lower court and regularly in the High Court. I had spent many 
hours in her office located in her home, as she practised as a sole 
practitioner without anyone assisting her in cases. She was considered 
successful by other lawyers, since she attended to ‘high-profile’ clients 
who came with a certain financial privilege and she practised regularly 
in the High Court. In my many meetings with her, she reasoned that 
this breaking of parties is an effect of time, and the effect and 
consequence of temporal delay on litigants’ lives. In most cases, she 
argued, settlements take place out of frustration with making court 
visits, and being ‘stuck’ in court. Time, then is crucial to carry the story 
forward even in cases that appear ‘stuck’ and where ‘nothing happens’. 
Judicial delay and waiting 
As I have argued, legal policy reforms so far have focused on the 
reasons and circumstances resulting in judicial backlog and arrears.296 
There has been no policy attention on the experience and impact of 
waiting and the effect of judicial delay on litigants’ lives, and what that 
has to do with ‘access to justice’. Legal scholars, like Marc Galanter in 
his seminal article of the same name, have observed how the “haves 
come out ahead”.297 Galanter writes how the ‘haves’ stand a better 
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chance at litigation owing to the legal representation they can afford, 
as well as having the resources to challenge and appeal against the 
decisions of the lower courts. This, he observes, greatly impacts the 
chances of success in courts based on whether they are “one-shotters” 
or “repeat players”.298  
Moreover, as Krishnan observes, policy and scholarly attention 
on judicial delay in India has been on the upper tier of the judiciary, 
that is, the State High Courts and the Supreme Court of India.299 The 
lower courts, which include the district courts, sub-district courts and 
quasi-dispute resolution bodies, have received scant scholarly 
attention. The lawyers and judges who practice in lower-tier courts, 
and the litigants who frequent it form the vast majority in courts, and 
these litigants may or may not have the financial ability to proceed to 
higher courts.300 As argued by Krishnan, the factors and constraints 
that litigants face in order to enforce their rights in lower courts has 
rarely been evaluated. The focus on lack of infrastructure has similarly 
focused on the scarcity of judges, as opposed to the quality of judges 
and lawyers practising in lower tier courts, the lack of basic sanitation 
and toilets in lower courts, and the absence of any waiting spaces 
(benches or waiting rooms) for litigants who wait long hours in courts. 
These factors are intrinsic to enabling access to law and to how 
litigants come to law.  
Krishnan remarks that the question of free legal aid after the 
1975 Emergency in India mainly focussed on public interest 
lawyering.301 This was echoed by various practitioners who lauded the 
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299 Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., “Grappling at the Grassroots: Access to 
Justice in India’s Lower Tier,”Harvard Human Rights Journal 27 (2014), 
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300 Krishnan et al. 
301 The two-year Emergency Rule in 1975 led to a concerted effort to enforce 
Part IV Article 39A of the Constitution, namely a Directive Principle of State 
Policy that stipulates that equal opportunity and free legal aid should be 
available to all, irrespective of economic or other disabilities. Efforts to 
enforce the rights of the disempowered segment were made by adopting 
public-interest litigation (PIL), where judges took proactive steps to enforce 
rights by responding to grievances that came to their attention through third 
parties, letters, or news reports. This initiative though, as Krishnan points 
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public interest litigation to empower the less privileged in higher 
courts, and the role that the Supreme Court of India played.302 In 
contrast, in the lower-tier courts the quality of lawyers, judiciary and 
the general infrastructure remain poor. Litigants require not merely 
the financial capacity to engage good quality lawyers in lower-tier 
courts but, as Galanter has warned, they also benefit from familiarity 
with local officials, local rules and local modes of custom. This chapter 
shifts the debate from the discussion on pendency of cases to closely 
examining waiting to reveal what bearing judicial delays have on 
litigants’ lives, how litigants combat waiting and how the definition of 
‘reasonable time’ is contested. 
Experiencing Waiting in Courts   
The women litigants I interviewed and whose cases I closely followed 
in my study spoke at length about their waiting in courts. As previously 
mentioned, they described their waiting as ‘empty time’ where 
‘nothing happens’, since their cases did not move forward. In this 
section, I will provide an ethnographic vignette of the experience of 
waiting in court. This waiting that I describe below includes an 
observation of how litigants wait; it also offers a glimpse of the wait 
that I experienced when I followed cases in court. The wait women 
describe starts from the date of filing an application under the 
Domestic Violence Act and ends with the closure of the case. Women 
mark and calculate the waiting time as the time between the two 
temporal points of filing the case and the closure of the case, or the 
final relief being granted. 
In this chapter, I am going to continue the story of Farzana. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Farzana had three dates assigned for her 
cross-examination. On the date assigned for her cross-examination, I 
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had arrived early to ensure a seat in the front rows of the courtroom.303 
This was the second date assigned for Farzana’s cross-examination; on 
the first date the Magistrate was absent owing to a customary jail visit. 
I arrived forty minutes early as the traffic was less than usual that day. 
There were a few lawyers and women with children standing in the 
court complex. On the ground floor a woman was sweeping the floor 
while a few people stood near the two lifts. The courtroom where the 
Magistrate had recently changed was empty, with mostly litigants 
seated. A lawyer was loudly advising his female client: “Remember all 
the dates. Just don’t ask for money. If I had believed you I would be 
in a mess.” After that, he walked out of the courtroom while his client 
remained seated inside; he returned a few minutes later and continued 
pacing inside and outside the courtroom. The sun and the morning 
traffic horns were both blazing outside. At 10.42 the transcriber 
arrived. The courtroom was slowly beginning to fill up as lawyers and 
other litigants trickled in. I sat below a whirring fan on the wooden 
bench, below the Magistrate’s dais. I could see some litigants fanning 
themselves and talking in hushed tones. As the courtroom began to 
get full, it became warmer and the air hung still.  
The new Magistrate , who was a woman, entered, and everyone 
rose up from their chairs. I saw Farzana and her two brothers seated at 
the back behind the lawyers. I hadn’t noticed when they entered the 
courtroom. Farzana was dressed in a black hijab and had a file resting 
on her lap; she was reading intently. It was an unusually warm day and 
the noise levels in the courtroom were high. Farzana’s lawyer was still 
not here and her case was listed as number 22 for that day; it was sure 
to start before lunch. I had seen the other side’s lawyer pacing in and 
out of the courtroom while I sat stuck between two lawyers on a hard-
wooden bench. The court clerk started to call out the cases, and out 
they tumbled – lawyers, clients, and relatives of clients – as the cases 
rolled out one after another. After months in court, many arguments 
between parties had begun to sound the same: the squabbling between 
clients and lawyers over the maintenance amount that remained 
unpaid, or an absent respondent who rarely made an appearance, an 
application to pay arrears. Most lawyers took later dates though some 
had their cases kept back for arguments for later in the day. It was only 
at noon that Farzana’s case came up, and so did Manju, her lawyer.   
As the case was called out, Manju sweating in her black vest, nervously 
requested ‘in-camera proceedings’ for the cross-examination. The 
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respondent’s lawyer objected stating that: “She is not a woman in 
purdah.”304 
Manju (in Marathi): The problem is that she is not comfortable 
speaking in open court. She is too scared  
Magistrate (in Marathi): Start the cross examination. If I feel the 
need, I’ll take it in-camera. 
Manju (in Marathi): Whatever you say, Madam.  
Respondent’s lawyer (Sarab) (in English): As such I have no 
objection.  
Manju (in Marathi): I had submitted some documents for 
enhancement of maintenance. You said you would consider it.  
Respondent’s lawyer (Sarab) (mumbles something I could not 
hear). 
Manju (in Marathi): You tell me how 1500 Rs. is enough to live on.  
The Magistrate looks impatient but does not respond. The other 
side’s lawyer requests that the cross-examination be pushed back to 
after lunch.  
Respondent’s lawyer (Sarab) (in English): I have a matter in other 
courtroom, Madam. Can we have the cross-examination after lunch? 
The Magistrate finally agreed to have the cross-examination after 
lunch, since the other side’s lawyer had a case in the adjoining 
courtroom. Farzana was standing behind Manju, and both agreed to 
return after the lunch break. When we returned after lunch, the court 
resumed with bail applications. I seated myself in the same place below 
the Magistrate’s table since the proceedings were more audible there, 
and I saw Farzana from a distance, still intently reading her file. A 
cross-examination in another case came up and given it was a sensitive 
matter we were asked to leave the courtroom at 3 pm. We stepped out 
into the windowless waiting area and chatted while fanning ourselves 
with loose sheets of paper; Farzana and her brothers stood in a corner. 
The corridor, which doubled up as a waiting room, was crowded with 
everyone from the courtroom. The crowds gradually thinned out by 4 
pm. At around 4.30 the cleaner woman was back sweeping the floor, 
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and we moved from one corner to the next as her broom prodded us. 
At nearly 4.40 the doors of the courtroom opened, and Manju told 
me, “Today the cross will not happen – too late now,” clicking her 
tongue against the roof of her mouth. We stepped in and the 
Magistrate assigned another date for early the following month 
(October).   
This waiting is characteristic of waiting in court. Typically, 
litigants wait the entire day for their cases to come up, and most often 
return home with another date fixed. The waiting and the conditions 
of waiting, though, have more than temporal consequences; the 
waiting area outside the courtrooms for instance has no chairs or 
benches. The lower court lacked a functioning toilet, and on a typical 
day people outnumbered chairs. In addition to no access to toilets, 
clean drinking water and subsidised food was not available. In the 
months of my fieldwork the public toilet was continuously ‘out of 
repair’. This meant that women and children had no access to toilets 
in the courts, nor were they permitted to use the lawyers’ and 
administrative staff’s toilets. For women to have access to toilets, they 
had to visit restaurants, and either had to pay to use the toilet there or 
had to purchase food. Women who attend court hearings with 
children often hang around the courts the whole day, without any 
opportunity for them or their children to rest. Given that the 
courtrooms are crowded, most litigants stand for long hours, and 
courtrooms lack good ventilation and during the summer months are 
unbearable. This are just some examples of how arduous and 
uncomfortable the wait for most people is. 
The staircase landing, which serves as a waiting area outside 
the courtrooms, indicates not merely how the less privileged wait for 
the court to commence, but also how they should wait. Notices on 
maintaining ‘silence’ or keeping mobile phones on silence or switched 
off mode are plastered on the faded walls of the courts. Litigants also 
wait inside the courtrooms. They wait when the time they are allotted 
is rescheduled without their knowledge or is fixed to suit their lawyers 
and judges; they wait for their case number that was to come up before 
lunch but is delayed to the post-lunch session; they wait when judges 
do not turn up or are transferred, or when cases are reshuffled and 
transferred to another courtroom without any prior warning. Yet, the 
only reference the law makes to time is the sixty days given in the 
Domestic Violence Act; the time by which relief should be granted. 
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Farzana’s cross-examination finally took place on the third 
date that was assigned by the Magistrate.305 This was two years after 
she had filed the case in the court. She had received a small sum of 
interim maintenance but not as much as what she had sought. Not 
until the evidence was filed and the cross-examination completed 
would a final order be passed. It was this waiting with nothing 
happening that litigants often referred to. As Sameera, one of my 
female informants, responded to my question on her case status, 
“Nothing has happened. That’s it. I come and sit here the full day” 
(Kuch bhi nahi hua hain. Bus pura pura dhin yaha aake baithe raho). 
Another described the court as continuing ‘violence and torture’. Yet, 
many continued with their case instead of withdrawing the matter. 
 
Analysing Everyday Court Time and Bureaucratic Time  
In this section I focus on waiting in court, and the multiple 
temporalities at play. The wait in court is a particular experience of 
time and space. I use Bakhtin’s evocative phrase how waiting ‘thickens 
time’, and how time in turn affects our experience of space. Bakhtin 
writes on the dialogic effects of time and space: “Time, as it were, 
thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space 
becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot, and 
history.” The waiting in court therefore is a specific spatio-temporal 
experience. Scholars writing on time have discussed different 
conceptions of time, but have mostly focused on time 306  without 
discussing its effects on space, and vice versa.307 In this section I focus 
                                                             
305 The third date for the cross-examination was after one month. The cross-
examination is recorded in Chapter Three.  
306 The writing on time has emphasised the linear conception of time that 
came with Christianity, and the belief in the time of creation and the 
eventual advancement towards the Judgement Day. For more, see Carol J. 
Greenhouse, “Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of 
Law,” Yale Law Journal, 98, no. 8 (June 1989): 1631–1651. 
307 The differing conceptions of time in various cultures has been well studied 
in anthropology. A single conception of time was used in an industrial unit 
or a factory or in social institutions, where the linear movement of time was 
required since different individuals working in collaboration require a single 
conception of time. The challenge to the conception of singular time thus is 
not new. Naturally, then, the measurement of time and its experience is not 
uniform either. See Pitirim A. Sorokin and Robert K. Merton, “Social Time: 
A Methodological and Functional Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 42, 
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on different conceptions of time. The different conceptions of time 
become apparent as what qualifies as ‘reasonable time’ in law and for 
the court as institutions and women differs. I firstly start with the 
multiple temporalities of court time and bureaucratic time, the 
objective being to show that something does happen in courts, despite 
the feeling of stillness and immobility that women describe. Women 
measure different chronotopic events in their lives, and it is the spatio-
temporal experience of waiting when looked at relationally that 
accentuates the ‘stillness’ of court time. This is not to suggest that legal 
actions in India are not long, strenuous and laborious, nor do I wish 
to underplay the wait of those who turn to courts for relief.  
The nature of the wait, and where and how women wait 
colours the experience of waiting. Thus, the spatio-temporality of 
waiting in courts results in a certain experience of time and waiting. 
Mariana Valverde’s work on the court as a chronotope is particularly 
instructive to my analysis here, and the most recent work to 
understand the court, its temporal markers, and legal speech as 
chronotopic. Valverde’s work does not, however, discuss waiting.308 
Valverde writes about courts as a chronotope where time pauses 
between opening and ending times and on business days. According 
to her, courtrooms are temporally specific where they exist only in 
official time or when the court is in session.309 The temporality is not 
continuous and the judge can stop and restart time. Courts do not 
exist in a single chronotope, for there are many layers of temporality 
within courts that continuously shift in the day-to-day court life. For 
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instance, informal mediations that take place in the Magistrate’s 
chambers fall outside of official court hours. The mediation that takes 
place in the Magistrate’s chambers often to encourage a settlement 
between the parties, especially when magistrates perceive a lengthy 
trial before them, operates outside of court official hours. By removing 
his legal robe and sitting across from the parties with their respective 
lawyers, the magistrate steps out of both the temporal and spatial 
segment of court time. Such mediations are held in the court space, 
but the informal nature of the conversations, the lack of the 
magistrate’s black robes and the absence of a raised dais present a 
different spatiotemporal segment. It challenges the idea of a court time 
as a singular or one chronotope segment. The recording of the 
conversations and settlements in writing by the magistrate himself 
achieves the legitimization of law.   
Although for analytical purposes I speak of court time as 
‘singular’ time in this chapter, court time is manifold. Firstly, there is 
court time and bureaucratic time – time in both cases moves in what 
Bakhtin describes as cyclical everyday time. Time in court thus follows 
a cyclical rhythm where every day feels the same. The everyday 
function of courts exist in this daily toil, where cases, arguments and 
conversations repeat themselves. Every date and ‘hearing’ is like the 
previous one or like a case heard before. The relevance of court 
precedents and reliance by lawyers on landmark judgements is 
repeated in arguments day-after-day, where cases and the circulating 
discourse of violence against women is all too common. Both 
bureaucratic court procedures and trial procedures have their own 
functioning temporalities that transcend the everyday categories of 
measuring time. Scholars, especially legal anthropologists, have 
demonstrated that law exists in the everyday.310 But, what does the 
everyday time of the law look like in courts? Despite its eccentricities, 
incomprehensibility and its ‘stuckedness’, courts do function in the 
everyday. Lower courts typically have a six-day week and work from 11 
am to 5 pm from Monday to Saturday and have the second and the 
fourth Saturday off – two crucial days that afford lawyers time to draft 
cases, meet with clients, and finish off pending matters, and judges 
time to catch up on their reading. The court staff, however, works 
beyond the official hours of 5 pm.  
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Silbey, The Common Place of Law; Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal 
Consciousness among Working-Class Americans. 
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During my fieldwork in court, the staff was around until about 
7 pm and would start its day before the court sat at 11 am. At the end 
of the day, the listing of cases would have to be ready for the next day, 
the files for cases that were to come up needed to be arranged, and the 
court staff would file and document the events of the day. The list of 
cases would be hung outside the courtrooms, and most often would 
be inside the courtroom for lawyers to consult at the start of the day. 
Unlike the higher court, where the listing of cases is computerised, in 
lower courts the cases for the day were written using both a typewriter 
and computer. The listing of cases other than those hung up in the 
courtrooms, were filed in registers for future reference and were 
available from the registrar’s office for anyone to consult. The court 
clerk sitting beside the magistrate who typically calls out cases, 
intervenes and assigns dates was a constant in the court even after 
magistrates were transferred. In my fieldwork conducted in three 
phases, magistrates changed in at least two courtrooms in a matter of 
four months; it was the court clerks and the other functionaries of the 
court office that were the only constant. The clerk would often 
recognise parties, interact with lawyers on days magistrates were 
absent, and communicate the courts’ available dates informally to 
lawyers he recognised in the court. In the first few weeks, the court 
clerk told me to come after noon to hear domestic violence cases. 
“After noon the real hearing happens. Before that, saab (sir) will call 
matters to be adjourned or kept back.” It was a relevant piece of 
information that saved time.  
The court officials I interacted with during my fieldwork were 
a reassuring presence in the court who provided official information 
non-officially or off the record. Such information included who was a 
‘good’ judge; which magistrates worked beyond the court’s official 
hours; was the magistrate a no-nonsense type or was he or she having 
a bad day? The sincerity of judges, their hours of work, the lawyers I 
should contact or the cases I should follow – the court staff knew it 
all. Court functionaries often stepped in in matters such as filing 
applications, evidence and documents, and gave guidance in 
navigating the bureaucratic maze. As months passed by, the court staff 
had come to recognise me in court, often introducing me to the 
workings of a new magistrate who may have come in place of a former 
one, sharing information of a case that might be of interest to me, or 
a hearing or argument that might prove useful for my study. In Fuller 
and Benei’s book on the everyday state in modern India, they argue 
that the faceless bureaucrats in government offices ‘actually do have 
faces’, and demonstrate how social relationships can be formed with 
the lowest sarkari officials. Much of the work on the anthropology of 
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the state has focused on how bureaucratic knowledge serves to 
navigate and subvert the system, how low-level clerks understand the 
‘system’ and its workings and how the boundaries between the state, 
officials of different stature, and its people are blurred. The same holds 
true for courts.311 Thus, the purpose here is to demonstrate that courts 
do function in the ‘everyday’, even though they may not meet the 
expectations of temporal efficiency, namely the lengthy time taken – 
often amounting to years - to dispose.        
Nothing Happens in Everyday Cyclical Time 
Writing on time in plot development in novels, Bakhtin comments 
that time without progression is commonly found in novels, like those 
by Flaubert. Time in such novels was without event, and therefore 
seemed static.312 He adds: “It is a viscous and sticky time that drags 
itself slowly through space.”313 For Bakhtin, this time often served as 
ancillary time in novels or as time in contrast to other temporal 
segments that are more charged and energetic. The relationality of 
time is what provides a sense of time to readers. Here, Kafka’s The Trial 
is particularly instructive, for in this novel time plays a central role in 
plot development, since time is both static and fluid. Time here lacks 
the chronological progression of time, and the fluidity of spaces 
disorients readers and effectively depicts a chaotic and confusing legal 
system. The arbitrariness and capriciousness of law that Kafka’s 
protagonist Josef K is subjected to is evoked through the absence of 
spatio-temporal location. The only reference to time is made at the 
beginning and at the end of the trial, that is, when the case begins and 
closes. It is also what makes ‘waiting’ unpredictable and unbearable; 
                                                             
311 For more, see C. J. Fuller and Veronique Benei, eds., The Everyday State 
and Society in Modern India (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2001); 
Akhil Gupta’s early anthropological work on corruption challenges the 
public/private distinction, and he argues that the state is discursively 
constituted. See Akhil Gupta, “Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of 
Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State,” American 
Ethnologist 22, no. 2 (1995): 375–402; Emma Tarlo in her study of the Indian 
Emergency focused on sterilisation, slum resettlements, and the 
resourcefulness of citizens, challenging simplistic Emergency narratives. See 
Emma Tarlo, Unsettling Memories: Narratives of the Emergency in Delhi (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003).  
312 The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, 247. 
313 The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, 248. 
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we do not know how long Josef K has to wait, or how long he has 
already waited. Time is central to Kafka’s plot development, since the 
story never truly progresses because it lacks what Bakhtin calls 
‘advancing time’. It is ‘advancing time’ that is the key to plot 
development and gives a sense of progression. The Trial decidedly lacks 
that, as Kafka erases time and space to suggest how the legal system 
overpowers Josef K’s life. As readers, the erasure of time means we are 
not sure how to measure how much time has elapsed, since there is no 
relational reference available to us. It is this absence of time that makes 
the wait for Josef K and for the novel’s readers unbearable and 
arbitrary.  
It is here that Josef K’s waiting differs from that of the women 
litigants in my study. The female litigants I studied initiated the trial, 
and had some insight into the relationality of time. They were aware 
of the passing of time based on chronological years, but also based on 
the metamorphoses they witnessed in themselves from ‘victims to half 
lawyers’ and the ongoing nature of time in their own private lives. For 
the women litigants I interviewed, it is the passage of time in court 
contrasted with the passage of time in their lives, that provides them 
with a relational measurement of time. It also provides them with 
private time over which they have some control, as opposed to the 
‘waiting time’ that reveals asymmetrical and unequal power dynamics 
– the women waiting since they had no choice. And yet, I would argue, 
the everyday cyclical time in court where ‘nothing happens’ is critical 
to the progression of the case.  
I argue that the feeling of ‘nothing happens’ has to be viewed 
relationally, where time spent waiting in court for cases to progress 
moves at a different pace to the time in women’s lives, that is, their 
children growing up, the financial independence they acquire after the 
breakdown of a marriage, and the transformation they experience in 
themselves and their lives after filing a case. The change women 
experience in their personal lives after the breakdown or separation 
from their husband, stands in contrast to the case being stuck. It is the 
waiting time in court, in relation to the changing nature and pace of 
their private lives that further accentuates the feeling of ‘nothing 
happens’ in courts. The relationality of time is what provides women 
with a ‘sense of time’, by this I mean it is what gives their time meaning 
and structure. It includes an ability to make sense of time and to 
comprehend what can happen in time. A different conception of time 
and space is revealed when women narrate their self-transformations 
and compare them with their stagnating cases in court, revealing how 
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personal narratives move in a different time-space than their court 
cases.  
‘To happen’ means to occur or take place. When the word 
‘nothing’ precedes the verb it speaks of ‘dead’ time. Nothing, here 
implies not much of significance is taking place. In saying ‘nothing 
happens’, the female litigants articulated how they viewed their wait 
in temporal, spatial and situational terms. They were stuck in courts 
both spatio-temporally and situationally when their cases failed to 
progress. When they referred to the immobility of their cases, they 
were referring to the immobility of their own lives where the promise 
of independence and freedom that the Act supposedly guaranteed 
remained unfulfilled or delayed. Thus, their immobility was not 
merely spatial and temporal, but also situational when they found 
themselves stuck in court. In the temporal points between filing the 
case and relief being granted, cases were challenged, appealed, or 
moved to higher courts, but the temporal period was measured and 
perceived by the women as dead time, since they still had to keep 
returning to the courts and make appearances. This delayed their 
possibility to return to their everyday lives, or in some cases to starting 
working or studying. It is here that Bakhtin’s analysis of plot 
progressions and movement in Greek romance proves useful. Seeing 
‘nothing happens’ in terms of Bakhtin’s chronotope sheds light on 
how the women studied perceived waiting, stasis and the progression 
of time.  
In Greek romance Bakhtin writes it is the ‘suddenlys’ and ‘at 
just that moment’ that interrupt the normal progression of time. The 
time in between these plot turns, and twists is erased or condensed. 
Bakhtin describes ‘suddenlys’ and ‘at just that moment’ as “..this type 
of time, for this time usually has its origin and comes into its own in 
just those places where the normal, pragmatic and premeditated 
course of events is interrupted – and provides an opening for sheer 
chance, which has its own specific logic.”314 As Bakhtin writes, without 
the “chance disjunctions” and “chance simultaneity” there would be 
“no plot at all and nothing to write a novel about”.315 The ‘suddenlys’, 
writes Bakhtin, indicate a spatiotemporal change in the plot for the 
reader where ‘time segments intersect’. In the case of ‘nothing 
                                                             
314  The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, 1982, 
https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/bakdia, 92. 
315 The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, 92. 
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happens’, time remains static and continues without any interruptions 
or random disjunctions of chance and simultaneity.  
If we are to see the stasis the women refer to in ‘nothing 
happens’ through the lens of Bakhtin chronotope, the phrase is 
evacuated both of temporal and spatial change, since nothing changes 
or progresses in the story of the case. Although the women recall the 
changes in the trajectory of the case (the appeals, amendments, 
multiple applications) along the same lines as Bakhtin’s ‘earliers’ and 
‘laters’ that indicate the chain of events that follow one and another 
in the narrative realm, they do not carry the story forward or to its 
end. Thus, by ‘nothing happens’ the women do not refer to nothing 
taking place, but to ‘nothing changing’ and the continuance of the 
quotidian. In Bakhtin’s adventure time, things happen to people 
outside of their own initiative. ‘Nothing happens’, on the other hand, 
indicates the absence of anything extraordinary happening in the 
normal course of the ordinary. For the women litigants the 
extraordinary is not merely getting relief but the case closing once and 
for all.  
The term ‘chronotope’ thus serves as a useful analytical tool 
because unlike looking at space or time singly, the chronotope reveals 
how ‘time thickens’, ‘takes on flesh’ and shapes spaces, and how space 
becomes ‘responsive and charged’ and in turn shapes time and its 
dialogic effects. As Michael Holquist explains, an event is a ‘dialogic 
unit’, that is things happen only in relation to something else, and that 
is what gives us a perspective on change in time and space.316 From the 
perspective of courts and analysing the perceptible feeling of ‘nothing 
happens’, the chronotope throws light on the many micro-
chronotopes that exist in court time and serves as a tool to unpack this 
sense of ‘nothing happens’ in relation to other chronotopic events. As 
we will see, the women measured the time passed in recalling the 
itinerant journeys of their legal cases. This perception of time and its 
movement is correlated to the non-movement of the case, and the 
movement and change in their own lives. As I discuss in the next 
section, the women reflected on and discussed the transformations 
they had witnessed in themselves subsequent to coming before the 
court. This change in themselves stands in stark contrast to the case 
and the act of waiting which they viewed as a static act.  
                                                             
316Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 113. 
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The perceptible feeling of ‘nothing happens’ is underpinned 
by the fabric of the city where, by contrast, a lot happens. The 
breathless pace of the city, and the transformations in the women’s 
lives underscore court time as a dead and wasteful time where nothing 
moves. By officially filing the case, the women litigants learn that 
certain responses are continually demanded of them, such as 
responding to petitions, appearing in court, collecting evidence, 
making counter-applications for unpaid monetary relief, producing 
documents, and so on. The Act empowers women litigants, but also 
takes control of their lives. As Sally Engle Merry in her ethnography 
on Getting Even, Getting Justice describes it, while litigants can feel 
empowered by the law, they also have to submit to the law.317 After 
filing the case, the women realised that unlike they had previously 
thought, the act of coming before the law did not automatically make 
the case progress. Instead, the women litigants who filed their case lost 
control of their time and found themselves stuck in court. The loss of 
control the women experienced emerges from the expectation and 
anticipation that their act of filing a case should result in quick civil 
reliefs and justice.318 It is precisely on account of the lack of ‘suddenlys’ 
and ‘at just that moment’ that the women failed to see how their case 
was progressing. Yet, when the women narrated the stories of their 
cases and measured time in the chronological and spatial journeys of 
the case, we see how the women who waited came to ‘measure’ time 
both through their own cases and through their own personal 
transformations.   
Yet another register of time is the one stipulated in the 
Domestic Violence Act. The Act states that cases should be completed 
and relief should be granted within sixty days of the date of 
application. However, in practice, cases frequently exceed the 
stipulated time and take on an average three years until final relief is 
granted.319 The case is completed when the final relief under the Act 
is granted. Final reliefs are granted after evidence is produced, and 
cross-examination and final arguments take place. By stipulating sixty 
                                                             
317 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even.  
318  The Act provides for various civil reliefs, including monetary relief, 
compensation, right to residence, custody, and protection orders. See 
Chapter Two for further details.  
319 When I state that on an average a case takes up to three years, this is not 
a statistical evaluation of the number of years. Instead, I rely on the number 
of years lawyers I interviewed stated. Yet again, in most cases the case is 
settled outside court as opposed to an order being granted by the lower court.  
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days as a period within which an application under the Act should be 
disposed of, the Domestic Violence Act establishes a linear segment 
of time starting from the date of filing an application and the case 
disposal. It is this same time-period of sixty days that the women 
referred to in interviews to draw my attention to the failure of the Act 
to grant final reliefs within the said period, and the number of years 
they had spent waiting. The speedy relief promised by the Act in 
comparison to other laws, further increased disappointment and 
failed to meet their expectations.320 Yet, it is critical to consider that 
many women litigants had cases of divorce pending in Family Courts, 
or a criminal case under Section 498 of the IPC ongoing in other 
courts. This often meant that women had to visit many courts, and 
had a number of hearings going on at the same time. This further 
increased the waiting time. It is these simultaneous applications in 
other courts, mostly employed as delaying strategy by lawyers to tire all 
legal strategies and exhaust the respondents, that further lengthened 
the waiting time in courts. Although, most women referred to the 
Domestic Violence Act in their interviews when referring to the long 
delays, I suspect they also referred to the overall number of years and 
time they had spent in courts waiting for other petitions to close.    
Static Case-Time versus Women’s Rapid Transformations   
Meenakshi, a litigant I met in my third field-visit, was one of the 
litigants who waited for nearly seven years in court.321 A woman in her 
late forties with two children, Meenakshi had filed a case under the 
Domestic Violence Act in 2008. With an ironic smile on her face, 
Meenakshi told me: “I filed the case in the Andheri court, and I 
received an interim order with maintenance and residence seven 
months later. After that, my husband appealed against the verdict in 
the Sessions Court,322 where the case jumped from courtroom 18 to 
22.323 In courtroom 22, the lady judge kept giving dates. Then in 
                                                             
320 Lawyers preferred to apply the Domestic Violence Act, largely owing to 
the fact that the initial interim reliefs are granted usually within three months 
of filing. The provision for interim relief guaranteed that women would 
receive at least an interim relief quickly.   
321Field Notes from August, 2015. 
322 The Sessions Court is the higher court where lower court verdicts are 
appealed.  
323  The court numbers have been changed in order to maintain the 
confidentiality of the judges and litigants concerned. 
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courtroom 21 the judge changed. The new judge sent me to the 
mediator where we had three sittings. Before settlement the case was 
before the sixth judge.” Her case, like many others, had taken the usual 
twists and turns of appeals, delays, changed courtrooms and 
transferred judges. The case was finally settled outside court with the 
help of lawyers and the final relief that she received was not ‘granted 
by the court’ but negotiated by the respective parties. The parties drew 
up the settlement terms that included a lump sum payment for 
Meenakshi and her children, and the right to reside in a home owned 
by her husband. In addition to the case under the Domestic Violence 
Act, she also had a divorce petition in the Family Court. The 
settlement terms were drawn up for both cases and submitted to the 
respective courts.    
In recounting and recalling the legal trajectory her case had 
taken, Meenakshi had learnt how to measure time in the legal 
trajectory the case had taken. The length of the case was not merely 
measured in terms of linear chronological years spent waiting in court 
since the date of filing, but in the legal journey of multiple 
applications, appeals, interim relief granted or rejected, the movement 
of case from lower courts to higher, the adjournments, and the 
constant back and forth between courts and courtrooms. The legal 
journey of the case inside and outside courts was used as a 
measurement device. Meenakshi measured the time-period of the case 
spatio-temporally, the courtrooms and courts it moved in and out of, 
the multiple revisions and appeals, and the legal length it travelled. 
The legal length of the case becomes a measure of time ‘past,’ and of 
time spent ‘waiting’ where ‘nothing really happens’. Meenakshi 
measured the duration not in years alone, but by the number of times 
the case was transferred, the interim and final orders received, and the 
appeals, adjournments, and circuitous route the case took from lower 
court to higher court, and back again in the lower court. The length 
of waiting is articulated in the terminology of law’s administrative 
functioning, namely in terms of delays, dates, adjournments, and 
appeals. The primary way litigants understand movement of time is 
through movement and closure of their cases. The women I studied 
measured their waiting by recalling dates with precision, the number 
of court visits, and by marking the stages of their cases (arguments, 
hearings and the filing of evidence). 
Cases rarely progress in a chronologically linear fashion. The 
legal procedure permits cases to go back and forth between courts. 
They can move from lower courts to higher courts and then be sent 
back to lower courts, and appeals to verdicts are challenged, restored, 
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revised or amended. Cases generally go back and forth, or forward, 
backward and around. A verdict previously given can be amended or 
revised based on an appeal. In Meenakshi’s case, the verdict she was 
given was appealed against by her husband in a higher court. As the 
verdict was being appealed against, the implementation of the verdict 
given by the lower court was ‘stayed’. The staying of an order meant 
that the court would not compel its implementation until the appeal 
was completed or decided upon. This appealing of a past verdict in 
the future, and the constant back and forth in temporality challenges 
the linear progressive movement of a case that women expect from the 
law. However, the right to appeal or challenge a verdict is crucial to 
the democratic dispensing of justice. In contrast to the calendrical 
movement of time in which courts function, the case verdict defies 
temporal linearity by going back in time when it is appealed against. 
The procedural language of the law, such as the term ‘staying’, itself 
suggests a lack of movement.   
The multiple spaces and temporal frames where timespaces 
move fickly back and forth and spatiotemporal boundaries blur, 
causes spatiotemporal instability. Hence, the only way women can 
come to measure time is through the constant movement of their 
cases. This measuring of time by recalling case-movements itself 
challenges the idea of ‘nothing happens’ in courts. This measuring of 
case-time is relational to the time and its advancements in their own 
lives. The women I interviewed often spoke of how they had changed 
over the last few years. This transformation took many forms, 
involving changes in themselves and changes in their lives since the 
filing of the case. Changes were brought about both by the use of the 
law, and/or changes relating to moving from a small town into a big 
city like Mumbai and getting married. In the case of Meenakshi, she 
began working for the first time in her life and was in charge of her 
own life. She now had more freedom than ever before and she spoke 
about her new-found independence with great pride in herself, and 
with faith in her ability to fight a court case by herself.  
Like Meenakshi, Swagata, who I introduced in Chapter Four, 
is another litigant who had a case ongoing for over three years against 
her parents-in-law. 324  Time and again she referred to changes in 
herself: “I wasn’t earlier like this at all,” she said as we sat in her office. 
“I was meek, soft, eager to please, and scared to express myself. I came 
from a small town.” She described herself as a small-town girl hailing 
                                                             
324 Field Notes August, 2015. 
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from Kolkata and attributed the changes to her move to Mumbai after 
her marriage. Prior to her marriage she had had a sheltered 
upbringing, since in the absence of her parents her brother had 
sheltered her from the ‘real’ world. In her own words, the problems 
with her husband started immediately after her marriage, such as 
interference from his parents and their unhappiness at her giving birth 
to a girl. After her husband became paralysed, she had filed the case 
against her in-laws, who were harassing her and wanted to dispossess 
her of the property. Filing of the case and coming before the law 
changed her. She attributed the change to how she had learnt how to 
speak up for herself. “I couldn’t speak before. I was scared,” she said 
observantly.  
This transformation aided by law was reiterated by the lawyers 
I followed. In one of my conversations with Tara, a lawyer, I asked 
what had transpired in one of her litigants’ cases. I had recently met 
Tara’s client Simran and had learnt the various details of her case and 
how the settlement had come about. Tara recounted the journey the 
case had taken, and how Simran had been transformed in the process 
of ‘fighting for justice’ from someone who was previously ‘scared’. 
“Now look at her!” exclaimed Tara. “She is a bold cat.” Simran also 
articulated her own transformation by describing herself as a simple 
middle-class girl who wanted her marriage to work, to someone who 
had the ability to fight for justice.  
This transformation takes place between two temporal points: 
the first is coming before the law and the second is the closure of the 
case. Although the time between these two temporal points appears 
static to the women litigants I met, in fact their personal 
transformations were a result of both going to court and the passage 
of time. The change women recount is not limited to the changes in 
themselves alone, but in how in the period of this waiting their lives 
and their children’s lives had progressed, establishing landmarks of 
chronological growth. While the women went to court to bring about 
certain changes in their lives, the law appears to have also changed 
them in the process. In Greek romance, the temporal hiatus that 
Bakhtin notes leaves no trace in the heroes’ lives. In the case of the 
women litigants, the temporal hiatus aids their changes and 
transformations, even though there are no significant twists and turns 
in the narrative as the cases remain stuck. For the purpose of my 
informants, this legal consciousness also served as a reminder of how 
their cases did not transform. With my informants, their cases had 
lacked the ‘suddenlys’ and ‘at just that moment’ that marked 
159 
 
development. In fact, the changes in their personal lives accentuated 
the inactivity of their court time 
  
Conclusion 
Waiting in courts and outside courts is part of daily court life for both 
lawyers and litigants alike. From the time women file their case in 
court, their time is governed by the court. The long wait and delay that 
lawyers and women litigants frequently complain about also acts as an 
efficient mediator. The waiting and sitting impose a ‘heavy strain’. Yet, 
waiting is not pointless. Waiting, if anything is an act of hope.325 In a 
discussion between the businessman and Josef K in Kafka’s The Trial, 
a businessman whose case is ongoing in court observes that waiting is 
not pointless, instead he learns how to negotiate the waiting time by 
hiring five different lawyers to work simultaneously on his case. Below 
is a dialogue between the businessman and Josef K. 
 
“Waiting is not pointless,” said the businessman, “it’s only pointless if you 
try and interfere yourself. I told you just now I’ve got five lawyers besides this 
one. You might think — I thought it myself at first — you might think I could 
leave the whole thing entirely up to them now. That would be entirely wrong. 
I can leave it up to them less than when I had just the one. Maybe you don’t 
understand that, do you?” “No,” said K., and to slow the businessman down, 
who had been speaking too fast, he laid his hand on the businessman’s to 
reassure him, “but I’d like just to ask you to speak a little more slowly, these 
are many very important things for me, and I can’t follow exactly what you’re 
saying.” “You’re quite right to remind me of that,” said the businessman, 
“you’re new to all this, a junior. Your trial is six months old, isn’t it? Yes, I’ve 
heard about it. Such a new case! But I’ve already thought all these things 
through countless times, to me they’re the most obvious things in the world.” 
“You must be glad your trial has already progressed so far, are you?” asked 
K., he did not wish to ask directly how the businessman’s affairs stood, but 
received no clear answer anyway. “Yes, I’ve been working at my trial for five 
years now,” said the businessman as his head sank, “that's no small 
achievement.”  
 
                                                             
325  Adam Reed, “Hope on Remand,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 17, no. 3 (2011): 527–544. 
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Like Josef K, the businessman’s trial does not proceed, except for some 
hearings and the collecting of documents. What the businessman tries 
to achieve is ‘tangible progress’ where things move to a conclusion, but 
that is rare in trials like this he admits. Getting a final date for a trial 
he explains is difficult. It is this tangible progress that moves 
chronologically into the future that the women studied refer to, a 
conclusion to the case. Yet, without the spatio-temporal segment of 
waiting in courts, negotiations and progress do not take place. The 
long delay affords women an opportunity to negotiate a settlement out 
of court where otherwise nothing would have happened. In fact, the 
‘delay tactics’ adopted by lawyers by adjourning or postponing a case 
or by not turning up are well-known strategies to manage cases. If a 
magistrate is unlikely to give a favourable verdict, then delaying a case 
until the magistrate is transferred is a common ploy. Nidhi, one of my 
lawyer informants, confessed that delaying tactics are usually employed 
after an interim order is passed, and the woman has received some 
relief. ‘Delay’ was a legal strategy she herself employed; it was 
something of a ‘public secret’, rarely articulated but widely known. 
It would be inaccurate to view litigants in the Foucauldian 
sense as merely passive subjects whose time is manipulated and 
governed to create docile subjects. The daily engagement and 
governing of time by courts is not one-sided. The effects of delay reap 
benefits, even for those without power. To take the example of Zarna, 
her case was finally settled after her cross-examination started. Hina 
was pleased with the outcome, reiterating that the settlement was 
better than what she would have received from court. The settlement 
was an by-product of waiting. The delay in cases often results in an 
efficient settlement outside of court. Time is an efficient negotiator 
that makes a compromise between parties more palatable. A 
settlement that may have been less acceptable to parties earlier 
becomes more palatable with time. The settlement, as many of my 
lawyer informants suggested, may often be more in congruence with 
what parties seek than what the court may have granted.              
Magistrates actively encourage ‘settling’ cases outside the 
formal procedures of the trial. The settlement between parties takes 
place anytime during the trial, but is usually encouraged by the 
magistrates and lawyers after the interim relief has been granted and 
before final arguments and the production of evidence takes place – 
both very time-consuming stages. Courts often actively discourage 
prolongation of cases, and insist on them being ‘settled’. ‘Settling’ 
means when the parties concerned agree to the terms and conditions 
of a compromise, and in the court cases I followed it meant that the 
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female litigant would agree to close or withdraw the case from court. 
After a compromise is made, in cases like these typically the court 
closes the case file with a note indicating that the terms of the 
compromise are attached to the file.  
In a classic oft-quoted line from a 1990s Hindi film titled 
Damini (thunder), the movie climax ends with a disillusioned male 
lawyer breaking into a rhetorical speech on insaaf (justice) and tareeq 
(a legal postponement, literally ‘a date’) that encapsulates the decay of 
the legal system.326 In courtrooms bursting at the seams: “All we have 
is date after date, date after date … but not justice.” The movie, which 
is a story of one woman and a lawyer’s fight to get justice for a raped 
woman, revolves around how lawyers manipulate the legal system to 
delay cases and circumvent justice by taking later dates. It is a line that 
one of the women litigants quoted from the movie, “I didn’t get 
anything, except a date” (“Kuch nahi mila, sirf tareeq hi mili hai”), she 
said with a laugh. Thus, suggesting the similarities between her case 
and the ‘real’ court, and what happens in the fictional court in the 
movie. The movie though ends with a positive verdict that reinforces 
the faith of the audience in justice, as manipulative lawyers and a 
corrupt legal system are defeated.  
Yet, unlike the movie, the waiting for a tareeq is not a powerless 
position in courts for women who survive the system and the tareeq. 
Litigation, if anything, as Tara summed it up, is about who ‘breaks 
first’. The breaking point is caused by the long wait. It serves to 
encourage and provoke settlements between parties where otherwise 
nothing might have happened. Even in Meenakshi’s case, her 
complaint that “all the judge wants to give is a date” and the 
accompanying frustration played out in her favour at the time of 
negotiations with her husband. Not only did the settlement result in 
a favourable final outcome, she also managed to get her husband to 
agree to a divorce by mutual consent that was being contested in the 
Family Court. Despite her disappointment with the court, she 
received an interim relief of the sum she had demanded. Yet, the time 
spent waiting felt static and unmoving in respect to her case. Waiting 
characterises women’s entrapment in court where although time 
moves ahead, their cases are stuck in time and the everyday loops of 
bureaucratic court functioning. It is also important to consider that 
the women I interviewed for the study are women who socially and 
economically survived the wait. 
                                                             
326 Damini. 1993. Directed by Rajkumar Santoshi.  
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The modes of waiting in court have their own temporality that 
stand in contrast with the linear temporality of the textual law and the 
court time. Yet, it is the interaction between these different 
temporalities that produces the perception of ‘nothing happens’ in 
women as the many temporalities fail to coalesce and instead cause a 
seismic shift. The simultaneity of the ordinary court visits is against 
which the extraordinary happens. The everyday, much like in literary 
novels, is what you do not see, though it does move the story forward. 
At the same time, most women I interviewed had multiple cases going 
on either in the Family Court where divorce cases were pending or 
under Section 498A, where cases in criminal courts were ongoing. The 
multiplicity of cases in different courts that proceeded at different 
stages further added to the delay.  
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how it is the dialogic 
relation of various spatio-temporalities that influence women’s 
experience of time. The neat calendric movement of linear time, to 
draw on Bakhtin’s idea of chronotope, is not only arranged 
sequentially in literature but also functions in institutions like courts 
and in our day-to-day living. The cases I spoke about did in fact move 
forward, though not in the same spatiotemporal pace women expected 
it to. The delays that take place in court, the adjournments, are often 
instances of litigation strategy on both sides. What we also have to 
consider is that this temporality of court time, and the movement of 
time also has to be contextualised within the city of Mumbai, where 
time moves briskly. The constant refrain of the city’s residents about 
how no one has time in the city, and how time moves without noticing 
it, influences how these temporalities overlap and accentuate their 
perception of time. In courts, on the other hand, experience of time 
is static as day after day  where nothing appears to happens. Although, 




Chapter Six  
Conclusion 
 
In January 2014 when I visited the lower court for the first 
time, the objective was to study what happens to an internationally 
modelled law in courtrooms, and how does the wide definition of 
domestic violence and ascribing it a legal name alter how we talk about 
violence in intimate relationships. My focus in many ways changed, 
and yet it retained some of the original inquiries, that is, how law is 
transformed in the day-to-day dealings, and the essential variance 
between what law stipulates and what it becomes. What changed in 
my study is the focus on what does the ‘everyday’ do to law, and what 
the everyday of law is like. This attention on the micro and habitual of 
law changed some of the questions I started with, but not essentially 
the kind of conversations and questions I posed to litigants and 
lawyers. The focus of my research changed as undertaking a study 
where for the first few months I sat through all court proceedings in 
the lower court, and witnessed a handful of oral arguments, made me 
rephrase my initial inquiries. As a researcher waiting and taking notes 
of the ‘happenings’ and banal court proceedings, what happened in 
court was not open to immediate insights. It was the waiting, talking, 
listening and attending to what women litigants said and did not say, 
and what women litigants did, sometimes in contradiction to what 
they said, that provided the insights in this study.  
As Ingold observes, writing on anthropological knowledge 
production, “waiting upon things is precisely what it means to attend 
to them”.327 Participant observation, in this sense, is not underwritten 
with ‘objective’ insights into the workings of the law, nor do I claim to 
present authorised knowledge based on the data I collected, instead it 
is an insight into what and how I know, as well as the insights and 
knowledge I gained from talking to the women litigants, to lawyers 
about law, and from witnessing the everyday court proceedings.             
Participant observation, as Ingold has argued, is more than a 
research method, it is an ontological acknowledgement of “what we 
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are and what we know”. 328 This recording, listing and cataloguing of 
the ‘everyday’ in court also reinforced the characteristic response in 
my field notes that ‘nothing happened’. However, my notes recorded 
at length what happened in court day after day. This characteristic 
response that ‘nothing happens’, as I learnt, was critical to attend to. 
This insight may not have been achieved if I had focused on appellate 
court judgements. My initial interest in examining what happens to 
the Domestic Violence Act in courts was not a normative inquiry into 
how the Act was being implemented. Instead, it was in situating myself 
in the lower court where domestic violence cases were being 
adjudicated that everyday conditions, problems and possibilities of the 
law were revealed.     
I hope this study has demonstrated this disconnect between 
what the law is, and what women litigants seek and perceive it to be. 
Much of these initial expectations from the law, and what is sought 
from the Act emanates from stipulations and guarantees under the 
Domestic Violence Act. To give just one example, the disappointment 
with delay in courts stems from the stipulation that final relief may be 
granted within sixty days from the date of filing the application, a time-
frame that courts fail to meet. At the core of this, I argue, is a 
disconnect between the many meanings of what accessing law means. 
Does it mean merely physical access to courts, or does it imply relief 
granted by inducing settlement? Does accessing the law mean being 
granted relief in the stipulated time? Does a hearing in court suggest 
listening, or can written submissions qualify as being heard, even if 
women are not afforded the opportunity to articulate their grievances 
in court? I have attempted in this thesis to show what the law is and 
what accessibility to the law means in terms of day-to-day. What this 
accessibility means in law and in policy research, I argue, is vastly 
different from what accessibility means to litigants. If it was not for 
participant observation, my attention would not have been drawn to 
how the everyday is critical to this accessibility to the law and what it 
means. It is this everyday experience of the Act that essentially 
transforms it, so much so that, to borrow Baxi’s words, the Act bears 
little resemblance to itself.329  
                                                             
328 Susan MacDougall, “Enough about Ethnography: An Interview with Tim 
Ingold,” Cultural Anthropology, https://culanth.org/fieldsights/841-enough-
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329 Pratiksha Baxi makes a similar argument in her monograph on rape trials. 
For more, see Baxi, Public Secrets of Law. 
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In this concluding chapter, I will rehearse some of the key 
arguments and themes I examine in this thesis. I start with why does 
the everyday matter, and from there on, I proceed to reprise some of 
the main themes that this thesis has addressed. 
Why does the everyday matter? 
In this thesis, I have closely attended to this feeling of what ‘nothing 
happens’ means in the everyday context by employing Maurice 
Blanchot’s analysis on the everyday. In discussing the everyday, 
Blanchot specifically refers to the public street, in the context of a 
person using public spaces where seemingly a lot happens. Despite the 
rather obvious differences between the court and the street, for court 
users the day-to-day functioning of a court is similar to the street since 
in both a lot happens but little that is considered worthy or eventful 
enough to stand out. The street and the court thus have both obvious 
differences and latent similarities. Yet, for Blanchot it is not the nullity 
of the everyday life that gives meaning to the ‘not null’ moment; 
instead, it is in the quotidian that the possibilities of what can happen 
are revealed.330 As Blanchot writes, the elusive quality of the everyday 
is not easy to pin down, neither is it amenable to definitions and it 
lacks beginnings and endings. The everyday by its very nature is 
alienating.331 This, as I argue, is also the essence of everyday law, where 
despite being in court and seemingly ‘before the law’, it escapes and 
remains beyond our grasp. It is this essential nature of the everyday 
that forms the core of all the chapters in this thesis, where law, though 
accessible, remains unreachable and alienating. From the perspective 
of law, the seemingly apparent and taken for granted meanings of 
rights and guarantees are unsettled. So, what is a right to fair trial? Or, 
what does a hearing entail, or is the meaning of ‘reasonable time’ 
different for institutions as opposed to litigants. All these aspects are 
considered in this thesis.  
In my study I have examined the ‘right to hearing’ and what 
that means and what it translates into. The examination of the 
multiple ‘hearings’ explores the exact nature of what a hearing in law 
is, what it translates into in the everyday, and what its significance in 
the day-to-day activity of the court is. The sunwayi (hearing) that the 
women litigants in my study referred to denoted a different kind of 
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hearing than the one intended by law, namely the right to a fair trial. 
Hearing is, as I argue, an embodied experience.  
This perceptible feeling of nothing happens since nothing 
registers in the everyday of court visits, is also as I argue how silence 
surrounding the nature of violence suffered by women is traded for 
civil reliefs. ‘Nothing happens’ is thus characteristic of the ‘silencing’ 
of the nature of violence that women coming before the court have 
suffered. Interim and final arguments, in the lower court I studied, are 
centred around the relief sought, but they fail to represent and 
catalogue the kind of violence that the women have suffered. Rarely 
during my fieldwork in the lower court did I witness arguments that 
appealed to the court or drew the attention of the Magistrate to the 
kind of violence a claimant had suffered. If the violence suffered was 
emphasised, it was largely to  justify separation or combat the frequent 
request of the man to live with the woman again, and to make a 
compromise. This silencing of violence, with a view to gaining civil 
reliefs, is the direct opposite of the primary objective for which a law 
addressing and naming ‘domestic violence’ was originally enacted. 
As claiming reliefs becomes significant, the violence that 
women have suffered is no longer represented by means of oral 
arguments. Lawyers are concerned with ensuring that their clients are 
granted reliefs, but the verbalising of ‘violence’ in courtrooms does not 
necessarily improve their chances. The silencing of violence also means 
that the law ‘looks away’ and does not attend to the kind of violence 
women have suffered. Moreover, despite bringing cases of domestic 
violence to court, monetary orders and residence orders are frequently 
violated by male partners without any consequences. In Chapter Five, 
I wrote about Meenakshi, who in describing her court journey 
articulated that her husband’s violence continued after filing the case. 
In addition, his violation of the residence and protection order 
granted by the court did had no consequences, even though the Act 
stipulates that a breach of a protection order or an interim protection 
order is an offence under the Act.332  
Waiting  
In this thesis I have paid attention to the waiting experiences women 
describe. How women wait, and how they deal with constant delays, 
                                                             
332 Section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act stipulates that a breach of a 
protection order or an interim protection order by the respondent is an 
offence under the Act, and is either punishable with imprisonment for up to 
a year or with a fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.   
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adjournments and the uncertainty of being in courts reveals where the 
power resides in the practice of law, and what the effects of that power 
are. What does judicial delay feel like, and what does it do? I examine 
‘waiting’ and how women litigants and lawyers deal with ‘judicial 
delay’ in courts, and how this correlates to the hierarchal nature of 
accessing courts, where people who do not wait are people whose time 
is supposedly of value as opposed to those who wait. This demonstrates 
the effects of power and knowledge, as the powerful do not wait. Along 
similar lines as Pratiksha Baxi, I argue that understanding this 
seemingly commonplace practice in the lower court is important in 
the project of law reform. Thus, I catalogue and analyse the uneventful 
waiting of women litigants. In research on judicial delay, no attention 
has been paid to waiting and how this waiting is negotiated, or how it 
influences women’s perception of law. Judicial delay essentially reveals 
what law is and what law does. 
As I have demonstrated, day-to-day visits to courts where cases 
are adjourned to a later date represent spatio-temporal sites where 
power is negotiated. It is here that what I call ‘formalised settlements’ 
are compelled and cajoled from the litigants by judges and lawyers 
alike. It is also the day-to-day social and economic factors of a case that 
drags on that reign in the will of women to continue with a case and 
reinforce the ineffectiveness of coming before the court. Everyday 
socio-economic factors have a bearing on how the Act responds to 
what women seek in court. Whether women are heard in courts or not 
is also a question of what kind of lawyer they can afford. Also, access 
to courts is not merely contingent on whether women have the 
financial ability, it is also whether they have the social, cultural and 
economic capacity to wait in courts. Not all women wait in the same 
way, and not all the conditions and circumstances of their waiting are 
the same.  
Thus, I argue that the everyday must be taken into 
consideration when policy debates on judicial reform and judicial 
delay are made. The quotidian and mundane aspects of law provide 
insights into how courts function in daily practice, and instead of 
finding solutions to judicial delay in digitisation or increasing the 
number of judges, attention to what takes place in courts compels us 
to take a more nuanced approach when dealing with delay in court 
cases. This delay is common even in alternative dispute resolution 
forums, as they are besieged by similar problems as formal courts, and 
their effectiveness is arguable. The quality of ‘hearing’ and resolving 
conflicts in informal dispute resolution tribunals has been questioned 
by scholars. Jayanth Krishnan and Marc Galanter describe informal 
tribunals as “debased informalism” that continue to perpetuate the 
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same problems that affect the formal courts in India. Suggestions have 
been made to decongest courts and create an efficient justice 
mechanism focused on speedy trials by means of informal courts. 
However, in practice  this ‘speedy’ justice system would exclude rural 
citizens without resolving the core problem, namely an excessively 
litigious government whose cases crowd the already congested 
courts.333 The presumption that access to justice can be achieved by 
instilling temporal efficiency, reducing litigation costs, and improving 
speediness fails to interrogate what ‘access’ or ‘justice’ mean. The 
settling of cases inside and outside of formal courts is illustrative of 
what Laura Nader has called “trading justice for harmony”, where the 
concern is not ‘justice’ but eliminating what are considered ‘garbage 
cases’ in court.334 This is symptomatic of how the court responds to 
backlogged cases by coercing mediation between parties and hence 
‘silencing disputes’, instead of reaching a solution via an adversarial 
process.335 The long-drawn-out court cases, along with a complicated 
and circuitous legal system, and the inability of the lower courts to 
discipline lawyers who employ delaying tactics, adds to 
inaccessibility.336  
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As the preceding chapters show, the everyday is not the same 
for all. The everyday in court is busy, and full of activity for lawyers as 
time is scarce and they have to constantly juggle multiple matters in 
different courts. When ‘nothing happens’ then is a question for whom 
does ‘nothing happen’; lawyers for one do not describe their visits to 
courts in these terms. Lawyers are cognizant of the power of the 
everyday and how the everyday is key to negotiations and settlements 
in courts. This power that the everyday yields on women’s lives when 
setting later dates compels and enforces ‘settlements’. When Blanchot 
asks for whom nothing happens, he is referring to this intersubjective 
nature of the everyday.  
Articulating violence in the everyday  
The discourse on misuse of the Act surfaces in conversations with 
lawyers and litigants alike. Such discourse often alters how facts are 
constituted and how narratives of violence are framed when seeking 
relief in courts. I argue that the challenge of straddling the 
contradictory positions of being a victim and a witness to their own 
violence exposes women’s testimonies to constant doubt. The everyday 
creeps in the way in which violence is spoken about. The articulation 
of violence in the language of ‘one-slap’ cases, for example, normalises 
‘everyday’ violence as not worthy of reporting and cataloguing, and 
therefore not worthy of coming to court for. As this everyday kind of 
violence is often considered banal, it can escape notice or be thought 
of as the kind of violence that does not deserve attention. It is also the 
kind of violence that might not placed on evidentiary record, such as 
medical bill receipts or prescription for burns or injury, or brutal 
violence that needs medical intervention, or violence that deserves 
police intervention. I particularly look at the discourse of misuse, and 
how women grapple with this constant doubt about and accusation of 
misuse of the Act. It is, as feminist lawyers have argued, the essential 
‘use’ of the law by women that is termed ‘misuse’.  
This doubt is implicated in the ‘legal sensing’ lawyers refer to 
in identifying ‘real’ victims. I explore the implicated nature of legal 
sensing that lawyers refer to, and how this legal sensing is aligned with 
legal categories and definitions stipulated under the Domestic 
Violence Act, where claims of ‘brutal violence’ resonate with the 
‘aggrieved person’ category under the Act, but also a particular sensing 
body of the lawyer. This accessibility to the law, and meeting 
evidentiary requirements place the burden on how facts are 
constituted, and how narratives of violence are framed to appeal to 




In this thesis, I have analysed the ‘everyday’ and the law in light 
of the everyday, as it is key to the questions and inquiries I have 
pursued in my study. This focus on the everyday has been both an 
ontological and a methodological commitment to the everyday as 
integral to our lives and to the accessibility of law. In the absence of 
accessibility, new laws and enactments will have no effect. Other than 
physical, economic, linguistic and timely access, accessibility is also 
when claims of violence are taken seriously and foregrounded in court 
arguments, as opposed to the Domestic Violence Act merely serving as 
a relief-claiming mechanism. The objective of the law is also to alter 
the conversations on violence, and the normalisation of violence in 
the domestic space. Courtrooms where accusations of women 
misusing the law and questioning claims of violence are commonplace, 
undermine violence and categorise some violence as worthy of legal 
action and others as ‘false’ or misusing the law. Accessibility in the case 
of women claiming violence in intimate relationships also means a 
recognition of a wrongdoing. To take the example of Preeti, in seeking 
a landmark judgement in her case, she was claiming recognition of the 
violence committed against her (see Chapter Five). This accessibility to 
law requires that debates on violence and courtroom talk take 
cognizance of the violence suffered, as opposed to the current 
emphasis on disposing of cases by settlement. 
The question of settlement and disposal of cases so far has 
focused on court backlogs as the main reason to push for settlements. 
The lawyers I spoke to, on the other hand, argued that settlements 
often result in better monetary relief, and save litigants’ time and 
money. So, for instance, Hina argued that settling outside court is 
beneficial to all parties, reasoning that: “I charge a lump sum amount 
for a case. This means that in order to sustain my practice I have to 
take more clients. Also, the case drags on and does not benefit the 
woman. Settlement is the best thing.”337 Lawyers that charge for each 
hearing may have a different approach, she argued, since each hearing 
is beneficial to them. Thus, for lawyers and courts ‘settling matters’ is 
beneficial in terms of time. When the main focus is on civil relief, 
questions on violence are silenced.   
Of the eight women litigants I closely followed, Simran, Zarna 
and Meenakshi all had their cases ‘settled’ by August 2015. In all cases, 
several attempts were made to settle the case prior to the final 
arguments and the cross-examination of the parties. In Zarna’s case, 
for instance, her husband finally agreed to the lumpsum monetary 
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payment and compensation amount she sought after the cross-
examination took place. Similarly, Meenakshi and Simran both 
received the monetary relief they sought under the Act. In Meenakshi’s 
case, she was granted the right to live in the shared household with her 
children and monetary relief for both children in her custody, while 
the husband was forced to vacate the house. Owing to the ongoing 
case and the number of times Meenakshi’s husband had to attend 
court for the case and ask for leave of absence from his place of work, 
her husband had lost his job, and had been forced to move to another 
city for work. Farzana’s case was close to a settlement, Hina intimated 
to me, articulating with her usual confidence ‘ho jayega’ (it will 
happen). It was only Preeti who received a favourable court verdict in 
record time. In Swagata’s case the matter had not progressed much 
since we last met in December 2014. Her cross-examination was still 
pending, largely because her parents-in-law had deep enough pockets 
to appeal the interim relief she had been granted by the lower court, 
and continue with the case. Nidhi was convinced the matter would go 
to the High Court. Likewise, for Sameera, whose case was ‘stuck’, her 
husband had failed to comply with the court monetary orders without 
any consequences or had not even provided for their underage son, 
despite many demands for payment of arrears. When I met Sameera 
in August 2015, she was still living with her brother and studying in 
order to financially support herself and provide for her five-year-old 
son. Sharon, I was informed, was close to receiving an order. Flavia 
Agnes, a lawyer working on women’s rights has argued that the 
Domestic Violence Act has largely failed women owing to the lack of 
implementation and the mistake of locating its jurisdiction in 
magistrates’ courts (as opposed to Family Courts), where magistrates 
lack sensitivity and fail to understand the urgency of protection orders 
and have little experience of dealing with civil claims in family matters. 
Thus, ‘settlements’ where women’s consent is a prerequisite for the 
settlement are disregarded or given little consideration. 338  
Hence, for many women litigants, the only way ‘something 
happened’ was through settlements. Settlement was a way out of the 
drudgery of long-drawn-out trials for both judges and litigants. The 
long and interrupted process of trials, where women typically spent an 
average of three years in courts made an interim relief granted in their 
                                                             
338 For more, see Flavia Agnes and Audrey D’Mello, “Protection of Women 





favour pale. After spending more than two years in court, an exit from 
court by ‘settling’ was a better alternative, as it was both temporally 
and economically efficient. But as Basu writes in her monograph on 
mediation, settlements fail to address the issue of violence. Under the 
Domestic Violence Act the focus is on reliefs, not on adjudicating 
violence, despite the fact that it is the first law that provides a broad 
and comprehensive definition of domestic violence. The settlements 
that women are often forced to make owing to economic reasons and 
temporal delays is contrary to the expectations with which women file 
claims under the law. Moreover, the nature of ‘settling’ and 
compromise defeats the intent of the law, where women often have to 
concede to terms that may be inequitable, or contrary to what they 
seek from the Act. Compromise, as it is generally called, obliterates 
any sense of empowerment that seeking relief under the law may have 
achieved. Basu writes that in Family Courts, mediation erases the 
reality of violence and anger in violence cases. This was evident in 
many cases where one party refuses to settle or finds the terms of 
settlements in contradiction to the rights under the Act.  
I often heard Magistrates and lawyers persuading litigants to 
‘settle’, with reassurances like: “Truth will prevail in the higher court” 
or “For how long will you fight? Leave something for the next life,” 
Tara often cajoled her clients. Yet, settling, although a compromise, 
makes ‘justice’ more accessible by reducing the length that cases drag 
on and by providing relief to parties. The Domestic Violence Act 
promised easy access to the law, with multiple stakeholders and an easy 
to complete form that iterates violence only have to be checked in a 
tick box for the kind of violence and nature of relief that is sought. 
Access to courts, though, is far more complicated. Does access imply 
an unmediated lawyer-free access to courts, or a law that promises 
quick relief? Or does it mean an opportunity to argue your own case 
and air your grievances in ‘plain language’? Access to justice, as women 
litigants have discovered, often means negotiating under the shadow 
of law, that is, where the law becomes a site of contestation under 
which a compromise is struck. The compromise may be far removed 
from the law’s original intent. Scholars like Basu have argued that the 
law reforms lobbied by feminists provide little guarantee that the 
justice they envisioned will be achieved in courts.339 
The focus on judicial reform needs to pay heed not only to the 
completion of cases, but to how women are forced to wait and how 
they endure this waiting. In practice, the conditions of waiting, such 
                                                             
339 Basu, “Judges of Normality.” 
173 
 
as the lack of toilets or lack of access to resting places for women and 
children who travel long distances to get to court, are often gruelling. 
The lack of an affordable or a subsidised canteen is another issue. On 
the face of it, these appear to be merely infrastructural changes, but 
they deny equal space to litigants in courts. The issuing of a date for 
cases similarly takes into consideration what is amenable to the court 
and lawyers, while working women who cannot always come to court 
on account of their work are often humiliated with remarks such as, 
“You should have thought about this before filing the case.” Such 
treatment reinforces the undesirability and shame associated with 
bringing families to court.   
In this thesis I have attended to questions relating to 
accessibility, and what accessibility means in law means in the everyday 
context in order to respond to questions that were raised in my 
fieldwork. Hence I have addressed issues concerning delay and the 
nature and conditions of a hearing and of waiting. More specifically, 
my analysis of legislative and judicial reform takes into consideration 
what court users say and think, as opposed to paying sole attention to 
doctrinal law and appellate judgements. The objective of conducting a 
participant observation study of the law, and its adjudicatory site was 
to pay attention to, and to an extent respond to, what women litigants 
and lawyers say and do.340 Equally, it was to observe and lend attention 
to what they do not say, and do not do.  
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